East Patchogue, NY, USA
N610MH
COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT MFG LC41 550FG
The noninstrument-rated pilot contacted flight service to inquire whether the conditions for his 15-nm flight, planned for about 1 hour later, would be suitable for visual flight rules (VFR) operations. The pilot received an abbreviated briefing that included only the current conditions at both his departure and destination airports, both of which reported VFR conditions; he subsequently departed on the accident flight about 3 hours later. About 10 minutes after takeoff, after entering the controlled airspace of the destination airport, the pilot contacted air traffic control (ATC) and stated, "I need your help, sir." The controller queried the pilot as to his location, heading, and destination, and the pilot replied with his destination, stating, "I just don't have visibility." The controller asked the pilot whether he was declaring an emergency and advised that the destination airport was under instrument meteorological conditions (IMC); the pilot did not respond. The pilot then stated that he would return to his departure airport and was advised by the controller to "squawk VFR." The pilot acknowledged, and no further communications were received from the accident airplane. Radar data showed that the airplane, about the time of the last radio transmission, entered a descending right turn that continued until ground contact. Such a a flight track is consistent with a somatogyral illusion known as the "graveyard spiral." Given the reported weather conditions in the area about the time of the accident, the pilot's statement that he was experiencing reduced visibility, the fact that the pilot did not hold an instrument rating, and the radar flight track of the airplane, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation and a subsequent loss of control as a result of his continued VFR flight into IMC. The extent to which the pilot may have used the airplane's automation, including the autopilot system, could not be determined. Recorded weather data and statements from pilots flying in the area about the time of the accident indicated that, although the departure airport was experiencing visual meteorological conditions, IMC prevailed for much of the area surrounding the destination airport. These conditions had not been forecast until just before the airplane's departure. Had the pilot received the forecast from flight service when he received the current weather, he would only have been informed of low-level scattered clouds at his destination. Despite the discrepancy between the forecast and actual conditions present on the day of the accident, it should have been apparent to the pilot upon takeoff that the cloud ceilings and visibilities were below VFR minimums as the flight progressed. Additionally, the pilot could have obtained the automated weather report at the destination airport via radio shortly after departure, which would have informed him that the airport was experiencing IMC. However, the pilot's communication with ATC suggested that he was not aware of the weather conditions at his destination. If the pilot had declared an emergency and stated that he was not capable of instrument flight rules flight, he would have been provided priority handling and greater assistance from ATC. Although he did indicate that he was experiencing reduced visibility conditions, he did not declare an emergency and did not provide any specific information about the conditions he was experiencing or his limitations as a noninstrument-rated pilot. In the absence of this information, the controller likely assumed that the pilot was able to maintain VFR flight and return to the departure airport as stated without any further assistance.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 17, 2014, at 0903 eastern daylight time, a Columbia LC-41-550FG, N610MH, was destroyed when it impacted terrain in a residential area, and was subsequently consumed by postcrash fire, while maneuvering near East Patchogue, New York. The private pilot was fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions were reported near the accident site, and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which departed Farmingdale Republic Airport (FRG), Farmingdale, New York, at 0850, and was destined for Long Island MacArthur Airport (ISP), Islip, New York. The personal flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single engine land. The pilot did not hold an instrument rating. His most recent third-class FAA medical certificate was issued April 22, 2013. The pilot's logbooks were not recovered and no determination could be made of his flight experience in the accident airplane make and model; however, he reported a total flight experience of 1,200 hours on his most recent medical certificate application. The pilot's most recent flight review was conducted on August 26, 2013. According to the flight instructor who conducted the review, the pilot had never received any formal training on the airplane's Garmin G1000 avionics system. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe low-wing, single engine, carbon fiber construction airplane was manufactured in 2006, and registered to the pilot in October 2008. It was equipped with a Continental Motors TSIO-550C, 310 hp turbocharged, reciprocating engine and a Hartzell 3-bladed, constant-speed propeller. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on July 5, 2013, at a total aircraft time of 321.8 hours. The airplane's maintenance logbooks were not recovered, and complete maintenance history for the airplane could not be determined. According to manufacturer and FAA airworthiness records, the airplane was equipped with a Garmin G1000 system, which was comprised of dual LCD primary and multifunction flight displays that provided information about the airplane's altitude, airspeed, attitude, engine parameters, and navigation and communication systems status, as well as a moving map display. The airplane was equipped with a backup altimeter, attitude indicator, and airspeed indicator instruments. The G1000 also included an integrated automatic flight control, or autopilot, system that had the capability to control the airplane in the roll, pitch, and yaw axes. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe 0753 weather observation at FRG included wind from 200 degrees at 4 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, and clear skies. The 0853 weather observation at FRG included wind from 210 degrees at 3 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, and broken clouds at 10,000 feet. The 0807 weather observation at ISP, located about 6 nautical miles (nm) west of the accident site, included wind from 190 degrees at 8 knots, 7 statute miles visibility, broken cloud layers at 700 feet and 11,000 feet, and an overcast ceiling at 13,000 feet. The 0856 weather observation at ISP included wind from 220 at 8 knots, 7 statute miles visibility, and overcast clouds at 700 feet. The 0756 weather observation at Brookhaven Airport (HWV), Brookhaven, New York, located about 5 nm east of the accident site, included wind from 190 degrees at 8 knots, 6 statute miles visibility, mist, and an overcast cloud layer at 700 feet. The 0856 weather observation at HWV included 6 statute miles visibility, mist, and overcast clouds at 500 feet. A terminal aerodrome forecast (TAF) for ISP, issued at 0741, forecast conditions at 0800 with visibility better than 6 statute miles, scattered clouds at 700 feet and 13,000 feet, and a broken cloud layer at 25,000 feet. An amended TAF for ISP, issued at 0854, forecast visibility greater than 6 statute miles, with broken cloud layers at 700 feet, 13,000 feet, and 25,000 feet. A rawinsonde (weather balloon) launched from the National Weather Service Forecast Office in Upton, New York (KOKX), located about 6.5 miles northeast of the accident site, about 0800 EDT, indicated that the relative humidity decreased from 95% to 75% between about 1,050 feet and about 1,330 feet above ground level (agl). This suggested a visible cloud boundary between these altitudes at the rawinsonde's location at that time. The pilot of a multi-engine airplane departed FRG for New Jersey about 20 minutes prior to the accident airplane's departure. He stated that after departure, he climbed to an altitude about 1,000 feet and flew south towards the Long Island shoreline. As he neared the shoreline, the weather began to deteriorate "rapidly" and he began to lose visibility. He elected to return to FRG and land due to the weather conditions. The pilot of a single-engine airplane reported that he and a student conducted a flight from Bridgeport, Connecticut (BDR), to ISP on the morning of the accident, and conducted an instrument approach at ISP about 0920. He stated that the weather conditions between BDR and ISP were consistent, with ceilings about 700 feet above ground level and cloud tops around 1,500 feet. He further stated that they experienced visual meteorological conditions at their cruise altitude of 2,000 feet after climbing through the cloud layer. He remarked that the weather conditions predicted in that morning's TAF were better than the actual conditions experienced in the area on the day of the accident. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe low-wing, single engine, carbon fiber construction airplane was manufactured in 2006, and registered to the pilot in October 2008. It was equipped with a Continental Motors TSIO-550C, 310 hp turbocharged, reciprocating engine and a Hartzell 3-bladed, constant-speed propeller. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on July 5, 2013, at a total aircraft time of 321.8 hours. The airplane's maintenance logbooks were not recovered, and complete maintenance history for the airplane could not be determined. According to manufacturer and FAA airworthiness records, the airplane was equipped with a Garmin G1000 system, which was comprised of dual LCD primary and multifunction flight displays that provided information about the airplane's altitude, airspeed, attitude, engine parameters, and navigation and communication systems status, as well as a moving map display. The airplane was equipped with a backup altimeter, attitude indicator, and airspeed indicator instruments. The G1000 also included an integrated automatic flight control, or autopilot, system that had the capability to control the airplane in the roll, pitch, and yaw axes. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane's initial impact point was identified as a tree about 25 feet in height that displayed numerous broken and angularly-cut branches. The wreckage path extended about 185 feet from the tree on a magnetic heading of approximately 223 degrees. The propeller, various engine components, and pieces associated with both left and right wings were located along the wreckage path. The main wreckage, comprised of the engine, cabin area, and empennage, came to rest in the backyard of a residence, and was completely consumed by post-impact fire. The extensive thermal damage precluded examination of the cockpit instruments, flight control surfaces, and control tubes. The three-bladed propeller, along with the crankshaft propeller flange, was separated from the engine and located along the wreckage path. One blade was fractured near the propeller hub; the other two blades exhibited s-bending, leading edge gouging, and chordwise scratching. The engine exhibited significant thermal damage, and several of its accessories were separated during the impact sequence. Removal and inspection of one spark plug from each cylinder revealed thermal damage and light-colored combustion deposits. The crankshaft was seized, consistent with the observed thermal damage, and could not be rotated by hand. Borescope examination of the cylinders revealed no anomalies. Only one magneto was recovered, and exhibited significant thermal and impact damage. COMMUNICATIONSInformation provided by Lockheed Martin Flight Service revealed that the pilot placed a phone call to the flight service station at 0630 the morning of the accident and received an abbreviated briefing. The pilot indicated that he would be departing FRG for ISP at 0730, and inquired whether the conditions were "good VFR [visual flight rules]." The briefer advised the pilot of a presidential temporary flight restriction for the area that would be effective later that day, and asked when the pilot would be returning to FRG. The pilot replied that he would return to FRG by 0900. The briefer then provided local notice to airmen (NOTAM) information and advised the pilot of the current cloud ceilings and visibilities at FRG and ISP, which included 9 miles visibility and few clouds at 7,000 feet, and 10 miles visibility, few clouds at 6,500 feet, scattered clouds at 9,000 feet, and an overcast ceiling at 26,000 feet, respectively. The briefer did not provide, nor did the pilot request, forecast conditions for either airport. Official recordings of air traffic control communications provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that the pilot contacted FRG ground control at 0840, and was cleared for takeoff from runway 14 at 0850. At 0854, the pilot requested a frequency change and subsequently contacted the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facility, who provided him with another frequency for the appropriate TRACON controller based on his position and route of flight. The pilot contacted the second controller at 0859. When the controller asked the pilot to state his position, the pilot replied that he had departed FRG and stated, "I need your help sir." About 0901, the controller queried the pilot as to his location, heading, and destination, and the pilot replied he was, "heading to Islip I just don't have visibility." The controller asked the pilot, "Are you declaring an emergency because Islip's IFR [instrument flight rules]," to which the pilot did not respond. When the controller called the accident airplane again about 1 minute later, the pilot stated, "I will go back to FRG." The controller instructed the pilot to "squawk VFR" and approved a frequency change, which the pilot subsequently acknowledged about 0902. Review of FAA radar information showed a VFR target correlated to be the accident airplane depart from FRG at 0851. The target tracked eastbound at altitudes averaging between 1,000-1,300 feet mean sea level (msl) before beginning a left turn toward the north around 0858, about 5 miles south of ISP. About this time, as the airplane tracked north, it penetrated and continued through the Class C airspace surrounding ISP prior to establishing contact with air traffic control. The pilot contacted the second controller about 0859, and during the ensuing conversation with ATC, the airplane tracked north before turning northeast at an altitude about 1,200-1,300 feet, passing within 3 miles of ISP. At 0901:45, about the time the pilot indicated to ATC that he would be returning to FRG, the airplane climbed about 100 feet and began a slight turn to the left before initiating a descending, 540-degree right turn that continued to ground contact. The last four radar targets, at 0902:31, 0902:36, 0902:40, and 0902:45, identified the airplane at altitudes of 900, 700, 700, and 500 feet msl, respectively (See figure 1). A witness located near the accident site observed the accident airplane approach from the east and circle his home twice at a "very low" altitude. The witness described the airplane "flying on its side" in a right-wing-low attitude as it passed over his home the second time, and shortly thereafter, he heard a "loud boom" and observed black smoke. Figure 1 - Final Turn MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONAn autopsy was performed by the Suffolk County Medical Examiner, Hauppauge, New York. The cause of death was listed as multiple blunt force injuries. Toxicological testing was performed on the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Rosuvastatin, used to treat high cholesterol and related conditions, was detected in liver and blood. Ethanol was detected in blood in a concentration of 59 mg/dL. The ethanol detected was most likely from sources other than ingestion. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLThe FAA Aeronautical Information Manual, Chapter 5, "Air Traffic Procedures," Section 5; Pilot/Controller Roles and Responsibilities, stated in part: b. The pilot-in-command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to the safe operation of that aircraft. In an emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot-in-command may deviate from any rule in the General Subpart A and Flight Rules Subpart B in accordance with 14 CFR Section 91.3. c. The air traffic controller is responsible to give first priority to the separation of aircraft and to the issuance of radar safety alerts, second priority to services that are required, but do not involve separation of aircraft and third priority to additional services to the extent possible. d. In order to maintain a safe and efficient air traffic system, it is necessary that each party fulfill their responsibilities to the fullest. Chapter 6, "Emergency Procedures," Section 2, Emergency Services Available to Pilots, stated in part: If continued flight in VFR conditions is not possible, the noninstrument rated pilot should so advise the controller indicating the lack of an instrument rating, declare a distress condition… Section 3, Distress and Urgency Procedures, stated in part: a. A pilot who encounters a distress or urgency condition can obtain assistance simply by contacting the air traffic facility or other agency in whose area of responsibility the aircraft is operating, stating the nature of the difficulty, pilot's intentions and assistance desired. d. Distress communications have absolute priority over all other communications, and the word MAYDAY commands radio silence on the frequency in use. FAA Order 7110.65 (Air Traffic Control) provided guidance and instruction to controllers for determining emergencies and obtaining information for handling an emergency. Paragraph 10-2-8 stated in part: 10-2-8. RADAR ASSISTANCE TO VFR AIRCRAFT IN WEATHER DIFFICULTY a. If a VFR aircraft requests radar assistance when it encounters or is about to encounter IFR weather conditions, ask the pilot if he/she is qualified for and capable of conducting IFR flight. b. If the pilot states he/she is qualified for and capable of IFR flight, request him/her to file an IFR flight plan and then issue clearance to destination airport, as appropriate. c. If the pilot states he/she is not qualified for or not capable of conducting IFR flight, or if he/she refuses to file an IFR flight plan, take whichever of the following actions is appropriate: 1. Inform the pilot of airports where VFR conditions are reported, provide other available pertinent weather information, and ask if he/she will elect to conduct VFR flight to such an airport. 2. If the action in subpara 1 above is not feasible or the pilot declines to conduct VFR flight to another airport, provide radar assistance if the pilot: (a) Declares an emergency. (b) Refuses to declare an emergency and you have determined the exact nature of the radar services the pilot desires. 3. If the aircraft has already encountered IFR conditions, inform the pilot of the appropriate terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude. If the aircraft is below appropriate terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude and sufficiently accurate position information has been received or radar identification is established, furnish a heading or radial on which to climb to reach appropriate terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude. Spatial Disorientation The Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3A) stated, "…the VFR pilot is, in effect, in IMC anytime he or she is inadvertently, or intentionally for an indeterminate period of time,
The noninstrument-rated pilot's encounter with instrument meteorological conditions and his decision to continue visual flight rules flight in instrument conditions, which resulted in a loss of control due to spatial disorientation.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
Aviation Accidents App
In-Depth Access to Aviation Accident Reports
