LaBelle, FL, USA
N456RM
S.Z.D. SZD 48 JANTAR STD 2
The private pilot assembled his glider for a local flight, and a tow rope from a tow airplane was attached to the glider. According to the tow pilot, the pilot requested to be towed to 3,000 ft above field elevation before release. During the climb out, when the glider was about 200 ft above ground level (agl), the tow pilot noticed that the tow rope had a lot more slack than normal and that the glider was moving around a lot more than usual. The tow pilot started a shallow turn to the right to keep the airplane upwind and "take up the slack in the tow rope," but, during this maneuver, the slack remained in the line. The tow pilot stated that, at 400 ft agl, the glider encountered a thermal and began to climb rapidly while lifting the tail of the tow airplane. The glider released from the tow rope, and the tow pilot continued in straight ahead in level flight to avoid the glider. The tow pilot subsequently noticed that the glider was about 200 ft below the tow airplane in a spin. The glider continued to spin until it impacted the ground. A review of the data retrieved from the onboard flight data recorder revealed that, when the glider reached an altitude of 400 ft agl, its airspeed was 75 knots. The glider's altitude continued to increase as its airspeed began to decrease. The glider reached a maximum altitude of 485 ft before descending to 472 ft about 6 seconds later. At that time, the airspeed reached its lowest recorded speed, about 55 knots. No other information for the flight was recorded. Although the glider's lowest recorded speed was above its stall speed, it is possible that the glider entered an inadvertent stall based on the tow pilot's observations of the glider spinning and descending until impact; however, the investigation could not determine the reason for the loss of control.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn April 14, 2018, about 1540 eastern daylight time, an SZD-48 Jantar Standard 2 glider, N456RM, was substantially damaged after it impacted the ground near LaBelle Municipal Airport, LaBelle, Florida. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by the private pilot as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and no flight plan was filed for the local flight. The witness who assisted the pilot in assembling the glider before the flight stated that the assembly was "normal." After affixing the wings to the fuselage, a positive control check was completed and the pilot prepared for takeoff. The glider was then attached to the tow rope of the tow airplane, and the glider was positioned on runway 14. The tow pilot, who had towed the pilot's glider for the past 5 years reported that he and the glider pilot were in radio communication before takeoff. According to the tow pilot, the pilot requested a "left break" after takeoff, which was precautionary in case the tow rope broke on climbout. The tow pilot was not concerned with the pilot's request because the wind was aligned with the departure runway. The tow pilot also stated that the glider pilot requested to be towed up to "3,000 ft above the field before release" and that the tow pilot acknowledged this request. During the initial climbout, when the glider was about 200 ft above ground level (agl), the tow pilot noticed that the tow rope had a lot of slack, which did not seem normal. He also stated that the glider was "moving around a lot more than [the tow pilot] was accustomed to." The tow pilot started a shallow turn to the right to keep the glider upwind and "take up the slack in the tow rope." After this maneuver, the slack remained in the tow rope, which affected the glider's airspeed. When the glider was at 400 ft agl, it encountered a thermal and began to climb rapidly and the tow rope lifted the tail of the tow airplane. The tow pilot was about to release the glider from the tow rope, but the glider released on its own. The tow pilot continued straight ahead in level flight to avoid the glider; afterward, he noticed that the glider was about 200 ft below the tow airplane in a spin. The glider continued to spin until it impacted the ground. Data retrieved from a Nano flight data recorder that was onboard the glider indicated that, when the glider reached an altitude of 400 ft agl, its airspeed was 75 knots. The glider reached a maximum altitude of 485 ft about 12 seconds later then descended to 472 ft about 6 seconds later. At that time, the glider's airspeed reached its lowest point, which was about 55 knots. No other flight information was recorded. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the glider pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multiengine land, glider, and instrument airplane. The pilot held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for single-engine land and glider. He reported a total flight experience of 25,000 hours, including 71 hours during the last 6 months, on his FAA third-class medical certificate application, dated May 18, 2017. A review of the pilot's logbook revealed that it was his third glider logbook. The logbook indicated that the pilot had over 406.1 hours of total flight experience in gliders. Further review showed that the pilot had accumulated a total of 42.4 hours in the accident glider, of which 19.6 hours were in the 90 days before the accident. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA airworthiness records, the glider was manufactured in 1981 as a one-seat, standard-class, high-performance glider. It was a glass fiber-reinforced epoxy resin construction with frames, ribs, and a center section truss, built up from welded steel tubes, to support the wings; a single-wheel retractable undercarriage; and a towing hook. The cockpit was covered by a two-piece plexiglass canopy with a fixed forward portion and a rearward hinged portion, and the cockpit instruments were on a panel in the central pedestal between the pilot's legs. Aluminum plate-style airbrakes extended from upper and lower surfaces of the wing. A maintenance logbook excerpt revealed that the glider received its most recent annual inspection on November 1, 2017, at a tachometer time of 697 hours. The accident glider was not equipped with ballast. According to an excerpt from section 4.5.4 of the flight manual, which discussed spinning, the height loss during recovery from a spin is about 328 ft or more depending on the recovery procedure. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 1535, the recorded weather at Immokalee Regional Airport, Immokalee, Florida, which was about 18 nautical miles north of the accident site, included wind from 160° at 11 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 34°C, dew point 14°C, and altimeter setting 29.98 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA airworthiness records, the glider was manufactured in 1981 as a one-seat, standard-class, high-performance glider. It was a glass fiber-reinforced epoxy resin construction with frames, ribs, and a center section truss, built up from welded steel tubes, to support the wings; a single-wheel retractable undercarriage; and a towing hook. The cockpit was covered by a two-piece plexiglass canopy with a fixed forward portion and a rearward hinged portion, and the cockpit instruments were on a panel in the central pedestal between the pilot's legs. Aluminum plate-style airbrakes extended from upper and lower surfaces of the wing. A maintenance logbook excerpt revealed that the glider received its most recent annual inspection on November 1, 2017, at a tachometer time of 697 hours. The accident glider was not equipped with ballast. According to an excerpt from section 4.5.4 of the flight manual, which discussed spinning, the height loss during recovery from a spin is about 328 ft or more depending on the recovery procedure. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONExamination of the accident site revealed that the glider came to rest in a cow pasture about 1/2 mile southeast of the airport. The glider was orientated on a 030° magnetic heading, with the debris field extending outward 75 ft from the initial impact crater. All flight control surfaces were accounted for at the accident site. Examination of the fuselage revealed that the cockpit hull was fragmented aft of the wing attachment assembly, and all flight controls and pushrods were exposed. The instrument panel, which was also located within the debris field, sustained impact damage and thus did not provide any reliable information. The aileron pushrods were traced back to the quick locks aft of the wing spars. Both quick locks were intact and did not show signs of damage. The airbrake control was traced to the airbrake assembly in the fuselage and, when manipulated, rotated the airbrake tubes within the fuselage. The elevator pushrod was traced back to the empennage and, when moved, revealed continuity. The empennage was broken away from the fuselage and impact damaged. The pushrods for the elevator and rudder were impact damaged and, when moved, revealed continuity. Examination of the left wing revealed that the leading edge exhibited crush damage. The wing remained intact throughout the span of the wing. The aileron control tube was manipulated, and continuity was established to the aileron. The attachment fitting on the aileron control tube, which was connected to a quick lock in the fuselage, was impact damaged. The left wing was partially attached to the fuselage, displaced forward, and impact damaged at the wing root. Examination of the airbrake revealed that it was in the extended position. When the airbrake control tube was rotated, the airbrake retracted. The airbrake control tube was broken at its attachment fitting, and the control wheel was impact damaged. Examination of the right wing revealed that the outboard section of the wing was fragmented and that the aileron was separated from its attachment points. The aileron control tube was manipulated, and continuity was established to the aileron attachment fitting. The attachment fitting, which connected to the other quick lock in the fuselage, was impact damaged. The right wing was partially attached to the fuselage and impact damaged at the wing root. Examination of the airbrake revealed that it was in the stowed position. The airbrake control tube was rotated, and the airbrake deployed. The control tube was impact damaged at the gear fitting at fuselage beveled gear assembly. The Nano flight data recorder found at the accident site was sent to the National Transportation Safety Board's Vehicle Performance Division for data download. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONThe SZD-48 Jantar Standard 2 glider flight manual, section 4.5.3, notes the following information about stalling: NOTE: The sailplane does not warn before stalling! The stalling in straight flight takes place with nose high above horizon and considerable elevator up deflection. Before stalling the distinct fuselage oscillations appear as well as the oscillation of airspeed indicator hint, when the airspeed drops down to about 68 km/h [36 knots] light pilot without ballast or 85 km/h [45 knots] heavy pilot with ballast. In the same time the oscillation range decreases to about 10 km/h [5 knots]. During dropping of sailplane, the lateral balance can be retained. Recovery by releasing of stick is sure and easy. The stalling in circling appears as a tendency for diminishing the circling radius and is accompanied with the airspeed indicator hint oscillations. In 30° banked turn the stalling airspeed is about 78 km/h [42 knots] light pilot without ballast or about 88 km/h [47 knots] heavy pilot with ballast. During dropping down the lateral balance can be retained. Recovery without troubles. The height loss in stalling at turn with water ballast exceeds 50 m [164 ft]. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe District 21 Medical Examiner, Fort Myers, Florida, performed an autopsy on the pilot. His cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries. Toxicology testing performed at the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory was negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol, and drugs.
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the glider for reasons that could not be determined based on the available evidence.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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