Clearwater, FL, USA
N271TS
CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22
At the end of a personal cross-country flight, the private pilot terminated radar services with an air route traffic control center and entered the traffic pattern to land on runway 16 at an uncontrolled airport as a line of rain showers approached the airport. An airline transport pilot (ATP) who had just landed on the runway said that the wind was from 240° to 270° about 40 knots, and he had used full aileron deflection to maintain control. After the ATP landed, the wind increased, and it began to rain. The ATP knew the accident pilot was behind him in the traffic pattern and warned him over the radio about the wind. The pilot acknowledged and continued with the approach. When the accident airplane was over the runway, an airport employee heard the airplane's engine go to full power and saw the airplane in a vertical climb before it rolled left onto its back and descended out of view. The employee drove to the accident site and found that the airplane had crashed just east of the runway. A review of weather information indicated that a downburst/microburst/gust front was moving eastward across the airport at the time of the accident. Postaccident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical deficiencies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane or engine at the time of the accident. The airplane's flaps were observed at 100% (fully extended) postaccident. The airplane likely entered an uncontrolled descent and impacted the ground before the pilot was able to raise the flaps to 50%, as required during a go-around.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn May 5, 2017, about 1922 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus SR22, N271TS, impacted terrain during a go-around at the Clearwater Airpark (CLW), Clearwater, Florida. The private pilot was fatally injured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was registered to a private company and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the airport at the time of the accident. No flight plan was filed for the personal cross-country flight that departed Marion County Airport (MAO), Mullins, South Carolina, about 1620. A review of air traffic control (ATC) communications revealed that the airplane departed from the Groton-New London Airport (GON), Groton, Connecticut, about 1103 and was destined for the Hagerstown Regional Airport - James A. Henson Field (HGR), Hagerstown, Maryland. While en route, the pilot elected to continue to MAO. At MAO, he purchased 61.6 gallons of 100LL fuel. After departing MAO, the pilot received flight following services from Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) until he was handed over to Tampa Approach. When the airplane was about 8 miles north of CLW, about 1915, Tampa Approach terminated radar services, and the pilot proceeded to CLW. There was no further ATC contact with the pilot. As the accident airplane approached runway 16 at CLW, an airline transport pilot (ATP) was entering the traffic pattern at CLW in his Grumman Tiger airplane after deciding to terminate a local flight due to approaching convective weather. The ATP heard the accident pilot announce over the airport's common traffic advisory frequency that he was west of the airport and inbound for landing. The ATP told the pilot that there was a noise restriction on the west side of the airport and that he would need to enter the traffic pattern from the east. The pilot acknowledged and told the ATP that he would follow him in. The ATP said that weather was approaching the airport, and as he crossed over the approach end of the runway to land, the winds became increasingly strong and gusty. It took a long time to get the airplane on the ground, and he had to use full aileron deflection to maintain control. The ATP said that there was wind shear, but he could not estimate the speed or direction of the shear. He estimated that the wind was from between 240° and 270° at a velocity of about 40 knots. According to the ATP, while he was on final approach, he saw the accident airplane on the downwind leg and was aware that it was close behind him in the traffic pattern, so he cleared the runway quickly. He then radioed the pilot and told him that the wind was "snotty" at the approach end of the runway and to be careful. The pilot acknowledged. The ATP then taxied to his parking spot and did not see the accident airplane land. The ATP said that after he parked his airplane the wind was blowing so hard that it was a struggle to get the canopy cover on his airplane. It had also started to rain. The ATP was unaware that the accident airplane had crashed until he heard sirens on the airport and responded to the location of the accident. An airport employee observed the accident airplane on final approach for runway 16. He said it was very windy and gusty, and rainstorms were approaching the airport. The employee said that the airplane appeared to make a normal approach to the airport before it disappeared from his view. The employee then heard the airplane's engine go to full power and saw the airplane in a vertical climb before it rolled left onto its back and descended out of view. The witness said that he knew the airplane was going to crash and started yelling for someone to call 911. He then responded to the accident site and found the airplane in an inverted position adjacent to the taxiway. Data downloaded from the airplane's Avidyne electronic primary flight display (PFD) revealed that the flight from MAO to CLW was recorded. The data showed the airplane approaching CLW from the northeast, making a 360° left turn over the airport, and entering a left downwind leg of the traffic pattern for runway 16. The airplane continued to turn onto the base leg and then onto final approach before the data ended about 1922 when the airplane was over the runway. The last 4 to 6 seconds of the flight were not recorded by the PFD. According to the manufacturer, this can occur when there has been an abrupt loss of power. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. Review of his logbook revealed that as of April 26, 2017, he had a total flight experience of about 244 hours of which 23.6 hours were in the accident airplane. His last Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) third-class medical was issued on July 14, 2015, with no waivers or limitations. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane was a four-seat, low-wing, composite airplane with fixed landing gear. It was powered by a 310-horsepower Continental Motors IO-550-N piston engine. The airplane's last annual inspection was on June 9, 2016, at an airframe total time of 1,621.1 hours. The engine was also inspected at this time and had a total of 120.1 total hours since overhaul. Since the annual inspections, both the engine and airplane had accrued an additional 49.5 hours. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONCLW had an automated weather observing system. Recorded weather at 1915 included wind from 280° at 10 knots with gusts to 19 knots, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 4,500 ft above ground level (agl), a broken ceiling at 6,000 ft agl, overcast skies at 8,500 ft agl, temperature 21°C, dew point temperature 11°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.78 inches of mercury. Recorded weather at 1935 included wind from 280° at 14 knots with gusts to 23 knots, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 3,200 ft agl, a broken ceiling at 4,500 ft agl, an overcast ceiling at 6,000 ft agl, temperature 21°C, dew point 12°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.79 inches of mercury. Based on the airplane's flight track, at 1920, it was located in an area of 0 to 15 dBZ reflectivity values. Between 1924 and 1928, Reflectivity values of 10 to 30 dBZ moved over the accident site between 1924 and 1928, and the main band of higher reflectivities of 40 dBZ moved over the accident site after 1928. The 0 to 30 dBZ reflectivity values corresponded to light precipitation. There were no lightning strikes around the accident site at the accident time. An airmen's meteorological information (AIRMET) advisory was valid for the accident site at the accident time. AIRMET Tango was issued at 1645 and advised of moderate turbulence below 12,000 ft. The area forecast issued at 1345 and valid at the time of the accident forecasted a scattered to broken ceiling at 4,000 ft, cloud tops at 8,000 ft, isolated light rain showers, and a west wind with gusts from 25 to 30 knots. The terminal area forecast (TAF) issued for PIE at 1333 and valid at the time of the accident forecasted a wind from 290° at 18 knots with gusts to 28 knots, greater than 6 miles visibility, and scattered clouds at 5,000 ft. A search of weather briefing sources, such as Lockheed Martin Flight Service, Leidos weather briefings, and Direct User Access Terminal Service indicated that the pilot did not receive an official weather briefing from any of these sources. The pilot did receive a weather briefing at 1012 through ForeFlight for a flight between GON and HGR; no ForeFlight weather briefing data was requested or received for a flight to CLW. It is unknown if the pilot checked or received additional weather information before or during the accident flight. A review of the Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) Situation Display applicable to the Tampa Bay, Florida, area for the time surrounding the accident indicated that a downburst/microburst/gust front was moving eastward across the CLW and PIE areas around the accident time. ITWS information is not available to controllers in ARTCCs but is available to airports with air traffic control towers. CLW did not have an air traffic control tower. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe airplane was a four-seat, low-wing, composite airplane with fixed landing gear. It was powered by a 310-horsepower Continental Motors IO-550-N piston engine. The airplane's last annual inspection was on June 9, 2016, at an airframe total time of 1,621.1 hours. The engine was also inspected at this time and had a total of 120.1 total hours since overhaul. Since the annual inspections, both the engine and airplane had accrued an additional 49.5 hours. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane came to rest inverted on a magnetic heading of 073° in a dry retention pond just east of the runway. The initial impact point was a ground scar. Embedded in the scar were pieces of the left wingtip. The main wreckage, which include the empennage, fuselage, wing, and the engine and propeller, was located about 50 ft east of the initial impact point. The left section of the wing was fractured just outboard of the left flap, and the wing tip had separated. There was no postimpact fire, and the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) was not deployed. The roof of the airplane had collided with an elevated storm drain that was made of concrete. A section of the airplane's roof and door were found at the base of the drain. Propeller marks were also observed on the aluminum guard-rail that was attached to the drain. Flight control cable continuity was established from all major flight control surfaces to the cockpit area. The flap actuator indicated the flaps were at 100% (fully extended). The pitch trim motor was found near the neutral pitch trim position, and the roll trim motor was found in about the full left roll trim position. Both front seats were equipped with airbags, and both bags were deployed. The pilot's four-point seat belt/shoulder harness assembly was cut by rescue personnel. The engine remained partially attached to the airplane, and the three-bladed propeller remained attached to the engine. All three blades were bent aft and exhibited polishing at the tips. The spinner exhibited only minor damage. Examination of the engine revealed that it had sustained some impact damage, but the accessories remained on the engine. The fuel pump was removed, and some fuel was observed in the chamber. The fuel coupling was not broken. The engine crankshaft was manually rotated, and valve train continuity and compression were established on each cylinder. The top spark plugs were grey in color consistent with normal wear per the Champion Check-A-Plug chart. Spark was observed to each ignition lead when the crankshaft was rotated. The fuel manifold valve was removed and disassembled. Some fuel was noted in the manifold chamber, and the screen was absent of debris. Honey-colored oil was observed throughout the engine. The oil pump pumped oil when the crankshaft was rotated. The oil filter was removed and opened. The filament was absent of debris. No mechanical deficiencies were observed with the engine that would have precluded normal operation at the time of impact. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONAdvisory Circular The FAA's Advisory Circular (AC) 00-6B, titled "Aviation Weather," issued in August 2016 is the primary basic training guide on many weather hazards, including downbursts and microbursts. Section 19.6.3 of the AC states that downbursts and microbursts are associated with rain showers and more frequently with thunderstorm activity. Downbursts create many hazards for aviation and often cause damaging wind at the surface. Further information on the hazards of downbursts and microbursts and the safest courses of action for pilots can be found in the FAA's AC 00-24C and the FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual and obtained from the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research. The FAA and the National Weather Service provide many examples of downburst and microburst conditions associated with rain showers. Pilot Operating Handbook The go-around procedure described in the airplane pilot operating handbook included retracting the flaps to 50%, after the application of full power. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe Medical Examiner's Office (District Six), Largo, Florida, performed an autopsy of the pilot. The cause of death was determined to be blunt head trauma. The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing that was negative for all items tested.
The pilot's decision to attempt to land while a line of rain showers with microburst activity was crossing the airport, which resulted in a loss of control during a subsequent attempted go-around.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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