Port Huron, MI, USA
C-GLKX
Cessna 340A
The private pilot of the multi-engine airplane was conducting an instrument approach during night visual meteorological conditions. About 1.3 nautical miles (nm) from the final approach fix, the right engine lost total power. The pilot continued the approach and notified air traffic control of the loss of power about 1 minute and 13 seconds later. Subsequently, the pilot contacted the controller again and reported that he was unable to activate the airport's pilot-controlled runway lighting. In the pilot's last radio transmission, he indicated that he was over the airport and was going to "reshoot that approach." The last radar return indicated that the airplane was about 450 ft above ground level at 72 kts groundspeed. The airplane impacted the ground in a steep, vertical nose-down attitude about 1/2 nm from the departure end of the runway. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear and the flaps were extended and that the right propeller was not feathered. Data from onboard the airplane also indicated that the pilot did not secure the right engine following the loss of power; the left engine continued to produce power until impact. The airplane's fuel system held a total of 203 gallons. Fuel consumption calculations estimated that there should have been about 100 gallons remaining at the time of the accident. The right-wing locker fuel tank remained intact and contained about 14 gallons of fuel. Fuel blight in the grass was observed at the accident site and the blight associated with the right wing likely emanated from the right-wing tip tank. The elevator trim tab was found in the full nose-up position but was most likely pulled into this position when the empennage separated from the aft pressure bulkhead during impact. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Although there was adequate fuel on board the airplane, the pilot may have inadvertently moved the right fuel selector to the OFF position or an intermediate position in preparation for landing instead of selecting the right wing fuel tank, or possibly ran the right auxiliary fuel tank dry, which resulted in fuel starvation to the right engine and a total loss of power. The airplane manufacturer's Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) stated that the 20-gallon right- and left-wing locker fuel tanks should be used after 90 minutes of flight. However, 14 gallons of fuel were found in the right-wing locker fuel tank which indicated that the pilot did not adhere to the POH procedures for fuel management. The fuel in the auxiliary fuel tank should be used when the main fuel tank was less than 180 pounds (30 gallons) per tank. As a result of not using all the fuel in the wing locker fuel tanks, the pilot possibly ran the right auxiliary fuel tank empty and was not able to successfully restart the right engine after he repositioned the fuel selector back to the right main fuel tank. Postaccident testing of the airport's pilot-controlled lighting system revealed no anomalies. The airport's published approach procedure listed the airport's common traffic advisory frequency, which activated the pilot-controlled lighting. It is possible that the pilot did not see this note or inadvertently selected an incorrect frequency, which resulted in his inability to activate the runway lighting system. In addition, the published instrument approach procedure for the approach that the pilot was conducting indicated that the runway was not authorized for night landings. It is possible that the pilot did not see this note since he gave no indication that he was going to circle to land on an authorized runway. Given that the airplane's landing gear and flaps were extended, it is likely that the pilot intended to land but elected to go-around when he was unable to activate the runway lights and see the runway environment. However, the pilot failed to reconfigure the airplane for climb by retracting the landing gear and flaps. The pilot had previously failed to secure the inoperative right engine following the loss of power, even though these procedures were designated in the airplane's operating handbook as "immediate action" items that should be committed to memory. It is likely that the airplane was unable to climb in this configuration, and during the attempted go-around, the pilot exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. Additionally, the pilot had the option to climb to altitude using single-engine procedures and fly to a tower-controlled airport that did not have any landing restrictions, but instead, he decided to attempt a go-around and land at his destination airport.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn September 5, 2018, about 2347 eastern daylight time, a Canadian-registered Cessna 340A, C-GLKX, impacted terrain during an instrument approach to St. Clair County International Airport (KPHN), Port Huron, Michigan. The pilot received fatal injuries, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was owned by Flex Air, Inc., and was being operated by the pilot as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the flight, which was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight departed St. Thomas Municipal Airport (CYQS), St. Thomas, Ontario, Canada, about 2304, and was enroute to KPHN. Flight track data obtained from the Stratus 2S unit onboard the airplane indicated that, the day before the accident flight, the pilot completed three flights for a total of 3 hours 37 minutes of flight time. A fuel receipt showed that the airplane was fueled with 106 gallons of fuel at 1836 on the day of the accident at Carp Airport (CYRP), Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, where the airplane was based. The owner of the airplane reported that the pilot intended to fly to fly to KPHN to clear US Customs before proceeding to his destination in Wisconsin on the day of the accident for business purposes. He stated that the departure from CYRP was delayed about 4 hours because the airport was out of fuel and the pilot had to wait for a fuel truck to arrive. Flight track data indicated that the flight departed CYRP for KPHN about 1929 and climbed to 23,000 ft; however, according to the aircraft owner, the pilot encountered adverse weather conditions and diverted to CYQS. The flight from CYRP to CYQS lasted about 2 hours 23 minutes. There was no record of the airplane refueling at CYQS. The pilot subsequently departed CYQS about 2304 and climbed to 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl) and maintained a 290° heading toward WYDUK, the initial approach fix for the RNAV (GPS) RWY 22 approach at KPHN. Review of air traffic control (ATC) information indicated that, about 2335, the pilot confirmed that he was inbound to WYDUK at 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl). About 2337, the controller informed the pilot that the airplane was no longer in radar contact (the airplane had descended below the floor of the radar coverage available for that area). About 2342, the controller asked the pilot if he had passed WYDUK; the pilot confirmed that he had and was inbound for runway 22. The controller then instructed the pilot to cross the ZORIX waypoint at or above 2,200 ft, cleared the flight for the RNAV (GPS) RWY 22 approach, and approved a frequency change to the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF); the airport was not staffed with a tower controller. Radar track data indicated that the airplane was at 4,000 ft msl at 127 kts groundspeed at that time. At 2343:23, the engine data monitor recorded a rapid decrease in fuel flow to the right engine with a coinciding decrease in EGT and engine rpm. The airplane was about 1.3 nautical miles (nm) from ZORIX. The engine data recorded a brief spike in fuel flow to the right engine a few seconds after the initial fuel flow drop; the EGT and engine rpm displayed coinciding spikes. About 2344:01, the airplane crossed the final approach fix, ZORIX, at 3,500 ft msl at 118 kts groundspeed. Another spike in fuel flow, EGT, and engine rpm was recorded, and the engine rpm returned to 600. No other spikes were recorded. About 2344:33, about 3,200 ft msl, the pilot contacted the controller and advised him that he had "just lost my right engine." When the controller asked if he would still make the landing, the pilot stated, "I'm gonna work on it." About 2346:41, the airplane was at 1,700 ft msl at 100 kts groundspeed; the pilot stated, "I see no lights at the runway, uh, and I tried to turn them on. They don't turn on." The controller responded that he did not have control over the lights and there were no NOTAMs concerning the runway lighting. The controller then asked if the pilot could see the airport, and he responded, "Negative." About 2347:20, at 1,300 ft msl and a groundspeed of about 93 knots, the pilot stated, "I'm right above the airport on, uh, one engine, so I'm gonna make a slow turn (unintelligible) to reshoot that approach." The radar data indicated that the airplane was above the airport environment. The controller asked again if the pilot could see the airport. About 2347:32, the pilot responded, "There's nothing lit up here, sir." Radar data indicated that the airplane was at 1,200 ft msl at 84 kts groundspeed. About 2349:35, the ATC controller tried contacting the pilot, but there was no response. The last radar return indicated that the airplane was at 1,100 ft msl at 72 kts groundspeed and had turned right to a westerly heading. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe 51-year-old pilot held a Canadian private pilot certificate with single-engine airplane, multi-engine airplane, and instrument airplane ratings. His first-class airman medical certificate, issued on January 22, 2018, listed no limitations. The pilot's logbook indicated about 690 total hours of flight experience, including about 51 hours in the accident airplane. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane was a low-wing, twin-engine Cessna 340A that was manufactured in 1981. The airplane was equipped with two Continental TSIO-520-NB9A engines modified with the RAM conversion (STC-SE4327SW) in March 2007, which increased the engine horsepower to 335 horsepower. The airplane's maximum takeoff weight was 6,390 lbs. The airplane originally seated six, but one passenger seat had been removed. The last annual inspection was conducted on May 16, 2018, at a total aircraft time of 4,038.4 hours. The last flight recorded into the airplane's journey log was the day before the accident, which noted an aircraft total time of 4,161.1 hours and 1,095.5 hours since major overhaul for both the left and right engines. Fuel System The airplane's fuel system comprised two 50-gallon main tanks mounted on each wingtip, two 31.5-gallon auxiliary tanks located between the spars in the outboard wing, and two 20-gallon wing locker tanks, for a total of 203 gallons. Two fuel selectors, one for each engine, were located between the pilot and copilot seats and were mechanically connected to fuel valves located in each wing. The right fuel selector allowed selection of the right main fuel tank, the right auxiliary fuel tank, crossfeed, and OFF. The left fuel selector was similar, allowing selection of the left tanks. The Cessna 340A Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) provided procedures for fuel management. The procedures stated the following: 1. Set fuel selector valves to left main tank for left engine and right main tank for right engine in takeoff, descent, landing, emergency, and first 90 min. of flight. 2. Takeoff and land with auxiliary fuel pumps on. 3. Use full rich mixture and auxiliary fuel pumps on "LOW" when switching tanks. 4. Operate on main tanks until fuel quantity is less than 180 pounds per tank. 5. Transfer wing locker fuel while operating on main tanks in straight and level flight. 6. Turn transfer pumps off when lights illuminate. 7. Use fuel crossfeed system to balance main fuel quantities if one wing locker does not transfer. 8. Switch to auxiliary tanks when main fuel is again less than 180 pounds per tank. Engine Inoperative Procedures The POH procedures for Engine Failure During Flight (Speed above Vmca) were: 1. Inoperative Engine – Determine. 2. Operative Engine – Adjust as required. 3. Fuel Flow – Check. If deficient, position auxiliary fuel pump to ON. 4. Fuel Selectors – Main Tanks (Feel for Detent). 5. Fuel Quantity – Check. 6. Oil Pressure and Oil Temperature – Check. 7. Magneto Switches – Check On. 8. Mixture – Adjust. Lean until manifold pressure begins to increase, then enrichen as power increases. Note: The first 8 items are outlined in black in the POH. According to the POH, these items are "immediate-action items and should be committed to memory." If Engine Does Not Start, Secure as Follows: 9. Inoperative Engine – Secure. a. Throttle – Close. b. Mixture – Idle Cut-off. c. Propeller – Feather. d. Fuel Selector – Off (Feel For Detent). e. Auxiliary Fuel Pump – Off. f. Magneto Switches – Off. g. Propeller Synchrophaser – Off. h. Alternator – Off. i. Cowl Flap – Close. 10. Operative Engine – Adjust. a. Power – As Required. b. Mixture – Adjust for power. c. Fuel Selector – As Required (Feel for Detent) d. Auxiliary Fuel Pump – On. e. Cowl Flap – As Required. 11. Trim Tabs – Adjust 5° bank toward operative engine with approximately 1/2 ball slip indicated on the turn and bank indicator. 12. Electrical Load – Decrease to minimum required. 13. As Soon as Practical – Land. The POH procedures for Engine Inoperative Go-Around (Speed Above 91 KIAS) were: 1. Throttle – Full Forward (38.0 Inches Hg.) 2. Positive Rate-of-Climb – Establish. 3. Landing Gear – Up. 4. Wing Flaps – Up, if extended. 5. Cowl Flap – Open. 6. Climb at One Engine Inoperative Best Rate-of-Climb Speed – 100 KIAS. 7. Trim Tabs – Adjust 5° bank toward operative engine with approximately 1/2 ball slip indicated on the turn and bank indicator. The first 4 items in this checklist were designated as immediate action items. The POH indicated that, given the estimated weight of the airplane at the time of the accident (5,471 lbs) at 21°C, with one engine inoperative, landing gear retracted, wing flaps retracted, the inoperative propeller feathered, and with a 5° bank toward the operative engine, the service ceiling was about 16,000 ft msl. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 2335, the surface weather observation at KPHN included calm wind; 10 miles or greater visibility; moderate rain; scattered clouds at 5,000 ft and 7,000 ft; broken ceiling at 12,000 ft; temperature 21°C; dew point 20°C; and an altimeter setting of 30.16 inches of mercury. A convective SIGMET was issued at 2255 and was valid for the accident location and time. A Meteorological Impact Statement was issued at 2045 and valid until 0800 the following day. For Central/Eastern Michigan, it advised of scattered thunderstorms moving from west-southwest at 35 knots with tops to FL450 (45,000 ft), ending at 0500 on September 6, 2018. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe airplane was a low-wing, twin-engine Cessna 340A that was manufactured in 1981. The airplane was equipped with two Continental TSIO-520-NB9A engines modified with the RAM conversion (STC-SE4327SW) in March 2007, which increased the engine horsepower to 335 horsepower. The airplane's maximum takeoff weight was 6,390 lbs. The airplane originally seated six, but one passenger seat had been removed. The last annual inspection was conducted on May 16, 2018, at a total aircraft time of 4,038.4 hours. The last flight recorded into the airplane's journey log was the day before the accident, which noted an aircraft total time of 4,161.1 hours and 1,095.5 hours since major overhaul for both the left and right engines. Fuel System The airplane's fuel system comprised two 50-gallon main tanks mounted on each wingtip, two 31.5-gallon auxiliary tanks located between the spars in the outboard wing, and two 20-gallon wing locker tanks, for a total of 203 gallons. Two fuel selectors, one for each engine, were located between the pilot and copilot seats and were mechanically connected to fuel valves located in each wing. The right fuel selector allowed selection of the right main fuel tank, the right auxiliary fuel tank, crossfeed, and OFF. The left fuel selector was similar, allowing selection of the left tanks. The Cessna 340A Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) provided procedures for fuel management. The procedures stated the following: 1. Set fuel selector valves to left main tank for left engine and right main tank for right engine in takeoff, descent, landing, emergency, and first 90 min. of flight. 2. Takeoff and land with auxiliary fuel pumps on. 3. Use full rich mixture and auxiliary fuel pumps on "LOW" when switching tanks. 4. Operate on main tanks until fuel quantity is less than 180 pounds per tank. 5. Transfer wing locker fuel while operating on main tanks in straight and level flight. 6. Turn transfer pumps off when lights illuminate. 7. Use fuel crossfeed system to balance main fuel quantities if one wing locker does not transfer. 8. Switch to auxiliary tanks when main fuel is again less than 180 pounds per tank. Engine Inoperative Procedures The POH procedures for Engine Failure During Flight (Speed above Vmca) were: 1. Inoperative Engine – Determine. 2. Operative Engine – Adjust as required. 3. Fuel Flow – Check. If deficient, position auxiliary fuel pump to ON. 4. Fuel Selectors – Main Tanks (Feel for Detent). 5. Fuel Quantity – Check. 6. Oil Pressure and Oil Temperature – Check. 7. Magneto Switches – Check On. 8. Mixture – Adjust. Lean until manifold pressure begins to increase, then enrichen as power increases. Note: The first 8 items are outlined in black in the POH. According to the POH, these items are "immediate-action items and should be committed to memory." If Engine Does Not Start, Secure as Follows: 9. Inoperative Engine – Secure. a. Throttle – Close. b. Mixture – Idle Cut-off. c. Propeller – Feather. d. Fuel Selector – Off (Feel For Detent). e. Auxiliary Fuel Pump – Off. f. Magneto Switches – Off. g. Propeller Synchrophaser – Off. h. Alternator – Off. i. Cowl Flap – Close. 10. Operative Engine – Adjust. a. Power – As Required. b. Mixture – Adjust for power. c. Fuel Selector – As Required (Feel for Detent) d. Auxiliary Fuel Pump – On. e. Cowl Flap – As Required. 11. Trim Tabs – Adjust 5° bank toward operative engine with approximately 1/2 ball slip indicated on the turn and bank indicator. 12. Electrical Load – Decrease to minimum required. 13. As Soon as Practical – Land. The POH procedures for Engine Inoperative Go-Around (Speed Above 91 KIAS) were: 1. Throttle – Full Forward (38.0 Inches Hg.) 2. Positive Rate-of-Climb – Establish. 3. Landing Gear – Up. 4. Wing Flaps – Up, if extended. 5. Cowl Flap – Open. 6. Climb at One Engine Inoperative Best Rate-of-Climb Speed – 100 KIAS. 7. Trim Tabs – Adjust 5° bank toward operative engine with approximately 1/2 ball slip indicated on the turn and bank indicator. The first 4 items in this checklist were designated as immediate action items. The POH indicated that, given the estimated weight of the airplane at the time of the accident (5,471 lbs) at 21°C, with one engine inoperative, landing gear retracted, wing flaps retracted, the inoperative propeller feathered, and with a 5° bank toward the operative engine, the service ceiling was about 16,000 ft msl. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane impacted a grass field at a baseball complex 0.67 nautical mile from the departure end of KPHN runway 22 on a 266° bearing. Damage indicated that the airplane impacted the ground in a nose-down, vertical attitude before it came to rest upright on a heading about 145°. The right propeller separated from the engine and remained embedded in the ground about 14 ft from the right engine. One of the left engine's propeller blades separated from the left engine propeller hub and remained embedded in the ground about 8 ft from the left engine. The nose cone separated from the airplane and remained in the initial impact crater. The ground impact marks of the left and right engine propellers, fuselage nose cone, and the left and right wing tip fuel tanks indicated a direction of travel about 298°. The empennage was separated from the fuselage at the aft pressure bulkhead. It remained loosely attached by the flight control cables. The nose, instrument panel, and cockpit were crushed aft and the bottom side of the outboard section of the left wing's leading edge exhibited aft crushing. The metal compression indicated an approximate 50° to 70° nose-down impact angle. The left and right wing fuel tip tanks exh
The pilot's improper fuel management, which resulted in a total loss of right engine power due to fuel starvation; the pilot's inadequate flight planning; the pilot's failure to secure the right engine following the loss of power; and his failure to properly configure the airplane for the go-around, which resulted in the airplane's failure to climb, an exceedance of the critical angle of attack, and an aerodynamic stall.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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