Ridgway, CO, USA
N702H
SOCATA TBM 700
About 3 months before the accident, the pilot received about 9 hours of flight instruction, including completion of an instrument proficiency check, in the airplane. The accident flight was a personal cross-country flight operated under instrument flight rules (IFR). Radar track data depicted the flight proceeding on a west-southwest course at 15,800 ft mean sea level (msl) as it approached the destination airport. The flight was cleared by the air traffic controller for a GPS approach, passed the initial approach fix, and, shortly afterward, began a descent as permitted by the approach procedure. The track data indicated that the flight became established on the initial approach segment and remained above the designated minimum altitude of 12,000 ft msl. Average descent rates based on the available altitude data ranged from 500 feet per minute (fpm) to 1,000 fpm during this portion of the flight. At the intermediate navigation fix, the approach procedure required pilots to turn right and track a north-northwest course toward the airport. The track data indicated that the flight entered a right turn about 1 mile before reaching the intermediate fix. As the airplane entered the right turn, its average descent rate reached 4,000 fpm. The flight subsequently tracked northbound for nearly 1-1/2 miles. During this portion of the flight, the airplane initially descended at an average rate of 3,500 fpm then climbed at a rate of 1,800 fpm. The airplane subsequently entered a second right turn. The final three radar data points were each located within 505 ft laterally of each other and near the approximate accident site location. The average descent rate between the final two data points (altitudes of 10,100 ft msl and 8,700 ft msl) was 7,000 fpm. About the time that the final data point was recorded, the pilot informed the air traffic controller that the airplane was in a spin and that he was attempting to recover. No further communications were received from the pilot. The airplane subsequently impacted the surface of a reservoir at an elevation of about 6,780 ft and came to rest in 60 ft of water. A detailed postaccident examination of the airframe, engine and propeller assembly did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. The available meteorological data suggested that the airplane encountered clouds (tops about 16,000 ft msl or higher and bases about 10,000 ft msl) and was likely operating in IFR conditions during the final 15 minutes of the flight; however, no determination could be made regarding whether the clouds that the airplane descended through were solid or layered. In addition, the data suggested the possibility of both light icing and light turbulence between 12,000 ft msl and 16,000 ft msl along the flight path. Although the pilot appeared to be managing the flight appropriately during the initial descent, it could not be determined why he was unable to navigate to the approach fixes and maintain control of the airplane as he turned toward the airport and continued the descent.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On March 22, 2014, at 1400 mountain daylight time, a Socata TBM 700, N702H, impacted the Ridgway Reservoir, Ridgway, Colorado. The airplane came to rest in about 60 feet of water. The pilot and four passengers were fatally injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to Gadsden Aviation LLC and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the destination airport. The flight was operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight originated from the Bartlesville Municipal Airport (BVO), Bartlesville, Oklahoma, about 1111. The intended destination was the Montrose Regional Airport (MTJ), Montrose, Colorado.At 0622 on the morning of the accident, the pilot accessed the Direct User Access Terminal Service (DUATS) and obtained a weather briefing for the route of flight from the Northeast Alabama Regional Airport (GAD), Gadsden, Alabama, to BVO. An IFR flight plan for that route of flight was subsequently filed. The accident pilot was listed as the pilot-in-command. Tracking data indicated that the airplane subsequently departed GAD about 0739 and arrived at BVO about 1001. Personnel at the fixed base operator (FBO) located at BVO reported that upon arrival, the pilot requested that the airplane be topped off with fuel and that a ground power unit be made available for engine start. They noted that the pilot and passengers came into the FBO to eat lunch. At 1038, the pilot again accessed DUATS and obtained a weather briefing for the route of flight from BVO to MTJ. An IFR flight plan was subsequently filed for that route of flight. That flight plan also listed the accident pilot as the pilot-in-command. The FBO personnel stated that the pilot and passengers re-boarded the airplane after their lunch. The subsequent engine start up, taxi and takeoff appeared normal. Nothing with respect to the airplane or the pilot seemed out of the ordinary, nor did they have any concerns regarding the flight. At 1111, the pilot contacted the Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and informed the controller that the flight had departed BVO and requested an IFR clearance to MTJ. The accident flight was subsequently radar identified and cleared direct to MTJ at an ultimate cruising altitude of 26,000 feet pressure altitude (FL260). About 1233, control of the flight was transferred to the Denver ARTCC. At 1330, the controller advised the pilot to expect the RNAV(GPS) Rwy 35 approach at MTJ. At 1341, the controller instructed the pilot to descend to and maintain 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl). This was amended to 16,000 feet msl four minutes later. At 1348, the pilot was instructed to maintain 16,000 feet msl until reaching the YARUB navigation fix, an initial approach fix for the MTJ RNAV (GPS) Rwy 35 approach procedure. The pilot was also cleared for the approach at that time. At 1358, the pilot was released to change to the airport advisory frequency. At 1400:34 (hhmm:ss), the pilot transmitted, "spin I'm trying to get out of here." No further communications were received from the accident flight. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) radar track data depicted the airplane proceeding on a west course at 15,800 feet as it approached MTJ. The airplane passed the YARUB initial approach fix about 1356:59. About 23 seconds later, the airplane began a descent. The track data indicated that the airplane became established on the initial approach segment between YARUB and COQKU. The minimum altitude for this approach segment was 12,000 feet msl. At COQKU, the approach procedure required pilots to turn right and track a magnetic course of 328 degrees. The minimum altitude for that approach segment was 9,900 feet msl. At 1358:58, the airplane was located about 1.7 nm east-northeast of COQKU at an altitude of 14,400 feet msl. At 1359:10, the airplane was about 1.14 nm east-northeast of COQKU at an altitude of 13,600 feet msl. About that time, the airplane entered a right turn and proceeded northbound about 1.4 miles. At 1359:34 and 1359:46, the corresponding Mode C altitudes were 12,200 feet and 12,500 feet, respectively. The airplane subsequently entered a second right turn, tracking eastbound for about 0.85 mile. The final three data points were each located within 505 feet (0.08 mile) laterally of each other and of the approximate location of the accident site. The data point recorded at 1400:10 did not have Mode C altitude data associated with it. At 1400:22, the associated Mode C altitude was 10,100 feet. The final data point was recorded at 1400:34, with an associated Mode C altitude of 8,700 feet. U. S. Department of the Interior / Bureau of Reclamation data indicated that the elevation of the Ridgway Reservoir was about 6,870 feet on the day of the accident. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot held a private pilot certificate with single-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. He was issued a third class airman medical certificate with a limitation for corrective lenses on February 12, 2014. The pilot's logbook, denoted logbook number "02," was reviewed by the NTSB. The initial entry in this logbook was dated March 24, 2012, and the final entry was dated January 4, 2014. According to this logbook, the pilot had accumulated a total flight time of about 908 hours in single-engine land airplanes, 839 hours as pilot-in-command, 211 hours dual instruction received, 71 hours actual instrument, 46 hours simulated instrument, and 133 hours night flight time. The logbook included two entries attributable to the accident airplane, dated January 3 and 4, 2014, totaling 8.6 hours. These were also the only entries attributable to the same make and model aircraft as the accident airplane. These entries included a notation for one instrument landing system (ILS) approach. The logbook included flight review and instrument proficiency check endorsements dated January 4, 2014. The logbook also included an endorsement for high-altitude, pressurized airplane training as required by 14 CFR 61.31(g). According to the logbook endorsements, both the instrument proficiency check and the pressurized airplane endorsements were completed in a TBM 700 airplane. The logbook also included an entry for 12 hours of ground instruction covering TBM 700 systems and high altitude operations. Data obtained from a commercial flight tracking company indicated that a total of 12 flights related to the accident airplane were on file between December 27, 2013, and March 22, 2014. These flights totaled 28 hours and 2 minutes of flight time. However, no information regarding the pilot-in-command, any fight plan filed, or the flight conditions, was associated with the data. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The accident airplane was a 1996 Socata TBM 700, serial number 112. It was a six-place, single-engine airplane, with a pressurized cabin and a retractable tricycle landing gear configuration. The airplane was equipped with an ice protection system and was approved for flight into known icing conditions, with the exception of severe icing conditions. The airplane was powered by a 700 shaft-horsepower Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-64 turbo-propeller engine, serial number 111098, and a 4-blade, constant speed (adjustable pitch) Hartzell model HC-E4N-3/E9083SK propeller assembly. The accident airplane was issued an FAA normal category, standard airworthiness certificate in December 1996. The accident owner, Gadsden Aviation, LLC, purchased the airplane on December 30, 2013. The accident pilot signed the registration application as an authorized member of Gadsden Aviation. According to the airplane maintenance records, the most recent annual inspection was completed on November 21, 2013. At the time of that inspection, the airframe total time was 4,785.1 hours, with a total of 3,593 cycles. The recording hour (Hobbs) meter reportedly indicated 4,334.1 hours. The engine had accumulated 4,785.1 hours, with 2,806.4 hours and 1,235.1 hours since the most recent overhaul and the most recent hot section inspection, respectively. A subsequent maintenance record entry, dated December 30, 2013, which corresponded to the most recent sale date for the airplane, indicated that the logbooks were reviewed in accordance with the customer's request. In addition, a walk-around inspection was completed at that time, with no findings noted. The maintenance record contained no further entries. The recording hour (Hobbs) meter indicated 4,397.6 hours at the time of the postaccident examination. This is consistent with the airplane accumulating 63.5 hours since the annual inspection. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION Weather conditions recorded by the MTJ Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS), located about 19 miles north-northwest of the accident site, at 1353, were: wind from 210 degrees at 9 knots; few clouds at 1,500 feet above ground level (agl), broken clouds at 3,000 feet agl, overcast clouds at 3,900 feet agl; 10 miles visibility with light rain; temperature 5 degrees Celsius; dew point 2 degrees Celsius; and altimeter 30.10 inches of mercury. The Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) for KMTJ issued at 1134 and current at the time of the accident, was: wind from 270° at 11 knots, visibility of greater than 6 statute miles, showers between 5 and 10 miles from the airport, ceiling broken at 5,000 feet agl, overcast clouds at 10,000 feet agl. Temporary conditions between 1400 and 1600 were: visibility six statute miles, light rain showers, scattered clouds at 3,000 agl, ceiling broken at 4,000 feet agl. An area forecast covering Colorado was issued at 1345. For the mountainous areas of Colorado, the forecast included broken cloud bases at 12,000 feet msl, with tops to 16,000 feet msl. Occasional visibilities between 3 and 5 miles in widely scattered light snow showers were also forecast. Prior to the 1345 area forecast, an amended area forecast that included Colorado was issued at 0545. The portion of the area forecast applicable to the southern half of the mountains in Colorado, west of the Continental Divide forecasted for the accident time: a broken cloud ceiling at 10,000 feet msl, with additional cloud layers to flight level (FL) 250, and occasional visibility of 3 – 5 miles in widely scattered light snow showers and mist. An Airmen's Meteorological Information (AIRMET) advisory for icing was issued at 0845. The AIRMET advisory area encompassed most of Colorado, including the accident site. The AIRMET warned of the possibility of moderate icing between the freezing level and 19,000 feet, with conditions continuing through 2100. Freezing levels were forecast to range from the surface to 12,000 feet across the area. An AIRMET advisory for turbulence was also in effect beginning at 0845. The advisory area encompassed portions of central and southern Colorado, and central and northern New Mexico. The accident site was located near the northwest boundary of the advisory area. The AIRMET warned of the possibility of moderate turbulence below 14,000 feet, with conditions continuing through 2100. The North American Mesoscale model sounding for the accident location at 1500 identified a humid layer from near the surface to 30,000 feet. Near surface wind was about 10 knots from the west-southwest, increasing to about 50 knots from the west through 23,000 feet msl. Calculations by the Rawinsonde Observation Program (RAOB) suggested few to broken cloud condition from the surface through about 21,000 feet msl, with light rime or mixed icing between 12,000 and 16,000 feet msl. Satellite imagery identified cloudy conditions along the latter portion of the accident airplane's flight path. The coldest cloud-top temperatures in the vicinity of this portion of the flight were -30 degrees Celsius, which corresponded to heights of approximately 29,500 msl. However, the cloud top temperatures varied from -30 degrees Celsius to +2 degrees Celsius along this portion of the flight path. Weather radar data identified hydrometeor classification associated with dry snow, with some nearby ice crystals. In addition, radial velocity measurements identified some potential for wind shear between 12,000 feet and 16,000 feet msl. A pilot report (PIREP) was received about 1520 that noted light rime ice and moderate chop/turbulence between 13,000 feet msl and 17,000 feet msl about 30 miles north-northeast of MTJ. AIRPORT INFORMATION The Montrose Regional Airport (MTJ) was located about 1 mile northwest of the City of Montrose at an elevation of 5,759 feet. It was served by two paved runways: runway 17-35 was 10,000 feet long by 150 feet wide; runway 13-31 was 7,510 feet long by 100 feet wide. Both runways were constructed of asphalt. The airport was non-towered and operations were supported by a common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), commonly referred to as Unicom. Denver ARTCC provided air traffic control services for the surrounding airspace. Instrument flight rules (IFR) operations into MTJ were supported by six FAA-approved terminal approach procedures. Runway 35 was served by an RNAV (GPS) approach. For aircraft initially southeast of the airport, the procedure provided an initial approach fix at YARUB navigation fix. The minimum altitude for the initial segment beginning at YARUB was 12,000 feet msl. The approach procedure subsequently required a right turn to the north-northwest toward MTJ at the COQKU navigation fix. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) was 6,380 feet msl. One mile visibility was required to descend from the MDA and land. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The airplane came to rest inverted about 60 feet below the surface of the Ridgeway Reservoir, near the eastern shore. The aft fuselage/empennage had separated from the airframe at a point near the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer. The aft fuselage/empennage section was observed floating near the western edge of the reservoir by local authorities. The aft fuselage/empennage section was recovered separately from the surface of the reservoir. The wings, engine and propeller remained attached to the fuselage. The entire lower surface of the fuselage, wings and engine cowling exhibited upward crushing damage. The uniform extent of the damage appeared consistent with a near level attitude, upright impact with the surface of the reservoir. A partial circumferential fracture (tear) of the fuselage skin was located approximately in-line with the wing trailing edges. The empennage/aft fuselage section had separated about 2 feet aft of the aft pressure bulkhead. The aft pressure bulkhead was deformed over the lower one-third of the panel, but appeared otherwise intact. The instrument panel was dislocated from the surrounding airframe structure. The pilot and co-pilot control wheels remained in place relative to the panel. The throttle quadrant was partially dislocated from the instrument panel. Aileron control continuity was confirmed within the fuselage from each wing root to the cockpit. The left wing was deformed and damaged over the entire span. The lower wing skin was deformed upward and into the underlying sub-structure over the entire inboard one-half of the span. The inboard portion of both the forward and aft wing spars, including the wing-to-fuselage attachment lugs, appeared intact and undeformed. The left aileron was partially separated. The hinge fittings appeared fractured consistent with overstress. Aileron control continuity was confirmed from the control surface to the wing root. The left flap was separated from the wing completely and recovered from the reservoir. The flap assembly was separated into two sections near the mid-span hinge. The actuator extension was consistent with a flaps-up position. The spoiler panel remained attached to the wing and the control linkage was intact. The left main landing gear was in the retracted position. The right wing was deformed and damaged over the entire span. The lower wing skin was deformed upward and into the underlying sub-structure over the entire span. The inb
The pilot's loss of airplane control during an instrument approach procedure, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and entering an inadvertent aerodynamic stall and spin.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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