West Caldwell, NJ, USA
N979BA
HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORP G36
The pilot filed an instrument flight rules flight plan and departed from the airport. After takeoff, air traffic controllers observed the airplane “barely climbing,” in a left turn, and leveling off well below the pilot’s assigned altitude of 3,000 ft mean sea level. The cloud ceiling was at 900 ft above ground level (agl) at the time, and the pilot did not enter instrument meteorological conditions after taking off. The airplane only reached about 400 ft agl before it began to descend. The airplane then struck the roof of a warehouse with its left wing, impacted terrain in a nose-low attitude while rotating to the left, and contacted the ground about 0.5 miles from the departure end of the runway. A fire then erupted. The pilot was seriously injured and the airplane was destroyed. Following the accident, the pilot stated to police officers that during his climbout, the airplane would no longer gain altitude, “wouldn’t pull up,” and began to lose altitude. He stated that he had no warning lights or audible alerts, that the engine was running normally, and that he was attempting to return to the airport. He did not provide any additional statements or other information about the flight. An annual inspection of the airplane had been completed 5 days before the accident with no unresolved discrepancies noted. Postaccident examination and testing did not reveal evidence of any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions of the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the wreckage and security camera video revealed that the flaps were up and the landing gear had not been retracted after a positive rate of climb was established after rotation. The airplane would have had trouble accelerating with the landing gear in the down position, which may have degraded its ability to climb normally. The airplane was equipped with a stall warning horn that would sound as the airplane approached an aerodynamic stall. Review of recorded air traffic control audio transmissions from the airplane revealed the presence of the stall warning horn during the pilot’s transmissions for about 13 seconds before impact. This indicated that the pilot likely did not recognize the impending stall and did not reduce the angle of attack immediately to retain or regain control of the airplane, which allowed the airplane to approach and then exceed the critical angle of attack and resulted in the airplane entering an uncontrolled descent.
On January 21, 2017, about 1245 eastern standard time, a Hawker Beechcraft G36, N979BA, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near West Caldwell, New Jersey. The pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The airplane departed from Essex County Airport (CDW), Caldwell, New Jersey, destined for Westchester County Airport (HPN), White Plains, New York. Review of air traffic control (ATC) information from the Federal Aviation Administration revealed that at 1213, the pilot called on the clearance delivery frequency and was instructed to contact ground control. He was advised that the field was reporting instrument meteorological conditions and to file an instrument flight plan. At 1219, the pilot called for his instrument clearance to HPN; the controller advised him that the altitude filed of 1,500 ft was not good for the route of flight and destination and that the altitude was inappropriate and reserved for flight under visual weather conditions. At 1221, the pilot received an instrument clearance to HPN at an altitude of 3,000 ft. At 1227, the pilot advised that he was ready to depart. Several transmissions followed, after which the tower did not get a response from the pilot. At 1231, the pilot advised again that he was ready to depart and, at 1237, asked about the weather and whether he could depart under visual flight rules. At 1243, the departure controller issued a release for his departure and asked the tower to have the pilot climb directly to 3,000 ft. The pilot was then cleared for takeoff on runway 22 to climb to 3,000 ft. At 1244, air traffic controllers described that the airplane was “barely climbing,” in a left turn, and leveling off well below its assigned altitude. Review of ATC recorded audio transmissions from the airplane revealed the sound of a stall warning during transmissions from the pilot for about 13 seconds before impact. Air traffic controllers then observed the airplane descending and saw a smoke plume about 1 mile south of the airport. Review of radar data, security camera video, and photographs revealed that after taking off, the airplane turned left, continued climbing until it reached about 400 ft above ground level, and then began to descend. The airplane struck the roof of a warehouse with the left wing, impacted terrain in a nose-low attitude while rotating to the left, and then contacted the ground with the belly of the airplane. A fire erupted. The pilot stated to police officers after the accident that he owned the airplane and that it had just had an annual inspection. He stated that he had departed from CDW to return to HPN via a filed flight plan. He advised that during his climbout at about 800 ft, the airplane would no longer gain altitude, “wouldn’t pull up,” and began to lose altitude. He stated that he had no warning lights or audible alerts and that the engine was running normally. He attempted to abort the takeoff and return to the field and was unable to contact the tower for a mayday call before crashing. At the time of the writing of this report, the pilot had not submitted the required Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1/2, nor had he provided any other statements about the circumstances of the accident. The airplane’s most recent annual inspection was completed on January 16, 2017. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 251.9 total hours of operation. According to the maintenance repair company that performed the airplane’s annual inspection, they started the annual inspection and some avionics checks on December 13, 2016. During the inspection, they found a crack in the right flap actuator mount, which they repaired. The inspection was normal with no major findings noted, though they discovered two issues that they repaired/corrected: an ignition switch that had a hot ground in every position but off and a fuel drain on the left wing that was leaking. According to the Hawker Beechcraft Corporation G36 Pilot’s Operating Handbook, a stall warning horn located forward of the instrument panel sounds a warning signal as the airplane approaches a stall condition. The signal is triggered by a sensing vane on the leading edge of the left wing. The warning signal becomes steady as the airplane approaches a stall condition. The accident site was located about 0.5 miles from the departure end of runway 22. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear was down, the three-bladed propeller had separated from the engine during the impact sequence, and the majority of the airplane's cabin had been consumed by fire. The engine and firewall had separated from the fuselage. The empennage remained attached via the rudder cables and the elevator trim cables. Control cable continuity was established for all flight controls from the flight control surfaces to the breaks in the system and from the breaks to the forward cabin. The right flap actuator indicated the right flap was retracted. The inboard left wing had been consumed by fire. The left and right elevator control rods in the aft tail area were fractured. The right rod appeared to have been bent in half and fractured due to impact. The left rod was fractured at both ends immediately adjacent to the rod end bolt threads. The separated portion of the left elevator control rod was not bent and remained in one piece. The instrument panel was consumed by the postimpact fire, and the fuel selector valve and strainer assembly sustained thermal damage. The engine remained attached to the firewall via the engine control cables, the exhaust pipe clamps, the starter motor, the alternator wiring, and the exhaust gas temperature and cylinder head temperature wires. The engine mounts were fractured. The engine sustained impact-related damage that fractured the crankshaft aft of the propeller flange and forward of the thrust flange. The crankcase was damaged, and the propeller seal was not observed. The fuel injection lines were deformed downward around the cylinders. There was light soot over the cylinders. The cooling baffle behind the magnetos was thermally damaged. The throttle, propeller, and mixture control cables remained attached to their cockpit controls and respective levers, but the propeller control shaft was fractured from the housing. The cockpit controls were thermally damaged. Torque putty, consistent with that used at the factory, was observed on all the cylinders and the fuel injection lines. The fuel inlet fitting on the engine-driven fuel pump was fractured, and the vapor return line fitting was displaced in the housing. All three of the fuel metering unit fittings were fractured. The induction system remained mostly intact with the intake manifold on both the left and right sides sustaining puncture damage. The intake filter was separated from the throttle body, and the filter was deformed within its cowling bracket. The throttle valve was in the fully open position, and some dents were noted on the balance and intake tubes. The fuel pump remained secured to the back of the engine. The fuel inlet fitting was fractured, and the vapor return line fitting was displaced in the housing. Removal of the fuel pump from the engine revealed that its drive coupling was intact. Manual rotation of the drive coupling while inserted into the drive shaft resulted in a free rotation of the fuel pump. Disassembly of the pump revealed no preimpact anomalies. The throttle body and fuel metering unit remained secured to the bottom of the engine. The throttle and mixture control cables remained secured to the control levers. The controls were operated through their full range; no slipping was noted between the levers and the shafts, and both controls moved with no binding noted. The fuel metering unit was removed from the engine, and the mixture control shaft was bent. The fuel inlet screen was removed, and there was no debris noted. Disassembly of the fuel metering unit revealed no preimpact anomalies. The fuel manifold valve remained secured to the top of the engine. The fuel injection lines remained in place and sustained deformation damage in a downward direction. Remnants of torque putty remained in place on the fuel injection lines. The original safety wires on the housing cap screws were in place. The fuel line between the fuel manifold valve and the fuel flow transducer was removed, and fuel consistent in color and odor with 100LL aviation gasoline poured from the line. The fuel manifold valve was disassembled, and 100LL aviation gasoline was observed in the housing. The screen was clear. The diaphragm was intact and pliable, and the plunger was attached with no preimpact anomalies noted. The fuel injection nozzles were in place, and putty was intact between the line and the nozzle. There was no sign of fuel leakage around any of the nozzles. The nozzles were removed, and all but the No. 3 were clear. The No. 3 nozzle appeared to have oil glazing around the jet, and there was no sign of lead fouling. The oil sump remained secured to the bottom of the two crankcase halves. There were no signs of preimpact oil leaks from the oil sump. The oil quantity gauge was checked, and although it registered no oil, the observed internal components appeared to be well lubricated, and all residual oil appeared to be relatively fresh. Examination of the oil pump housing did not reveal any preimpact anomalies; although the pump was not disassembled and examined, the observed components appeared to be well lubricated with no signs of operational distress. The crankshaft rotated smoothly with no binding noted from the main bearings. The oil filter sustained thermal and impact-related damage but remained secured to its mounting pad with the safety wire intact. The oil filter was removed, and relatively fresh residual oil was observed on the mounting adapter. The oil filter was cut open, and no metal debris was noted in the oil filter pleats. The oil cooler sustained impact-related damage on its outer edge but remained secured to the left aft side of the engine. No preimpact anomalies were noted with the oil cooler. All six cylinders remained attached to the crankcase with no external anomalies noted. The original torque putty was present on the cylinder attaching hardware. Borescope inspection of the cylinders revealed no preimpact anomalies with the pistons, barrels, valves, or valve seats. Thumb compression and suction were obtained on all cylinders during crankshaft rotation, and valve operation was confirmed with no anomalies noted with the rocker arms or valve springs. The crankcase remained intact with no external anomalies noted. Rotational gouges were noted on the crankcase around the crankshaft fracture. There was no sign of main bearing binding during crankshaft rotation. The crankshaft fracture surface was irregular with smearing and discoloration of the metal. The crankshaft was rotated manually, and crankshaft continuity was confirmed from the back of the engine to the front and out to each connecting rod through the pistons. All the crankshaft gear bolts were in place with their safety wire intact. Camshaft continuity was confirmed during crankshaft rotation when all rocker arms and valves went through their range of motion during a compression check. No preimpact anomalies were noted with the camshaft or valve train. The propeller governor remained attached to the front left side of the engine. The control shaft was fractured and separated from the governor. The flyweights were visible through the fractured housing. The propeller remained attached to the propeller flange. The hub remained intact, and all three blades remained secured to the hub. The spinner was displaced aft around the hub and blades. One blade displayed large leading-edge gouges near the tip, with the outermost portion of the blade tip torn away. The blade was bent aft slightly around midspan, and the tip was bent forward. The second blade was twisted toward low pitch and displayed heavy leading-edge gouges and chordwise scratching at the tip. The third blade was twisted toward low pitch with the tip showing curling toward low pitch along with chordwise scratching and leading-edge gouging. The left magneto remained attached to its mounting pad, and remnants of slip putty were still in place with no signs of movement between the magneto and the mounting pad. Manual manipulation of the magneto revealed that it was secured in place. The ignition harness remained attached to the magneto. The magneto was tested on the engine through the ignition harness and the spark plugs. Three of the six spark plugs produced a spark during crankshaft rotation. The impulse coupling could be heard snapping during crankshaft rotation. The magneto was removed, and the driveshaft was manually rotated with spark observed on some of the spark plugs. The magneto was then placed on a test bench with the original ignition harness and produced a spark from each of the leads. The impulse coupling came in and out of operation around 300-400 rpm. No anomalies were noted with the magneto during the test bench functional test. The right magneto remained attached to its mounting pad, and remnants of slip putty were still in place with no signs of movement between the magneto and the mounting pad. Manual manipulation of the magneto revealed that it was secured in place. The ignition harness remained attached to the magneto. The magneto was tested on the engine through the ignition harness and the spark plugs. Five of the six spark plugs produced a spark during crankshaft rotation. The impulse coupling could be heard snapping during crankshaft rotation. The magneto was removed, and the driveshaft was manually rotated with spark observed on some of the spark plugs. The magneto was then placed on a test bench with the original ignition harness and produced a spark from each of the leads, but only after it reached a shaft rotation speed of about 1,200 rpm. The magneto then produced a spark from all but one lead throughout all operating speeds. The intermittent operation could not be duplicated on the test bench. The impulse coupling came in and out of operation around 300-400 rpm. There were some small, isolated areas of impact-related damage noted on the ignition wire insulation. However, during the functional testing of the magnetos, the ignition harnesses produced a spark from each of the terminals except for one lead on the right harness. The spark plugs were secured in their respective cylinders, and the ignition terminals were secured to the spark plugs. The top spark plugs were removed and appeared to be near new with no evidence of carbon or lead fouling. All the spark plugs were oil soaked (the engine came to rest inverted, and oil was noted in some of the cylinders during the examination). The top spark plugs were used during the magneto testing and were subjected to a spark plug tester with no anomalies noted during their functional tests. Magnetos and Ignition Harnesses The left and right magnetos appeared to have been exposed to heat and extinguishing agent during the firefighting efforts. During further examination and testing, it was discovered that on the left magneto, lead 1B had corrosion at the cap end and corresponding block tower. Ignition lead 3B was corroded at the spark plug end of the lead. The P-lead shielding ground attach point screw was still in place with a broken ring terminal secured under it. Lead 2T appeared to have a piece of tape affixed to it that was heat damaged. Several places on the ignition leads appeared to be zip tie impressions. The impulse coupling was rotated by hand, appeared to function normally, and was properly cotter pinned. There were marks on the housing base consistent with movement of the magneto while being held by the mounting lugs. The right magneto had visible impact damage. The upper housing was displaced several 1,000ths of an inch, and there were marks on the opposite side consistent with something striking the housing. The ignition leads had what appeared to be corrosion or possible arcing at leads 2B, 4B, and 6B at the cap ends. The corre
The pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control after takeoff, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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