Casa Grande, AZ, USA
N555FV
BEECH E90
The lineman who spoke with the pilot/owner of the accident airplane before its departure reported that the pilot stated that he and the flight instructor were going out to practice for about an hour. The flight instructor had given the pilot/owner his initial instruction in the airplane and flew with the pilot/owner regularly. The flight instructor had also given the pilot/owner about 58 hours of dual instruction in the accident airplane. The pilot/owner had accumulated about 51 hours of pilot-in-command time in the airplane make and model. It is likely that the pilot/owner was the pilot flying. Several witnesses reported observing the accident sequence. One witness reported seeing the airplane pull up into vertical flight, bank left, rotate nose down, and then impact the ground. One witness reported observing the airplane go from east to west, turn sharply, and then go north of the runway. He subsequently saw the airplane hit the ground. One witness, who was a pilot, stated that he observed the airplane enter a left bank and then a nose-down attitude of about 75 degrees at an altitude of about 300 feet above ground level, which was too low to recover. It is likely that the pilot was attempting a go-around and pitched up the airplane excessively and subsequently lost control, which resulted in the airplane impacting flat desert terrain about 100 feet north of the active runway at about the midfield point in a steep nose-down, left-wing-low attitude. The airplane was destroyed by postimpact forces and thermal damage. All components necessary for flight were accounted for at the accident site. A postaccident examination of the airframe and both engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, an examination of both propellers revealed rotational scoring and twisting of the blades consistent with there being power during the impact sequence. No anomalies were noted with either propeller that would have precluded normal operation. Toxicological testing of the pilot was negative for drugs and alcohol. The flight instructor's toxicology report revealed the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). Given the elevated levels of metabolite in the urine and kidney, the absence of quantifiable THC in the urine, and the low level of THC in the kidney and liver, it is likely that the flight instructor most recently used marijuana at least several hours before the accident. However, the effects of marijuana use on the flight instructor's judgment and performance at the time of the accident could not be determined. A review of the flight instructor's personal medical records indicated that he had a number of medical conditions that would have been grounds for denying his airman medical certificate. The ongoing treatment of his conditions with more than one sedating benzodiazepine, including oxazepam, simultaneously would also likely not have been allowed. However, none of the prescribed, actively sedating medications were found in the flight instructor's tissues, and oxazepam was only found in the urine, which suggests that the flight instructor used the medication many hours and possibly several days before the accident. The toxicology findings indicate that the flight instructor likely did not experience any impairment from the benzodiazepine medication itself; however, the cognitive effects from the underlying mood disturbance could not be determined.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On February 6, 2013, about 1135 mountain standard time, a Beechcraft E-90, N555FV, was destroyed following a loss of control during an attempted go-around and impact with terrain at the Casa Grande Airport (CGZ), Casa Grande, Arizona. The certified private pilot, who was the registered owner and occupied the left pilot seat, and the airline transport pilot/certified flight instructor (CFI) who occupied the right pilot seat, sustained fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and no flight plan was filed. The reported local instructional flight was conducted in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The flight departed the Marana Regional Airport (AVQ) , Marana, Arizona, about 1030. In a statement provided to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge, the Chief of Line Service at the fixed based operation where the airplane was based reported that after pulling the airplane out of the hangar, the CFI indicated that the airplane would not need to be fueled. The CFI stated that there was enough fuel on board, and that they were only going to be out for an hour. The lineman said that shortly thereafter, the pilot/owner arrived and began a preflight of the airplane. The pilot stated that he and the CFI were just going out to practice for an hour or so, and then asked that ground power be applied. The pilot added that they had plenty of fuel for what they were going to do. The lineman stated that the airplane departed AVQ between 1015 and 1030. Four witnesses to the accident provided written statements to the IIC relative to their observations of the accident sequence: Witness #1, a local fire fighter, reported that upon hearing his partner yell an expletive, he looked up and saw a white airplane with blue or dark green stripes pull up into a vertical flight, bank left, then rotate down nose first. The witness stated that he heard the engines as it banked up and over, and it sounded as if [they were] under full power. The witness opined that the airplane impacted the ground in a vertical fashion and burst into flames. Witness #2, a captain/paramedic for the local fire department, reported that while on the second story balcony at the CGZ fire station and looking to the west, he observed the belly of a twin propeller airplane banking straight up, going from west to east, turning sharply, and then going down to the north of the runway. The witness stated that the plane hit the ground and burst into flames, which was followed by a huge explosion. Witness #3 stated that he was riding his bicycle at the airport, and as he looked toward the direction of runway 5 he observed a twin engine aircraft in a left hand bank and a nose down attitude of about 75 degrees, at an altitude of about 300 feet [above ground level]. The witness, himself a pilot, felt the aircraft was too low to recover, and subsequently watched it crash, after which he reported the accident to the CGZ fire department. Witness #4 reported that she watches many airplanes perform "touch down and take off" practice, and that the accident airplane did not appear to be anything different until she noticed something in the sound of the engine. She stated, "It became too quiet, as if the engine had stopped completely." The witness stated that the airplane seemed to be on a normal route for touchdown, then the dirt flew up and she thought the plane went off the runway. She added that while she watched the dirt clear she heard a pop like a tire blowing, then saw the explosion. A postaccident on-site examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane was destroyed following impact with flat, dirt-covered terrain located about 150 feet west of runway 5 (5,200 feet in length by 100 feet in width), and about 120 feet south of the 2000-foot distance remaining marker. Impact orientation was on a measured magnetic heading of about 050 degrees. The airplane came to rest on a measured magnetic heading of about 135 degrees at an elevation of 1,452 feet mean sea level. The wreckage area measured about 175 feet east to west, and about 75 feet north to south. The airplane, which was destroyed by a combination of severe impact forces and thermal damage, was recovered to a secured storage facility for further examination. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Pilot #No. 1 The left-front seat pilot, age 65, possessed a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) private pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. His most recent FAA third-class airman medical certificate was issued on November 13, 2012, with the limitation "must wear corrective lenses." A review of the pilot's personal logbooks revealed that the most recent entry was made on December 15, 2012, about two months prior to the accident flight. The last entry, which was in the accident airplane, totaled 2.2 hours of dual instruction received from the accident CFI. The logbook review further revealed that the pilot had accumulated a total time of 1,079 flight hours in all aircraft, 663 flight hours in multiengine airplanes, and 112 flight hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane. The pilot listed about 51 hours as pilot in command of the accident airplane. It was also revealed that prior to the purchase of the accident airplane, the pilot had owned a Cessna 414 multiengine airplane, in which he had accumulated a total of 551 hours. According to an aviation insurance application, the pilot indicated that his most recent biennial flight review was completed on October 19, 2012. Pilot #No. 2 The right-front seat pilot, age 51, possessed an airline transport pilot certificate for airplane multiengine land, commercial privileges for airplane single-engine land, a certified flight instructor certificate for airplane single-engine and multiengine, and instrument airplanes, and a basic ground instructor certificate. His most recent FAA second-class airman medical certificate was issued on October 22, 2012, with the limitation "must wear corrective lenses." A review of the pilot's personal logbooks revealed that the last entry was made on October 25, 2012. As of this date, the logbook review revealed that the pilot had accumulated a total flight time in all aircraft of 8,552 hours, 2,787 hours in multiengine airplanes, 325 hours in the accident airplane make and model, 58 hours of dual instruction given to the left-seat private pilot in the accident airplane. The pilot's logbook also revealed that he had completed his most recent flight review on November 8, 2012. Training records supplied to the NTSB IIC by SIMCOM Training Centers of Scottsdale, Arizona, revealed that the pilot had completed his most recent Beechcraft King Air B200 Recurrent course with C90 Differences training on November 9, 2012. Total simulator time was recorded as 3 hours. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The Beech E90 twin-engine airplane, serial number LW-248, manufactured in 1977, was a high performance, low wing, of semi-monocoque construction. The airplane was equipped with dual controls for the left and right pilot positions. The airplane was powered by two 750-horsepower Pratt & Whitney PT6A-34 engines (left engine serial number RB0274; right engine serial number RB0186). The most recent inspection of both engines, performed in compliance with a Phase 1-2 per the Beechcraft Maintenance Manual, occurred on December 6, 2012. At that time records revealed a time since new (TSN) of 1,013.0 hours for the left engine, a TSN of 1,491.7 hours for the right engine. At the time of the inspections the aircraft's total airframe time was 8,345.4 hours, and a Hobbs time of 2,418.4 hours. The airplane was equipped with 3-bladed, Hartzell HC-B3TN-3B propellers. Both propellers underwent their most recent maintenance on December 6, 2012, in accordance with Phase 1-2 of the Beechcraft Maintenance Manual. The airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on September 6, 1977. METEROROLOGICAL INFORMATION At 1835, the CGZ Automated Weather Observation System reported, wind 190 degrees at 4 knots, visibility 10 miles, temperature 17° Celsius (C), dew point 7° C, and an altimeter setting of 29.97 inches of mercury. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The airplane impacted terrain in a steep nose down, left wing low attitude, and was destroyed by impact and thermal damage. A post-recovery examination of the wreckage by representatives from Beechcraft, Pratt & Whitney, and Hartzell Propellers, overseen by the NTSB IIC and representative from the FAA revealed the following: Airframe Examination The aft fuselage and empennage sections had separated from the main fuselage section by impact forces and postimpact fire. The empennage remained attached to the aft fuselage by flight control and flight trim control cables only. The right stabilizer and elevator were consumed by postimpact fire. The elevator and rudder bellcranks and assemblies were visible and exhibited thermal and impact damage. The vertical stabilizer, rudder, left elevator, left stabilizer and the aft fuselage area remained attached and displayed postimpact fire and impact damage. All control cables were intact and were cut during the retrieval process. The right elevator trim actuator remained attached by control cables only and remained attached to a fragment of the rear spar. The right elevator trim actuator extension measured 0.75 inches in length, which equates to 14 degrees tab down (nose up trim). The right elevator trim control rod was fractured. The cables remained attached to the drum. The right elevator balance weight was found in the main wreckage and was exposed to postimpact fire and was partially melted. The left elevator trim actuator remained attached to the stabilizer and elevator. The control cables remained attached to the drum. The left elevator trim actuator extension was 0.75 inches in length, which equates to 14 degrees tab down (nose up trim). The leading edge boot was burned away, and the paint was burned and bubbled. The elevator remained attached at all hinges. The elevator trim surface remained attached at the piano hinge. The left elevator balance weight remained attached and was not fire damaged. The rudder remained attached to the rudder bellcrank and the two mounting hinges. The rudder trim actuator rod extension measured 8.875 inches, which equates to a near neutral tab position. The rudder trim actuator remained attached to the rudder and the rudder trim actuator rod remained attach to the rudder trim tab. The rudder trim chain remained attached to the actuator gear, and the chain remained attached to the control cables. Both primary rudder control cables remained attached to the rudder bellcrank. Both rudder return springs remained attached to the bellcrank. The vertical stabilizer was mostly consumed by postimpact fire and remained attached to the aft bulkhead. The forward spar of the vertical stabilizer was burned through, and the aft spar remained attached. The inboard portion of the right wing was consumed by postimpact fire, while the outboard section of the wing remained attached to the airframe by the aileron cables only; the cables were cut for retrieval purposes. The right wing was burned away with about 12 feet remaining of the outboard section. The outboard portion of the aileron was thermally damaged. Sixty-six inches of the aileron remained intact. The aileron control rod remained attached to the aileron, and the aileron control cables remained attached to the bellcrank. Both aileron control cables were pulled by hand and actuation of the bellcrank and the aileron were observed. The aileron remained attached to the center and outboard hinges. The inboard hinge remained attached to the rear spar. The ground adjustable tab remained attached to the aileron. The leading edge of the right wing tip displayed compression damage measuring 42 inches in length. The right flap was not observed. The outboard 7 feet of the left wing, excluding the wing tip, was thermally damaged. The left aileron had separated from the wing. It was intact with impact damage, and displayed leading edge compression damage at all three hinge points. Spanwise compression damage was displayed on the outboard end. The mounting structure of the wing remained attached to all three hinges; each hinge remained attached to the aileron. The aileron trim tab actuator separated from the trim tab and was found in its relative position on the left wing. The trim cable remained attached to the drum. The actuator rod extension measured 1.25 inches, which equated to about 2.8 degrees tab up (roll right). According to the HBC representative, neutral aileron trim would measure 1.17 inches on the actuator rod, and 5 degree deflection would measure 1.31 inches. The left flap was not observed. The cabin and cockpit areas were both destroyed, with extreme fragmentation observed. Both of the pilot's outboard yoke control horns were observed separated and exhibited impact and thermal damage. Both yokes were loose in their sleeves and were removed easily from the console. The left yoke control column shaft had separated and was about 19 inches in length. The left horn of the left yoke had also separated. Additionally, the right horn of the right yoke had also separated. The right yoke control column shaft was observed separated, and was about 5 1/2 inches in length. Both control column sleeves were deformed to the left and forward in direction. Both left and right control horns were sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for examination and analysis in an effort to determine the failure mode of each. All cockpit panel instrumentation was destroyed by thermal and impact damage. The landing gear handle was bent to the left and appeared to be midway between the extended and retracted positions. The flap selector was in the full flap extended position. The elevator trim wheel had thermal discoloration and deformation. The indicator read about 14 units on the side scale. The indicator arrow was burned away and the indication was estimated by rivet placement on the surrounding structure. The aileron trim wheel indicator read about zero. The rudder trim wheel indicator read about 1 unit yaw left. The power control quadrant was observed, with the left power lever and left propeller lever positioned aft of their associated right power lever and propeller lever. Both left and right condition levers were observed in the full forward position. The right main landing gear had separated from the fuselage and was found lying to the left front of the wreckage area. The left main landing gear remained attached to the fuselage and was observed to be in the down and locked position. The examination of the airframe revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Engine Examinations Both the left and right engines displayed contact signatures to their internal components characteristic of engines producing symmetrical power at the time of impact, likely in the mid to upper power range. Left Engine The engine was a Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-34 model, serial number PCE RB0274. The engine was attached to the engines mounts and partially attached to the firewall. The engine was consumed by post impact thermal damage and the propeller assembly and portion of the front reduction gearbox had separated from the core. The propeller blades exhibited chordwise scratches, twisting and bending to the aft. One propeller blade was separated at the hub. The propeller spinner was partially attached and the propeller and over speed governor were attached by engine tubing. The exhaust duct was crushed inward and partially deformed on the bottom portion. The exhaust stacks were deformed and crushed aft and the left exhaust stack exhibited a small outward penetration on the upper portion. The gas generator case exhibited compression deformation and all of the inlet case struts were fractured. The engine was separated at the C flange. The upstream and downstream faces of the compressor turbine discs and blades exhibited deformation and rubbing. The power turbine and baffle exhibited rubs on b
The pilot’s loss of control of the airplane after pitching it excessively nose up during a go-around, which resulted in a subsequent aerodynamic stall/spin.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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