Northport, AL, USA
N447SA
PIPER PA 31
The private pilot and five passengers departed on a day instrument flight rules cross-country flight in the multiengine airplane. Before departure, the airplane was serviced to capacity with fuel, which corresponded to an endurance of about 5 hours. About 1 hour 45 minutes after reaching the flight's cruise altitude of 12,000 ft mean sea level, the pilot reported a failure of the right engine fuel pump and requested to divert to the nearest airport. About 7 minutes later, the pilot reported that he "lost both fuel pumps" and stated that the airplane had no engine power. The pilot continued toward the diversion airport and the airplane descended until it impacted trees about 1,650 ft short of the approach end of the runway; a postimpact fire ensued. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engines revealed no preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The propellers of both engines were found in the unfeathered position. All six of the fuel pumps on the airplane were functionally tested or disassembled, and none exhibited any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation before the accident. Corrosion was noted in the right fuel boost pump, which was likely the result of water contamination during firefighting efforts by first responders. The airplane was equipped with 4 fuel tanks, comprising an outboard and an inboard fuel tank in each wing. The left and right engine fuel selector valves and corresponding fuel selector handles were found in the outboard tank positions. Given the airplane's fuel state upon departure and review of fuel consumption notes in the flight log from the day of the accident, the airplane's outboard tanks contained sufficient fuel for about 1 hour 45 minutes of flight, which corresponds to when the pilot first reported a fuel pump anomaly to air traffic control. The data downloaded from the engine data monitor was consistent with both engines losing fuel pressure due to fuel starvation. According to the pilot's operating handbook, after reaching cruise flight, fuel should be consumed from the outboard tanks before switching to the inboard tanks. Two fuel quantity gauges were located in the cockpit overhead switch panel to help identify when the pilot should return the fuel selectors from the outboard fuel tanks to the inboard fuel tanks. A flight instructor who previously flew with the pilot stated that this was their normal practice. He also stated that the pilot had not received any training in the accident airplane to include single-engine operations and emergency procedures. It is likely that the pilot failed to return the fuel selectors from the outboard to the inboard tank positions once the outboard tanks were exhausted of fuel; however, the pilot misdiagnosed the situation as a fuel pump anomaly.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn August 14, 2016, about 1115 central daylight time, a Piper PA-31-325, N447SA, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain near Northport, Alabama, while diverting to Tuscaloosa Regional Airport (TCL), Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The private pilot and five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was owned by Oxford University Aircraft Charters, LLC and operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the personal flight, which departed Kissimmee Gateway Airport (ISM), Orlando, Florida, about 0855 with an intended destination of Oxford University Airport (UOX), Oxford, Mississippi. According to the fixed-based operator that serviced the airplane before departure, the pilot and passengers arrived at ISM on August 10. Fuel receipts indicated that the airplane's fuel tanks were "topped off" with 134 gallons of fuel before departure on the day of the accident. In the filed flight plan, the pilot reported that the airplane had about 5 hours 10 minutes of fuel on board. According to air traffic control data, at 0915 the airplane leveled off in cruise flight at 12,000 ft mean sea level. At 1059, the pilot reported a failure of the right engine fuel pump and requested a diversion to the nearest airport. The controller then provided radar vectors toward runway 30 at TCL. When the airplane was about 13 miles from TCL, the pilot reported that the airplane "lost both fuel pumps" and that there was "no power." The airplane continued to descend on an extended final approach to runway 30 until it impacted trees about 1,650 ft short of the approach end of the runway. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multi-engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued in August 2014. According to a flight log found in the airplane, the pilot had accumulated 48.7 hours of flight experience in the accident airplane since March 2016. The pilot's logbook noted that he received a total of 2.9 hours of dual flight instruction during two flights on March 17, 2016. The flight instructor who flew with the pilot on March 17 and accompanied him on several other flights stated that he did not provide the pilot with any multi-engine training and he believed that the pilot had not received any training in the accident airplane. The pilot "took the airplane pilot operating handbook home and read it." In addition, the flight instructor did not practice any single-engine operations or emergency procedures with the pilot in the accident airplane. He stated that they couldn't practice those procedures with "people in the airplane and we always flew" with passengers. When asked about the pilot's checklist usage, he stated that the pilot would use the checklists and "go through the cockpit like [he] should." AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records, the airplane was manufactured in 1984, and purchased by the pilot through a limited-liability company on March 14, 2016.. It was equipped with two Lycoming TIO-540-series, 350-horsepower engines, each of which drove a 4-bladed Hartzell controllable pitch propeller. The most recent annual inspection was performed on November 13, 2015; at that time, the airplane had accumulated 3,260.8 total hours in service. According to a flight log squawk list, the right engine fuel boost pump light illuminated several times in the month before the accident. The right engine fuel pump was reported as intermittent, the right fuel pressure gauge was oscillating, and the "[right engine] doesn't want to run [without] boost pump." According to receipts located at the accident site, the fuel boost pump annunciator light illuminated and the pump was tested on June 25, 2016. The fuel pressure and flow were found to be within operating limitations at that time. According to maintenance records, the right engine-driven fuel pump and right engine boost pump were replaced on July 19, 2016, at a Hobbs meter time of 1433.7 hours, about 17 hours before the accident. According to the flight instructor who flew the accident airplane with the pilot, neither he nor the pilot experienced any right engine fuel pump issues after the engine-driven fuel pump and emergency boost pump were replaced in July. The flight instructor spoke with the pilot after the flight to ISM on August 10, and the pilot stated that, "everything was fine, but the screen on the EDM was going out." The flight log squawk list also included an entry made by the pilot on August 10, 2016 that the right engine cylinder No. 1 was "hot on climb." The log also contained an entry dated the day of the accident that the right engine cylinder No. 1 was "hot on climb" and "ran rich of peak = 31", 2200, 23 gal/side, and EDM [engine data monitor] screen flicker." According to the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH), the fuel system of the airplane consisted of fuel cells, engine driven fuel pumps, fuel boost pumps, emergency fuel pumps, fuel injectors, control valves, fuel filters, fuel pressure and flow gauges, fuel drains, fuel tanks vents, and a fuel selector panel. Fuel was stored in four fuel tanks, two in each wing. The outboard fuel tanks have a capacity of 40 gallons each, and the inboard fuel tanks have a capacity of 56 gallons each, for a total fuel capacity of 192 gallons, 183.4 gallons of which is usable. The right and left wing fuel systems were independent of each other and were connected only when the crossfeed system was activated. Under normal operation, fuel was routed from the fuel cells, through the selector valve and fuel filter to the fuel boost pump. Fuel from the boost pump travels through the emergency fuel pump, the fire wall shutoff valve and the engine driven fuel pump to the fuel injector and then into the cylinders. Emergency fuel pumps are installed to provide fuel pressure in the event an engine-driven pump fails. The emergency fuel pumps are also used under normal conditions for takeoff, landing, and when necessary, priming the engines for start. Left and right emergency fuel pump switches are located on the overhead panel to the right of the fuel gauges in the cockpit. The fuel boost pumps are operated continuously and are provided to maintain fuel under pressure to the other fuel pumps, improving the altitude performance of the fuel system. Each fuel boost pump was controlled by a separate circuit breaker located in the circuit breaker control panel. The fuel boost pumps were activated when the master switch was turned on and continue to operate until the master switch was turned off or the fuel boost pump circuit breakers were pulled (off). Red fuel boost pump warning lights, mounted in the annunciator panel, provided a visual indication of an inoperative fuel boost pump. The fuel management controls were located in the fuel system control panel mounted between the front seats on the forward edge of the wing spar carry-through cover. Located on the fuel control panel are the fuel tank selectors, fire wall fuel shutoffs and the crossfeed controls. Two electric fuel quantity gauges were mounted in the overhead switch panel. The right fuel quantity gauge indicated that quantity of the fuel in the selected right fuel system tank (right inboard or right outboard), and the left fuel quantity gauge indicated the quantity of the fuel in the selected left fuel tank (inboard or outboard). Section 4, "Normal Procedures" in the POH recommended that when the airplane is loaded to a rearward center of gravity, fuel from the outboard tanks be used first during cruise flight. In addition, the flight instructor who flew with the pilot stated that they would check the fuel selectors and verify that they were on the inboard fuel tanks before takeoff; once the airplane was in cruise flight, they would switch to the outboard fuel tanks. Once the outboard fuel tanks were "drained," they would switch the fuel selectors back to the inboard fuel tanks. He stated that there was enough fuel for about 2 hours of flight time in the outboard fuel tanks. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe 1121 recorded weather observation at TCL included wind from 170° at 10 knots gusting to 14 knots, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 2,600 ft above ground level, broken clouds at 3,600 ft above ground level, temperature 30°C, dew point 25°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.09 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records, the airplane was manufactured in 1984, and purchased by the pilot through a limited-liability company on March 14, 2016.. It was equipped with two Lycoming TIO-540-series, 350-horsepower engines, each of which drove a 4-bladed Hartzell controllable pitch propeller. The most recent annual inspection was performed on November 13, 2015; at that time, the airplane had accumulated 3,260.8 total hours in service. According to a flight log squawk list, the right engine fuel boost pump light illuminated several times in the month before the accident. The right engine fuel pump was reported as intermittent, the right fuel pressure gauge was oscillating, and the "[right engine] doesn't want to run [without] boost pump." According to receipts located at the accident site, the fuel boost pump annunciator light illuminated and the pump was tested on June 25, 2016. The fuel pressure and flow were found to be within operating limitations at that time. According to maintenance records, the right engine-driven fuel pump and right engine boost pump were replaced on July 19, 2016, at a Hobbs meter time of 1433.7 hours, about 17 hours before the accident. According to the flight instructor who flew the accident airplane with the pilot, neither he nor the pilot experienced any right engine fuel pump issues after the engine-driven fuel pump and emergency boost pump were replaced in July. The flight instructor spoke with the pilot after the flight to ISM on August 10, and the pilot stated that, "everything was fine, but the screen on the EDM was going out." The flight log squawk list also included an entry made by the pilot on August 10, 2016 that the right engine cylinder No. 1 was "hot on climb." The log also contained an entry dated the day of the accident that the right engine cylinder No. 1 was "hot on climb" and "ran rich of peak = 31", 2200, 23 gal/side, and EDM [engine data monitor] screen flicker." According to the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH), the fuel system of the airplane consisted of fuel cells, engine driven fuel pumps, fuel boost pumps, emergency fuel pumps, fuel injectors, control valves, fuel filters, fuel pressure and flow gauges, fuel drains, fuel tanks vents, and a fuel selector panel. Fuel was stored in four fuel tanks, two in each wing. The outboard fuel tanks have a capacity of 40 gallons each, and the inboard fuel tanks have a capacity of 56 gallons each, for a total fuel capacity of 192 gallons, 183.4 gallons of which is usable. The right and left wing fuel systems were independent of each other and were connected only when the crossfeed system was activated. Under normal operation, fuel was routed from the fuel cells, through the selector valve and fuel filter to the fuel boost pump. Fuel from the boost pump travels through the emergency fuel pump, the fire wall shutoff valve and the engine driven fuel pump to the fuel injector and then into the cylinders. Emergency fuel pumps are installed to provide fuel pressure in the event an engine-driven pump fails. The emergency fuel pumps are also used under normal conditions for takeoff, landing, and when necessary, priming the engines for start. Left and right emergency fuel pump switches are located on the overhead panel to the right of the fuel gauges in the cockpit. The fuel boost pumps are operated continuously and are provided to maintain fuel under pressure to the other fuel pumps, improving the altitude performance of the fuel system. Each fuel boost pump was controlled by a separate circuit breaker located in the circuit breaker control panel. The fuel boost pumps were activated when the master switch was turned on and continue to operate until the master switch was turned off or the fuel boost pump circuit breakers were pulled (off). Red fuel boost pump warning lights, mounted in the annunciator panel, provided a visual indication of an inoperative fuel boost pump. The fuel management controls were located in the fuel system control panel mounted between the front seats on the forward edge of the wing spar carry-through cover. Located on the fuel control panel are the fuel tank selectors, fire wall fuel shutoffs and the crossfeed controls. Two electric fuel quantity gauges were mounted in the overhead switch panel. The right fuel quantity gauge indicated that quantity of the fuel in the selected right fuel system tank (right inboard or right outboard), and the left fuel quantity gauge indicated the quantity of the fuel in the selected left fuel tank (inboard or outboard). Section 4, "Normal Procedures" in the POH recommended that when the airplane is loaded to a rearward center of gravity, fuel from the outboard tanks be used first during cruise flight. In addition, the flight instructor who flew with the pilot stated that they would check the fuel selectors and verify that they were on the inboard fuel tanks before takeoff; once the airplane was in cruise flight, they would switch to the outboard fuel tanks. Once the outboard fuel tanks were "drained," they would switch the fuel selectors back to the inboard fuel tanks. He stated that there was enough fuel for about 2 hours of flight time in the outboard fuel tanks. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane impacted trees and the ground, and came to rest in an upright position on a magnetic heading of 011°. The debris path was oriented on a 300° magnetic heading and was about 250 ft long. All major components of the airplane were accounted for at the scene. A postimpact fire ensued, and first responders doused the wreckage with water to extinguish the fire. The forward fuselage was separated forward of the aft bulkhead and was heavily damaged by impact and postimpact fire. Control continuity was confirmed from all flight control surfaces to the cockpit through multiple overload failures. Examination of the cockpit and cabin areas revealed that both control yokes were attached to their respective columns at the time of impact and that the throttle, mixture, and propeller levers were intact in the throttle quadrant and in the full forward position. The left and right engine fuel selector levers were found in the outboard tank positions. The left and right fuel shut off valves were found in the ON position (not shut off) and the crossfeed selector was found in the OFF position. All fuel control positions were confirmed at the fuel valves. The right engine alternate air source was found in the ON position. The left engine alternate air source was found in the OFF position. The flap lever was in the retracted position. The Hobbs meter was located in the vicinity of the cockpit and indicated 1450.4 hours. The circuit breaker panel was thermally damaged; all of the breakers remained in place except the flap control and compass circuit breakers, which were open. The right wing was fragmented and partially separated and all sections were located along the debris path. Several sections were consumed by postimpact fire. The right wing fuel caps remained intact and seated in place. Both the outboard and inboard fuel tanks were breached. The fuel filter bowl was removed and had an odor similar to 100LL aviation fuel; a small amount of fluid was noted on the fuel screens. The right main landing gear remained attached in the retracted position. The aileron trim was measured and corresponded to the neutral position. The right engine remained attached to all engine mounts but was separated from the nacelle. All major components remained attached to the engine. The turbocharger was removed and examined, and the vanes rotated without resistance. There was no rotational scoring on the housing unit. The right pro
A total loss of power in both engines due to fuel starvation as a result of the pilot's fuel mismanagement, and his subsequent failure to follow the emergency checklist. Contributing to the pilot's failure to follow the emergency checklist was his lack of emergency procedures training in the accident airplane.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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