Newton, MS, USA
N7045G
CESSNA 172K
After an uneventful instructional flight, the student pilot entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern while the airplane was at 1,200 ft mean sea level. The flight instructor then asked the student to turn onto the base leg of the traffic pattern, but "he was slow to respond," and the airplane was too fast, which extended the downwind leg farther out than normal. The flight instructor then noticed that the student had not extended the wing flaps to the 10-degree position. The student pilot then extended the wing flaps to 10 degrees and started to slow the airplane. The flight instructor then asked the student to turn onto final, and, because of the extended downwind leg, to stop descending and add power. The student then arrested the descent, but he failed to add power as instructed. The flight instructor again asked the student to add power; however, the student did not respond by either adding power or by asking the flight instructor for clarification. The flight instructor stated that he was distracted by the airplane's airspeed and altitude and the student's lack of response and that he did not see the power lines during the final approach even though he had flown over them many times. When he finally did see the power lines, he took control of the airplane and then added full power and maximum up elevator. However, the airplane struck a static wire that ran along the top of the power poles, nosed over, and impacted terrain. Review of Federal Aviation Administration records revealed that the student pilot held a third-class medical certificate with the limitation that he "must use hearing amplification." However, the student pilot was not wearing a hearing aid during the accident flight; therefore, he might not have heard the flight instructor's command to increase engine power, which would explain his failure to do so as instructed. Further, neither the student pilot nor the flight instructor were wearing headsets in the loud cockpit of the single-engine airplane, which also could have made it difficult for the student pilot to hear the flight instructor's command. Although the power lines were not included in the airport information in the Airport/Facility Directory, they were depicted in the sectional aeronautical chart for the area. Examination of the power lines revealed that not only were they below the runway's 7.00-degree glidepath that was provided by a pulsating visual approach slope indicator to ensure obstacle clearance but that they were also below the obstruction identification surfaces listed in federal regulations, and, in many areas, they were at or below the trees located on the approach end of the runway. Given this information and the fact that the flight instructor had flown over them many times, the power lines should not have been a hazard. The flight instructor's slow response to the student pilot's failure to increase power during the descent led to the airplane's collision with the wire.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 12, 2013, about 0930 central daylight time, a Cessna 172K, N7045G, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain after striking an electrical transmission power line during approach, at James H. Easom Field Airport (M23), Newton, Mississippi. The student pilot was fatally injured, and the flight instructor was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local instructional flight, which was operated under the provisions of Title14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. According to the flight instructor, on the day of the accident, he met with the student pilot, then after briefing him, the student pilot preflighted the airplane. After starting the engine, they taxied out and then took off from runway 31. After takeoff, they flew in a southwesterly direction and climbed to an altitude of 2,000 feet above mean sea level (msl). After a little while, they returned to the airport for landing. After arriving in the vicinity of the airport, the student entered a left downwind for runway 31 at 1,200 feet msl. The flight instructor then asked the student to turn on to the base leg of the traffic pattern but "he was slow to respond," and they were too fast, which extended the downwind leg farther out than normal. The flight instructor then noticed that the student pilot had not extended the wing flaps to the 10 degree position. A little while later, the student pilot extended the wing flaps to 10 degrees, and started to slow the airplane. The flight instructor then asked the student to turn final, and because of the extended downwind which had placed them farther out than normal, to stop descending and add power. The student pilot then arrested the descent, but failed to add power and climb to a normal pattern altitude. The flight instructor then asked once more for the student pilot to add power, however the student pilot did not respond by adding power and initiating a climb or by asking the flight instructor for clarification. The flight instructor stated that he was distracted by the airspeed and the student pilot's lack of response and did not see the powerlines on final approach to runway 31. Then, when he finally did see the powerlines, he took control of the airplane, added full power, and added maximum up elevator. The airplane then cleared all of the powerlines except one, which ran along the top of the poles above the larger lines which was a different color and hard to see. The nosewheel landing gear then came into contact with the wire; the airplane nosed over, fell, and then impacted terrain. The flight instructor advised that as part of the flight lesson, he had wanted the student pilot to get comfortable with the airplane and that he had wanted him to fly as much as possible. The flight instructor further advised that he must have flown over the power lines at M23 at least a thousand times, and that he was trying to teach but, had gotten distracted with the student pilot's speed, and altitude, and had forgotten all about the power lines. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and pilot records, the flight instructor held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane multi-engine land, commercial privileges for airplane single-engine land. He also held type ratings for the BE-300, CE-500, and EMB-500, and a flight instructor certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on October 2, 2012. He reported 6,450 total hours of flight experience, 500 of which, was in the accident airplane make and model. According to FAA and pilot records, the student pilot was issued a student pilot certificate with third-class medical on November 8, 2012 with a limitation which stated "Must use hearing amplification." The student pilot had never soloed in any aircraft. He had accrued 20 hours of total flight experience, all of which was accrued while he was receiving flight instruction in the accident airplane make and model. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe accident aircraft was a strut braced high wing, four seat, airplane, of conventional metal construction. It was equipped with tricycle type landing gear, and was powered by a 180 horsepower, normally aspirated, 4 cylinder, air cooled engine, driving a fixed pitch, two bladed, metal propeller. According to FAA and airplane maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 1969. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on July 1, 2012. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 10,671.7 total hours of operation. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe reported weather at Key Field Airport (MEI), Meridian, Mississippi, located 20 nautical miles east of the accident site, at 0958, approximately 28 minutes after the accident, included: winds 300 degrees at 7 knots, 10 miles visibility, sky clear, temperature 30 degrees C, dew point 23 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.10 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe accident aircraft was a strut braced high wing, four seat, airplane, of conventional metal construction. It was equipped with tricycle type landing gear, and was powered by a 180 horsepower, normally aspirated, 4 cylinder, air cooled engine, driving a fixed pitch, two bladed, metal propeller. According to FAA and airplane maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 1969. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on July 1, 2012. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 10,671.7 total hours of operation. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONExamination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane had come to rest inverted next to an electrical transmission corridor right of way that crossed the final approach path approximately 2,290 feet from the threshold of runway 31. Wire contact marks were observed on the nose landing gear tire, the nose landing gear strut, the lower engine cowling, the engine mount structure, and the propeller. The wire marks were consistent with the airplane coming into contact while in a left bank, first with the propeller, and then with the nose landing gear. Airframe Examination Examination of the airplane revealed that control continuity existed from the ailerons, elevator, and rudder, to the control wheels and rudder pedals, and from the elevator trim tab, to the trim wheel. The fuel tanks were empty, however evidence of fuel having been present existed in the form of fuel staining on the fuselage and fuel dripping from the wreckage during the examination. The fuel strainer screen and fuel strainer bowl were clean, and the fuel selector handle had been moved to the "off" position by first responders. The airplane was equipped with seatbelts; however no shoulder harnesses were installed. The data tags on the seatbelts were worn and unreadable and the left front seat's secondary seat stop reel belt end fitting was not attached to the cabin floor. The reel's cable was also separated from the cable end just below the swaged end, and a rub mark was visible on the seat locking pin. The cable end mounting bracket was also mounted further forward on the seat frame than normal resulting in the cable bending as it exited the sheathing and rubbing against the seat pin. The master switch was on, the throttle was in the full throttle position, and the mixture was in the full rich position. The primer was in and locked, and the carburetor heat was off. The flap selector handle had been separated from its mounting location and the magneto switch had been turned to the off position by first responders. Engine Examination Examination of the engine did not reveal any preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation of the engine. Drive train continuity was confirmed from the propeller flange to the back of the engine, thumb compression was present on all 4 cylinders, the top sparkplugs appeared to be normal, and both magnetos had remained attached to the engine. Transmission Line Examination Examination of the electrical transmission lines revealed that they were not equipped with wire markers and that the "top wire" the airplane struck was the three strand 5/16th inch diameter static wire located above the conductors (cables) which were strung between the 75 foot high transmission towers. Further examination revealed that approximately 1,000 feet of the static wire and two insulator shoes required replacement due to the airplane's impact with the static wire. Review of the Airport Facility Directory revealed that the powerlines were not listed in the airport information for M23 however; review of the Memphis Sectional Aeronautical Chart revealed that they were depicted on the sectional aeronautical chart and were easily recognizable. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONIn order to improve safety, Mississippi Power Company advised the NTSB on October 19, 2013 that they had installed Spherical Aviation Wire Markers to help preclude wire strikes by aircraft that inadvertently descended below the obstruction identification area for runway 31 at M23. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONAn Autopsy was performed on the student pilot by the Mississippi State Medical Examiner's Office. Cause of death was blunt force trauma. Toxicological testing of the pilot was conducted at the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The specimens from the pilot were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, basic, acidic, and neutral drugs. TESTS AND RESEARCHCockpit Noise According to the FAA's Medical Facts for Pilots publication (AM-400-98/3), the sound intensity in the cockpit of an average single engine airplane is 70 to 90 Decibels and loud noise can interfere with or mask normal speech, making it difficult to understand. Use of Hearing Aid According to the FAA, the pilot was required to use hearing amplification while exercising the privileges of his student pilot certificate as he was unable to demonstrate during the examination for his third-class medical that he had the ability to hear an average conversational voice in a quiet room, using both ears, at a distance of 6 feet from the Examiner, with his back turned to the Examiner. According to the pilot's wife, "he used to wear a hearing aid but no longer did." According to the flight instructor, on the accident flight, neither he or the student pilot were wearing a headset, and when he told the student pilot to "Push the power up," it seemed like the student pilot did not hear him, and he did not recall the student pilot wearing a hearing aid. No hearing aid was recovered from the wreckage or accident site. Survey of Airport and Accident Site At the request of the NTSB, Mississippi Power Company, conducted a survey using Laser Illuminated Detection And Ranging equipment (LIDAR), and conventional survey means, to determine whether the electrical transmission lines which existed in the electrical transmission corridor right of way which existed off the approach end of the runway, were an obstruction for aircraft landing on runway 31 at M23. Review of the survey revealed that not only were the electrical transmission lines below the 7.00 degree glide path displayed by the PVASI, but they were below the obstruction identification surfaces listed under Title 14 CFR Part 77, and in many areas were at or below the trees that were located on the approach end of runway 31.
The student pilot's failure to increase engine power during the descent for landing when instructed to do so by the flight instructor and the flight instructor's delayed remedial action, which resulted in collision with a static wire. Contributing to the accident was the student pilot's failure to use hearing amplification as required by his Federal Aviation Administration medical certificate.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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