Pompano Beach, FL, USA
N6709Y
BEECH 76
The flight instructor was providing multiengine flight instruction to two students (who were both pilots), which included simulated engine failures over the course of two flights. The airplane landed, and the flight instructor told the accident pilot, who had only 2.4 hours experience in the accident airplane, that he wanted him to practice engine failures in the traffic pattern. The flight instructor advised the pilot to expect an engine failure during takeoff. While on the right crosswind leg of the airport traffic pattern, about 600 ft above ground level, the flight instructor retarded the right engine throttle lever, reducing the right engine power to idle. The pilot then pressed hard on the right (incorrect) rudder pedal with enough force that it moved the flight instructor's foot off the left rudder pedal. The airplane immediately rolled violently to the right before the flight instructor took control of the airplane; however, the airplane had entered a dive and the flight instructor was unable to recover before the airplane collided with a residence. The flight instructor is responsible for monitoring the students performance providing remedial action immediately if necessary. In this case, the instructor's delayed remedial action did not allow for recovery before the airplane struck the residence. All three pilots stated that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions with the airplane and postaccident examination of the wreckage did not reveal any.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On April 25, 2016, at 1456 eastern daylight time, a Beech 76 twin-engine airplane, N6709Y, was destroyed shortly after takeoff from Pompano Beach Airpark (PMP), Pompano Beach, Florida. The flight instructor, the private pilot, and the private pilot-rated passenger were seriously injured. The airplane was operated by Florida Aviation Academy, Pompano Beach, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions were reported at the airport at the time of the accident and no flight plan was filed for the local flight that was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an instructional flight. The flight instructor stated that he was providing multi-engine instruction for two pilots who were enrolled at Florida Aviation Academy. The two pilots flew together, with one of them flying and the other observing the lesson from the back seat. The instructor said he provided ground instruction and briefed the flight before they departed. The pilot to fly on the day of the accident practiced several simulated single-engine emergencies before landing at a local airport. The two pilots then switched seats for the accident flight. The flight instructor said had the pilot practice numerous simulated engine failures before executing a single-engine instrument approach back to PMP. The approach terminated in a full stop landing on runway 10. After landing, the instructor had the pilot taxi back to the runway because he wanted the pilot to practice simulated engine failures in the traffic pattern. Air traffic control (ATC) cleared them for takeoff and to make right closed traffic for runway 10. The instructor told the pilot before they departed to expect a right engine failure. He said, "About 600 ft, I proceeded to reduce the power on the right engine to simulate engine failure. [The pilot] then proceeded to stomp on the right rudder pedal with enough force to push through my guard of the left rudder pedal causing a violent roll and yaw to the right. I quickly took control and at this point the aircraft was pointed straight down at the ground. I brought both engines to idle and pulled out of the dive. Upon doing so we hit a house and ended up in the backyard of two other homes." The instructor said that if he had another 100 ft of altitude he would have recovered the airplane. The instructor reported that both engines were operating normally at the time of the upset and there were no mechanical problems with the airplane. The pilot observing the flight from the rear seat stated that the flight instructor reviewed emergency procedures with both her and the accident pilot before the flight. She said the instructor "drilled it into their heads" that they needed to anticipate an engine failure at any moment and needed to be prepared. About an hour into the accident flight, the accident pilot executed a single-engine instrument approach into PMP, landed, and then taxied back to the runway for another departure. The takeoff was normal, and the accident pilot made a right turn onto the crosswind leg of the airport traffic pattern. She was not sure of their altitude or if they had leveled out on the cross wind leg, but she saw the instructor reach over and pull the "left" engine throttle to idle while announcing they had an engine failure. The instructor immediately took control of the airplane, which had entered a steep, descending left hand turn toward the ground. The airplane momentarily leveled out, but they were too low to recover and impacted the ground. The observing pilot said she did not remember the impact, but did recall being in the burning wreckage. The instructor had exited and was taking "baby steps" away from the airplane. The accident pilot was having difficulty removing his seatbelt, and she said she was yelling at the instructor for help, but it was too loud and she knew that he could not hear her. The accident pilot was eventually able to unlatch his lap belt and they exited the airplane. The observing pilot reported everything was normal prior to the upset and that there were no mechanical problems with the airplane or engines. The accident pilot stated that he incurred a head injury during the accident and did not remember exact details; however, he recalled that he had performed several simulated single-engine out maneuvers before returning to PMP, where they did a "touch and go". During climb-out, at an altitude about 500 feet above ground level (agl), he began a right turn on to the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern. The pilot said the flight instructor then reached up and pulled "an engine," but he did not recall which one. The airplane then banked right and nosed over. The next thing the pilot remembered was "waking up" in the airplane all alone and it was on fire. He said he was only wearing a lap belt and no shoulder harness. The pilot tried several times to release the lap belt buckle, but the buckle was underneath the seat and hard to reach. He said his fingers were burned and it was struggle to find and unlatch. The pilot was able to finally unlatch the buckle and exit the airplane. He said there were no mechanical issues with the airplane or engines prior to the upset. The pilot said the instructor never told him which engine he was going to fail before they departed because the instructor wanted him to feel which engine failed via the rudder pedals. This was the first time the instructor had simulated an engine failure on takeoff, and he had previously only practiced simulated single-engine out maneuvers at altitude. Several people witnessed the accident, including two air traffic controllers, who were working in the PMP air traffic control tower at the time of the accident. According to one controller, after he cleared the airplane for takeoff, he watched it make a normal departure and right turn onto the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern. He said that when the airplane was about 400- to 500 feet agl, it made a sharp right turn followed by a sharp left turn and entered a steep nose down attitude toward the ground. The airplane then disappeared behind a tree line, before he saw an explosion. The controller did not hear the airplane but did recall that the airplane's landing gear was retracted. Another controller, who was working ground control, saw the airplane when it was on a right cross wind leg of the traffic pattern. He could not recall the airplane's altitude at that time, but said it made a "hard left turn from a southerly heading to a northerly heading" with the nose pointed down toward the ground. The controller said that just before the airplane disappeared behind trees, it appeared to level out. He then saw fire and smoke. A flight instructor was practicing crosswind takeoffs and landings with a student on runway 15 when he first observed the accident airplane in the run-up area for runway 10. Since the runways converged near the departure end, ATC had instructed him and his student to make left traffic for runway 15. The instructor said he heard ATC clear the accident airplane for takeoff on runway 10 and to make right traffic. The instructor said they were turning left base-to-final leg on runway 15, when he saw the accident airplane depart runway 10 and begin its initial climb. After the airplane had turned right onto the right crosswind leg of the traffic pattern, at an altitude of about 600 feet agl, the right wing suddenly "dipped" down. The airplane then very rapidly rolled wings level and the nose of the airplane nosed over. The instructor said the airplane appeared to have insufficient power and just "sank." He described what he saw as a departure stall or the onset of a "VMC" roll, that was momentarily corrected for but there was insufficient power and altitude to recover. The instructor said the airplane disappeared from his field of view followed by an explosion. The instructor immediately flew over the area and assisted rescue personnel to the site. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The flight instructor held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. He also held certified flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single and multi-engine, and instrument airplane. The flight instructor's most-recent first-class Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certificate was issued on February 5, 2016. He reported a total of 1,440 flight hours with a total of 428 hours in multi-engine aircraft, of which, 330 hours were in the accident airplane providing instruction. The accident pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. His most-recent first-class FAA medical was issued on November 16, 2015. A review of his logbook revealed he had a total of about 218.6 hours, of which, about 2.4 hours were in the accident airplane. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The accident airplane was a cantilever low-wing monoplane with an all-metal structure, four seats, retractable tricycle landing gear and a T-tail. It was powered by one 180-horsepower Lycoming O-360-A1G6D engine on the left wing and one LO-360-A1G6D on the right wing, which drove counter-rotating, constant-speed, two-blade Hartzell propellers. A review of the airplane's maintenance logbooks revealed the last annual inspection for both engines/propellers and the airframe was completed on February 24, 2016, at an aircraft total time of 9,601.8 hours. The left engine had accrued 5,868.39 hours since new and 2,118.39 hours since major overhaul. The right engine had accrued 6,454.39 hours of which 2,159.99 hours were since major overhaul. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION Weather reported at the airport at 1453, was wind from 090 degrees at 11 knots, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 2,800 feet, temperature 26 degrees C, dewpoint 18 degrees C, and a barometric altimeter setting of 30.00 inches of mercury. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION An on-scene examination of the wreckage revealed the initial impact point was the roof of a single-level, private residence. Pieces of the airplane's left wing were found on the roof. When the wing impacted the roof, the fuel tank breached and a section of the home caught on fire. As the airplane continued to descend along the wreckage path, it collided with a wooden fence, several trees, and a concrete wall that was part of another home before coming to rest upright on its right side in the backyard of the home that was next door to the home that was initially struck. From the initial impact point to where the main wreckage came to rest was about 150 ft. A post-impact fire consumed the cockpit area, a majority of the fuselage, and portions of the left and right wings. The empennage and tail section were not fire-damaged, but did sustain impact damage. Both engines separated from the airplane and both propellers separated from their respective engine. The cockpit area was consumed by fire and no instrument readings could be obtained except for the altimeter. The throttle/propeller/mixture levers were all full forward and the carburetor heat for both engines was "off." The seat belt webbing and seat material for each seat had burned away and only the metal buckles/latches/floor attachments and seat frames remained. The flap actuator was in the fully retracted position and the landing gear selector was in the up and locked position. The rudder trim was set to neutral/0 degrees. Flight control continuity was established for all flight controls to the cockpit. Both engines sustained impact and fire damage. Examination of each engine and its associated accessories revealed no evidence of any pre-accident mechanical deficiencies that would have precluded normal operation prior to impact. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The airplane's Pilot Operating Handbook (POH), Emergency Procedures section, pages 3-4 to 3-5, stated the following checks should be used to identify the inoperative engine: "1) DEAD FOOT - DEAD ENGINE. The rudder pressure required to maintain directional control will be on the side of the operative engine. 2) THROTTLE. Partially retard the throttle for the engine that is believed to be inoperative; there should be no change in the control pressures or in the sound of the engine if the correct throttle has been selected. AT LOW ALTITUDE AND AIRSPEED THIS CHECK MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH EXTREME CAUTION. Do not attempt to determined the inoperative engine by means of the tachometers or the manifold pressure gages. These instruments often indicate near normal readings. ENGINE FAILURE AFTER LIFT-OFF AND IN-FLIGHT An immediate landing is advisable regardless of take-off weight. Continued flight cannot be assured if take-off weight exceeds the weight determined from the TAKE-OFF WEIGHT graph. HIGHER take-off weights will result in a loss of altitude while retracting the landing gear and feathering the propeller. Continued flight requires immediate pilot response to the following procedures: 1) Landing Gear and Flaps - UP 2) Throttle (inoperative engine) - IDLE 3) Propeller (inoperative engine) - FEATHER 4) Power (operative engine) - AS REQUIRED 5) Airspeed a AT OR ABOVE THE 50-FT TAKE-OFF SPEED (80 KNOTS) After positive control of the airplane is established: 6) Secure inoperative engine: a. Mixture Control - IDLE CUT-OFF b. Fuel Selector - OFF c. Aux Fuel Pump - OFF d. Magneto/Start Switch - OFF e. Alternator Switch - OFF f. Cowl Flap - CLOSE 7. Airspeed - ESTABLISH 85 KTS 8. Electrical Load - MONITOR (Maximum load of 100% on remaining engine) NOTE: The most important aspect of engine failure is the necessity to maintain lateral and directional control. If airspeed is below 65 knots, reduce power on operative engine as required to maintain control. Refer to the SAFETY INFORMATION section for additional information regarding pilot technique."
The flight instructor's failure to maintain airplane control while demonstrating a simulated engine failure. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's improper response to the simulated engine failure.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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