Diamondhead, MS, USA
N7239Q
CESSNA 172
The student pilot obtained his first solo endorsement 10 days before the accident after he had accrued about 165 hours of flight experience. On the day of the accident, he was performing solo traffic pattern work, which included full-stop landings and then taxiing back for each subsequent takeoff. However, interpolation of radar data and the timing of the call to report the accident indicated that the pilot had performed a touch-and-go landing before the accident takeoff and flight. A witness described the airplane at a low altitude and airspeed as it crossed, at treetop height, an interstate highway immediately beyond the departure end of the runway. The airplane then disappeared below the trees. Examination of the wreckage site and the airplane wreckage revealed evidence consistent with engine power at impact and no preimpact mechanical anomaly. Measurement of the exposed threads of the flap actuator corresponded with a full-flap, 40° extension setting. According to the manufacturer's owner's manual, "flap settings of 30° to 40° are not recommended at any time for take-off." Thus, because the pilot took off with 40° of flaps, the airplane was unable to attain the normal climb speed and entered a stall/mush from which the pilot could not recover because of the low altitude.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 22, 2018, at 0659 central daylight time, a Cessna 172L, N7239Q, was destroyed when it collided with trees, powerlines, and terrain during the initial climb after takeoff from Diamondhead Airport, Diamondhead, Mississippi. The student pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was owned by the student's flight instructor, who was the operator of the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 solo instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and no flight plan was filed. According to the student pilot's flight instructor, the purpose of the flight was to conduct solo traffic pattern work at the airport. The student pilot was to conduct full-stop landings and taxi back to the approach end of the runway before initiating the next takeoff. The flight instructor also stated that the student pilot was "not supposed to perform" touch-and-go landings. A police detective saw the airplane while he was traveling westbound on the interstate near the departure end of runway 36. He said that the airplane appeared over the interstate, just above treetop height, traveling "slowly" northbound. The witness used a model airplane to show that, as the accident airplane crossed the roadway, the nose pitched up from a level attitude. Once the airplane was across the interstate and above the trees on the north side, the nose gradually pitched down as the airplane rolled and turned to the left until it was out of view below the trees. The witness stated that his car was directly abeam the airplane at that time and that he saw smoke above the trees when he was about 1/2 mile past the accident site. The witness stated that he used the radio in his car to contact police dispatch about the accident. The accident was reported to 911 at 0659:03. Radar data obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) depicted that the airplane was first detected on radar at 0628:28 then completed four left-hand traffic patterns. The last radar return was at 0658:24, near the end of the fourth approach; the airplane was at an altitude of 225 ft mean sea level (msl) and was 1,100 ft from the approach end of the runway. No further radar targets were associated with the accident airplane. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe student pilot was issued an FAA third-class medical and student pilot certificate in September 2017. A review of his logbook revealed that he had accrued 169.1 total hours of flight experience. His first solo endorsement was dated June 12, 2018, after he had accrued 164.9 hours of flight experience. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records, the accident airplane was manufactured in 1972. Its most recent annual inspection was completed on October 1, 2017, at 4,8984 total aircraft hours. The Cessna 172 owner's manual stated the following about wing flap settings: Normal and obstacle clearance take-offs are performed with wing flaps up. The use of 10° flaps will shorten the ground run approximately 10%, but this advantage is lost in the climb to a 50-foot obstacle. Therefore, the use of 10° flaps is reserved for minimum ground runs or for take-off from soft or rough fields. If 10° of flaps are used for minimum ground runs, it is preferable to leave them extended rather than retract them in the climb to the obstacle. In this case, use an obstacle clearance speed of 65 MPH. As soon as the obstacle is cleared, the flaps may be retracted as the airplane accelerates to the normal flaps-up climb speed of 80 to 90 MPH. During a high altitude take-off in hot weather where climb would be marginal with 10° flaps, it is recommended that the flaps not be used for take- off. Flap settings of 30 ° to 40 are not recommended at any time for take-off. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 0650, the weather recorded at Stennis International Airport, Kiln, Mississippi, which is 3 miles west of the accident site, reported clear skies and calm winds. The temperature was 24°C, the dew point was 24°C, and the altimeter setting was 29.93 inches of mercury. The calculated density altitude at the time of the accident was 1,100 ft. AIRPORT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records, the accident airplane was manufactured in 1972. Its most recent annual inspection was completed on October 1, 2017, at 4,8984 total aircraft hours. The Cessna 172 owner's manual stated the following about wing flap settings: Normal and obstacle clearance take-offs are performed with wing flaps up. The use of 10° flaps will shorten the ground run approximately 10%, but this advantage is lost in the climb to a 50-foot obstacle. Therefore, the use of 10° flaps is reserved for minimum ground runs or for take-off from soft or rough fields. If 10° of flaps are used for minimum ground runs, it is preferable to leave them extended rather than retract them in the climb to the obstacle. In this case, use an obstacle clearance speed of 65 MPH. As soon as the obstacle is cleared, the flaps may be retracted as the airplane accelerates to the normal flaps-up climb speed of 80 to 90 MPH. During a high altitude take-off in hot weather where climb would be marginal with 10° flaps, it is recommended that the flaps not be used for take- off. Flap settings of 30 ° to 40 are not recommended at any time for take-off. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe wreckage was examined at the site, and all major components were accounted for at the scene. The wreckage path was oriented along a magnetic heading of about 210° and was about 75 ft in length. The airplane came to rest upright and was oriented along a 098° magnetic heading. Several pieces of angularly cut wood, some of which were greater than 8 inches in diameter, were scattered around the airplane. The cockpit, cabin area, right wing, and the empennage were consumed by a postcrash fire. The left wing displayed uniform crushing along the leading edge. Striation marks and tearing along the leading edge, consistent with contact with a wire, were visible. The tail section showed thermal damage but was mostly intact. The engine was exposed, the propeller remained attached, and each displayed significant thermal damage. The right magneto and oil filter were separated from the engine, and the left magneto remained secure in its mounts. The engine was rotated by hand through the vacuum pump pad. Continuity was confirmed through the accessory section to the valve train and power train. Thumb suction and compression were observed at all cylinders except for the No. 2 cylinder. The No. 2 cylinder intake valve appeared not fully seated. The cylinder was removed and checked for leaks with water. Water drained from the intake port with only valve-spring tension applied to the valve stem. The valve was "staked" using a mallet, and, when water was again poured into the interior of the cylinder, no liquid was observed draining out of the intake port. Coking on the intake valve stem was consistent with the valve in an open position while exposed to the postimpact fire. Flight control continuity was confirmed from the cockpit area to the flight control surfaces or their associated hardware and attachment points. The flap actuator jackscrew was intact and measured in its as-found condition. Measurement of the exposed threads corresponded with a full-flap, 40° extension setting. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe Mississippi State Medical Examiner's Office, Pearl, Mississippi, performed a pathological examination of the pilot and determined his cause of death as blunt force injuries with thermal injuries. Toxicology testing performed at the FAA's Forensic Sciences Laboratory found that the pilot's specimens tested negative for drugs and ethanol.
The student pilot's failure to retract the flaps following landing and the stall/mush that resulted during the subsequent full-flap takeoff and initial climb.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
Aviation Accidents App
In-Depth Access to Aviation Accident Reports
