Fredericksburg, TX, USA
N6197H
CESSNA 182T
The private pilot obtained an abbreviated weather briefing and departed on a cross-country flight. While en route, an air traffic controller queried the pilot if he had the current weather information for his destination airport. The pilot acknowledged that he did. The pilot then requested vectors for a VOR DME-A instrument approach, but the controller was unable to give vectors and cleared the pilot direct to the initial approach fix (the VOR). The controller then informed the pilot that he was "constantly" 300-400 feet below his assigned altitude and reissued the local altimeter setting before clearing him for the approach. About a minute later, the pilot canceled his instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan when he was about 3-4 miles north of the VOR. The controller acknowledged the cancellation and approved a frequency change. There were no further communications or transmissions between the pilot and air traffic control. A review of radar data revealed that the airplane traveled on a southerly heading toward the VOR. An airport employee heard the pilot announce over the UNICOM frequency that he was crossing over the VOR and transitioning from IFR to visual flight rules flight; however, the weather at the airport was reported to be 1.5 miles visibility. A witness saw the airplane flying very slowly toward the airport about 200 feet above the ground when the engine suddenly stopped. The witness lost sight of the airplane but did see a plume of black smoke a few moments later. The airplane impacted terrain about 1 mile east-southeast of the airport in a nose-low attitude, consistent with a stall/spin. Postaccident examination of the airplane and engine found no preaccident mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Although a witness reported that the engine stopped, there was no evidence during postaccident examinations corroborating this. It is likely that the pilot, during his transition from instrument to visual flight while still in instrument conditions, did not ensure that the airplane maintained adequate airspeed.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn May 9, 2013, approximately 1315 central daylight time, N6197H, a Cessna 182T, was destroyed when it collided with terrain while on approach into Gillespie County Airport (T82), Fredericksburg, Texas. The private pilot and the passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to a private company and operated by Spinks Flight Center in Fort Worth, Texas. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight that originated at Fort Worth Spinks Airport (FWS), Fort Worth, Texas, about 1104, and was destined for T82. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the personal flight conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The pilot and his wife were traveling to Fredericksburg, Texas, to celebrate their wedding anniversary. According to an employee at Spinks Flight Center, the couple was scheduled to depart at 0800, but did not arrive at the airport until 0940. After they arrived and loaded their luggage in the airplane, the wife stepped outside and talked on the phone for about 20-30 minutes. As the pilot waited, he talked to one of the employees about the weather en route to Fredericksburg and their weekend plans. According to a representative of Lockheed Martin, the pilot had contacted the Lockheed Martin Flight Service Station in Fort Worth, Texas, at 0845 and obtained an abbreviated weather briefing. He also filed an IFR flight plan. A review of air traffic control communications revealed the pilot departed FWS about 1104. As he approached the Fredericksburg area, he was communicating with the Houston Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). At 1255, a controller asked the pilot if he had the current weather information for T82, and the pilot acknowledged that he did. The pilot then requested vectors for the VOR DME-A instrument approach into the airport. The controller was unable to give vectors and cleared the pilot direct to the Stonewall VOR, which was the initial approach fix for the approach. The controller then informed the pilot that he was "constantly" 300-400 feet below his assigned altitude of 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl) and reissued the local altimeter setting. At 1310, the controller advised the pilot to descend and maintain 4,100 feet msl until he was established on the approach and then he was cleared for the approach. At 1311, the pilot canceled his IFR flight plan when he was approximately 3-4 miles north of the Stonewall VOR (about 11 miles from the airport). The controller acknowledged the cancellation and approved a frequency change. There was no further communications or transmissions between the pilot and air traffic control. A review of radar data revealed the airplane proceeded on a southerly heading to the Stonewall VOR before the data ended at 1313:50. At that time the airplane was about 1 mile north of the VOR at an altitude of 3,700 feet msl. An employee at Fredericksburg Airport monitored the pilot's flight via an online flight tracking program. She said she was surprised the pilot had even departed due to the weather. Though the employee never talked to the pilot directly, she did hear him make a radio call as he approached the Fredericksburg airport over the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). The pilot announced that he was over the Stonewall VOR and transitioning from IFR to visual flight rules (VFR). The employee said the weather at the time was 800 feet overcast and the visibility was 7 to 10 miles. It was not windy, storming, or raining at the time. A witness, who lived approximately ¼-mile east of the crash site and had once worked as an aircraft mechanic, said he was walking up his driveway to the mailbox, when he first saw the airplane. He said it was initially traveling to the south and then it turned and headed west toward the airport. The witness said the airplane was approximately 200 feet above the ground; in level flight, and "moving very slowly." He was unable to estimate the airplane's speed, but said it was much slower than what he'd expect a Cessna on approach to be. The witness said that the airplane's engine was operating normally until it flew over his street and suddenly "stopped." The witness did not see the airplane impact terrain but later saw a large plume of black smoke and saw rescue personnel responding to the scene. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot held a private pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land, and instrument airplane. His last Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Third Class medical was issued on February 14, 2012. At that time he reported a total of 162 hours. The pilot's logbook was found in the wreckage but sustained extensive fire and water damage. Based on what information was readable, the pilot had a total of 175.7 total hours. However, his overall instrument flight experience could not be determined. A review of dispatch records provided by Spinks Flight Center revealed the pilot completed a biennial flight review (BFR) on October 25, 2012. After the BFR, he flew a total of 8.2 hours prior to the accident. The records also indicated the pilot had a total of 18.1 hours in the accident airplane prior to the accident. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONWeather at Gillespie County Airport at 1315 was reported as visibility 1.5 miles, calm wind, heavy drizzle, clouds broken 800 feet, overcast 1,300 feet, temperature 69 degrees, dewpoint 68 degrees, and an altimeter setting of 29.97 inches of mercury. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONA postaccident on-scene examination of the airplane was conducted on May 10-11, 2013, by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Investigator-in-Charge (IIC). The airplane came to rest upright in a pasture on a magnetic heading of 300 degrees about 1 mile east-southeast of the Fredericksburg airport. The main wreckage, which consisted of the cockpit, fuselage, empennage, tail section, engine, left wing, and right main landing gear, came to rest at the base of small mesquite trees. A post impact fire consumed portions of the cockpit, fuselage and aft cargo area of the main wreckage. The right wing, nose gear, left landing gear, and the three-bladed propeller assembly separated from the airframe. The right wing came to rest about 30-feet to the right of the main wreckage and the propeller assembly came to rest just forward of where the main wreckage came to rest. The nose wheel came to rest approximately 100-feet behind the main wreckage and the left main gear was found about 60-feet to the right of the main wreckage. All major components of the airplane were accounted for at the site. A 20-foot-long ground scar was found several feet to the left of the main wreckage and had a small impact crater at the far end of the scar and another closer to the main wreckage. Fragmented pieces of the left wing tip and strobe light were found embedded in the impact crater furthest from the wreckage and a propeller blade was found in the impact crater closest to the main wreckage. The left wing (including the fuel tank, aileron and flap) was consumed by fire. The tip of the wing was curled aft. The fuel tank's finger screen came loose from its mounting and was absent of debris. The left header tank was also fire damaged. The right wing was not burned and came to rest upright with the wing strut still attached. The flap was still attached to it's tracks and the aileron sustained impact damage and remained partially attached to the wing. The fuel tank cap was secure and approximately 15-20 gallons of fuel remained in the tank. Flight control continuity was established for the elevator, elevator trim and rudder from the flight control surface to the cockpit. Due to impact damage a reliable trim tab setting could not be established. The carry-thru cable for the ailerons was separated in the fuselage and the cable ends were frayed, consistent with overload separation. The left aileron cable was continuous from the cockpit control to the aileron quadrant in the left wing. The left aileron carry-thru cable was still attached to the quadrant in the left wing. The right aileron cable was attached to the cockpit control and was overload separated in numerous locations. However, the outboard end of the cable remained attached to the aileron quadrant in the right wing. The right end of the aileron carry-thru cable was not identified to due to impact damage. A measurement of the flap actuator indicated the flaps were extended approximately 25 degrees. The throttle, mixture, and propeller controls were all found in the full forward position. The fuel selector handle and valve were in the "both" position. The firewall mounted gascolator was thermally damaged and the filter was unobstructed. Due to extensive fire and impact damage, most of the avionics and instruments were unidentifiable. The Garmin G1000 multi-function and primary flight displays sustained impact and thermal damage; however, a portion of one of the display's faceplate was found outside the main wreckage. The slot holders for both of the G1000's secure digital (SD) cards were found in the wreckage, but the SD cards were not located. The propeller assembly separated from the engine at the crankshaft. Examination of the fracture surfaces on the crankshaft revealed 45- degree shearing consistent with overload. Two of the blades remained attached to the hub and one blade separated. The blade that separated was found in the engine impact crater and was bent aft. The second blade was loose in the hub and exhibited bending and was twisted. The third blade was tight in the hub and was straight. The only damage noted on the blade was a deep gouge on the trailing edge of the blade about 9 inches from the hub. Examination of the engine was conducted on June 4, 2013, by the IIC and representatives of Cessna Aircraft Company and Lycoming Engines. The engine sustained fire and impact damage. Both magnetos remained attached the engine and could not be tested due to fire damage. The vacuum pump also remained attached to the engine, but would not turn freely due to fire damage. The pump was removed from the engine and disassembled. Each of the six vanes was undamaged and no anomalies were noted. The engine was seized due to heat exposure and could not be rotated. The accessory case was removed from the engine along with the oil pump. When the oil pump was disassembled, the gears were found undamaged and no scoring on the interior walls was noted. The spark plugs and fuel nozzles were also removed. No anomalies were noted. Each cylinder was examined using a lighted borescope. Rust and some lead deposits were noted in the cylinder. Three holes were then drilled on the top of the case and the borescope was used to examine the case interior. No mechanical deficiencies were identified that would have precluded normal operation of the engine at the time of the accident. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONAn autopsy was conducted on the pilot by Central Texas Autopsy, PLLC, on May 10, 2013. The cause of death was determined to be "multiple traumatic injuries." Toxicological testing was conducted by the FAA Toxicological Accident Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The results were negative for all items tested.
The pilot’s failure to maintain airspeed while transitioning from instrument to visual flight while still in instrument conditions, which resulted in an inadvertent stall.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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