Sweetwater, TX, USA
N9759E
BELLANCA 17 30A
The pilot departed on a cross-country flight, making one stop to drop off one of two passengers. During the stop, the pilot reported topping off all three fuel tanks; he then departed on the accident flight. He stated that the airplane could fly 4 hours 45 minutes with fuel in reserve. However, on the day of the accident, 30mph headwinds were present. After flying for 3 hours 12 minutes primarily using the right fuel tanks, the engine lost full power about 2 miles from the destination airport. The pilot switched the fuel selector valve to the left tank and attempted to restart the engine but did not use the fuel boost pump as called for in the airplane flight manual. The airplane subsequently impacted trees and terrain short of the airport. The pilot was wearing a seat belt and shoulder harness and sustained minor injuries. The passenger had a shoulder harness available, but was seated in a reclined position with only the lap belt fastened during the accident sequence. She sustained fatal injuries during the impact. Examination of the wreckage revealed the engine was not producing power at impact. The fuel tanks were ruptured during impact and only a small amount of fuel was found in the tanks; however, no evidence of fuel spillage or fuel blighting to surrounding vegetation was present. Thus, the amount of fuel present at the time of the accident could not be determined. Based on the pilot's statements and on-scene evidence, the pilot did not adequately manage the airplane fuel, which resulted in a total loss of engine power. Although the airplane's range was greater than that flown on the day of the accident, the headwinds would have significantly shortened the range, which, when combined with the lack of fuel on-scene, would support fuel exhaustion. However, the pilot did not use the fuel boost pump to assist with restarting the engine, as called for in the airplane flight manual, which would support fuel starvation. Thus, the loss of engine power was due to either fuel exhaustion or starvation, which could not be determined because the fuel tanks were breached.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn April 27, 2014 about 1453 central daylight time (cdt), a Bellanca Super Viking 17-30A, N9759E, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain near Avenger Field Airport (SWW), Sweetwater, Texas. The airplane had departed from Shreveport Regional Airport (SHV), Shreveport, Louisiana about 1140. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed. The commercial pilot received minor injuries and passenger was fatally injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to the Nolan County Sheriff's officer who responded to the accident, the pilot stated he had run out of fuel. The pilot explained to the officer the airplane had three fuel tanks and when he attempted to switch tanks the engine stalled and he could not get it started again. The pilot told the officer that the flight was windy and rough. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot, age 58, held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane ratings. A third-class airman medical certificate was issued on August 22, 2012, with no limitations. The pilot reported that he had accumulated 1,279 total flight hours. He reported 900 hours in the accident aircraft make and model, with 44 hours in the accident airplane in the last 90 days. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane, manufactured in 1974, was a 4-seat, low-wing, retractable-gear airplane, serial number 75-30762, and was powered by a Continental Motors IO-520-K1B engine, rated at 300 horsepower. The engine drove a metal, 3-blade McCauley D3A34C401-C constant-speed propeller. According to the airplane's logbooks, the most recent annual inspection was completed on July 1, 2013, at a Hobbs time of 4,081.39 hours. The aircraft total time at the time of the accident was unknown. The airplane was equipped with 7 fuel tanks on the airplane; three in each wing and one (auxiliary) in the fuselage. The wing tanks held a total on 34 gallons of fuel, with 30 gallons being useable fuel. The auxiliary tank held 15 gallons of fuel. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe 1435 recorded weather observation at SWW, included wind from 230 degrees at 26 knots gusting to 41 knots, visibility 7 miles, scattered clouds at 2,800 feet above ground level (agl), broken clouds at 3,500, temperature 27 degrees C, dew point -9 degrees C; barometric altimeter 29.58 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe airplane, manufactured in 1974, was a 4-seat, low-wing, retractable-gear airplane, serial number 75-30762, and was powered by a Continental Motors IO-520-K1B engine, rated at 300 horsepower. The engine drove a metal, 3-blade McCauley D3A34C401-C constant-speed propeller. According to the airplane's logbooks, the most recent annual inspection was completed on July 1, 2013, at a Hobbs time of 4,081.39 hours. The aircraft total time at the time of the accident was unknown. The airplane was equipped with 7 fuel tanks on the airplane; three in each wing and one (auxiliary) in the fuselage. The wing tanks held a total on 34 gallons of fuel, with 30 gallons being useable fuel. The auxiliary tank held 15 gallons of fuel. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe main wreckage was located at N32°30.572' W100°24.321 in a ravine. The airplane came to rest inverted on the south edge of the ravine with the nose at the bottom of the ravine and the tail section rising out of the ravine edge. Flight control continuity to all flight control surfaces was verified on scene. Engine The engine remained partially attached to the airframe via various lines, hoses and cables. All four engine mount legs were broken. The exhaust system exhibited impact damage and was crushed upward. The engine was pushed back toward the firewall. The accessory section of the engine was pushed into the throttle body and induction elbows. The induction crossover tube exhibited impact damage and was breached. The starter was fractured from the starter adaptor but remained attached to the firewall via a cable. The three bladed McCauley propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft propeller flange. Two blades were bent aft from near the hub to the tips. The third blade was relatively straight with a slight bend to the trailing edge of the tip. The propeller, valve covers, and upper spark plugs were removed and the crankshaft was rotated by hand at the propeller flange using a tool. Continuity to the accessory gears was audibly heard via impulse coupling engagement. Continuity to the valve train and thumb compression was obtained on all six cylinders. Spark was observed on all six top spark plug leads. A light coating of oil was observed on all of the cylinder overhead areas. The engine driven fuel pump was removed and the drive coupling was intact. The fuel pump drive turned freely by hand. During the inspection of the fuel system, no fuel was observed in the fuel system components, fuel lines or hoses. The only engine fuel line that contained fuel was the fuel line for the metered pressure gauge. The fuel nozzles were removed and all were found to be free of debris with the exception of the #6 fuel nozzle. The #6 fuel nozzle was tapped and a small amount of material similar to dirt was observed. The #6 fuel nozzle then appeared to be free of debris. The fuel manifold valve remained attached to the engine and the safety wire and lead seal were intact. The fuel manifold valve was partially disassembled and the screen was free of debris. The diaphragm was intact and the retaining nut and plunger were tight and secure. The fuel manifold valve cavity contained fuel which tested negative for water using Sar-Gel water finding paste. The throttle body/metering unit exhibited impact damage at the wye of the induction system. All of the control arms and shafts moved freely by hand from stop to stop. The fuel screen was free of debris. Fuel The fuel tanks were ruptured during impact. A total of approximately 4 gallons of 100 low lead aviation fuel was drained from the left, right and auxiliary fuel tanks on the airplane. No evidence of fuel spillage or fuel blighting to surrounding vegetation was present. Landing gear Examination of the wreckage indicated the landing gear was stowed and the landing gear switch in the cabin was in the "UP" position. The emergency gear extension lever was not depressed as required to operate. Cockpit The fuel mixture control was set in the rich position. The throttle was ¼ from full throttle with the friction at normal. The cockpit fuel selector valve was in the "LEFT" position. The master switch was "ON," and the ignition switch was in the "OFF" position with the keys still in the ignition. All electrical switches were in the "ON" position with the exception of the fuel pump, which was in the "OFF" position. The flap selector was located in the "zero flaps" position. The auto pilot was "ON." And the remote emergency locator transmitter (ELT) was "ARMED." Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONAccording to the pilot, all tanks were topped off with fuel during his stop in SHV. He stated he would typically make the trip from SHV to SWW using only "one wing's tanks," but believed the airplane would use more fuel on the accident flight with the headwind enroute. He recalled checking the winds at 6,000 and 9,000 feet agl, they were 30 knots and 35 knots, respectively, from a heading of 200. He stated he had never flown the route in a 30 mile per hour headwind similar to the accident day. His typical fuel management was based on time in the air. The auxiliary tank would typically last for 45 minutes to an hour. The wing tanks would typically last for about 2.5 hours each and he would keep them selected for only about 2 hours each. He said he felt the airplane would fly safely for 4 hours and 45 minutes with plenty in reserve. According to the Bellanca Viking 300A Pilot Operating Handbook stated the following within the "Fuel System" section: "On aircraft model 17-30A, Continental powered, the red auxiliary fuel pump switch has three positions, OFF, Low and PRIME… Prime should be used only for starting or restoring lost fuel flow." The Bellanca Model 17-30A Airplane Flight Manual stated the following within the "Normal Procedure; Fuel System" section: "If a tank is run completely dry, it is necessary to switch the selector valve to a tank containing ample fuel and the hold the boost pump on PRIME (top position). The auxiliary fuel pump must be turned on in order to insure fuel flow to the engine. If ample fuel is available and boost is used, an air restart should occur in less than 10 seconds." The pilot did not use the fuel boost pump during his attempted engine restart. He stated that based on his past experiences, when an engine ran dry he did not need the fuel boost pump to restart the engine and thought using it may flood the engine. The pilot explained the passenger, his wife, did not like to wear the shoulder harness and typically only wore the lap belt during flight. During the accident flight, she was reclined in the seat sleeping with only the lap belt fastened. When on final approach, the pilot woke his wife but she remained lying down in the seat with only the lap belt fastened. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Civil Aeromedical Institute did not conduct a toxicology examination for the pilot. An autopsy of the passenger was not obtained during the investigation. TESTS AND RESEARCHGarmin GPS A Garmin GPSMAP 396 handheld unit was found with the wreckage. The unit was powered on and the following information was retrieved: The airplane was flying on a 039 degrees radius, 2.2 nautical miles (nm) from SWW. The airplane came to rest at an elevation of 2,162 ft. The airplane flight time from SHV to the accident location was 3 hours and 12 minutes (3.2 hours), with a total flight distance of 361.4 nautical miles. The GPSMAP 396 was sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory to recover additional data pertinent to the accident flight. The data extracted included the first leg of the trip was from the Greenville Mid-Delta Airport, Greenville, Mississippi (GLH) to SHV and the second leg of the trip from SHV to SWW. For the first leg of the trip, the aircraft departed Runway 18R at GLH at approximately 08:39:43 and performed a right turn out as it began a cruise on a course toward SHV at approximately 8,400 feet. The aircraft entered an 8.5 nautical mile left base and arrived at Runway 14 at SHV at 10:19:11 and the session ended in the ramp area at 10:21:41. For the second leg and accident portion of the flight, the aircraft departed from Runway 14 at SHV around 11:40:19 and performed a right turn out as it began a climb to roughly 8,300 feet (GPS Altitude) where it established a cruise on a west-southwest heading. During this first portion of cruise flight, the aircraft's ground speed varied from between 100 knots and 120 knots. The aircraft then made a turn to the south-southwest and traveled for another about 20 nautical miles before turning on course towards the Sweetwater, Texas area around 12:40:00. During this second portion of cruise flight, the aircraft's groundspeed varied between 100 knots and 165 knots. The aircraft began its descent from roughly 7,000 ft at approximately 14:36:00 near Dyess Air Force Base (DYS), Abilene, Texas. The aircraft continued to descend as it entered a left base for Runway 22 at SWW. In the final portion of flight, the altitude continued to decrease as the aircraft made a final turn toward Runway 22. The last airborne data point showed the aircraft at 2,316 feet traveling at 53 knots at 14:53:00. This location was approximately 1.40 nautical miles northwest from the Runway 22 threshold at SWW. Fuel Selector Unit The fuel selector unit and two dent balls were sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory in Washington, DC for further examination of the selector detent positions. The top cover plate was cleaned and then inspected using the scanning electron microscope (SEM). A circular area between the detent positions showed wear in the exterior cadmium plating. This wear pattern corresponded to the original contact position of the detent balls. No indication of gross material spalling, galling or corrosion was observed in the worn areas of the cover plate. Some rounding of the detent edges was observed corresponding to the wear pattern in the cadmium platting on the cover plate. However, during visual examination before cleaning, the detent balls were able to seat securely in each detent position. The detent balls were inspected visually and using the SEM. The balls exhibited superficial scratches consistent with continuous rolling contact with the top cover plate and backing springs. However, there were no macroscopic features observed that would be consistent with wear, spalling, or fatigue.
The pilot’s inadequate inflight fuel management, which led to a loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion or starvation.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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