North Las Vegas, NV, USA
N7GA
CIRRUS SR-22
The pilot was conducting a visual flight rules (VFR) personal flight with two passengers during dark night conditions. Prior to the flight, the pilot had filed and subsequently activated a VFR flight plan from his point of departure to his intended destination. As the pilot neared his intended destination, he contacted Nellis Air Traffic Control Facility and reported his altitude of 6,500 ft and that he had the weather at his destination airport. He also requested a practice instrument landing system (ILS) approach. The controller acknowledged the request and advised the pilot to expect the ILS approach. Throughout the following 7 minutes, the controller issued various heading changes to the pilot due to departing traffic at a nearby Air Force base, which the pilot acknowledged. The controller then issued the pilot a left turn to a westerly heading and informed the pilot that altitude was his discretion, which the pilot acknowledged. About 1 minute, 54 seconds later, the pilot transmitted “we’re getting a low altitude alert for N7GA, we gotta turn left.” Shortly after, the controller instructed the pilot to “turn left heading 250°,” which the pilot acknowledged. No further communications from the pilot were received despite multiple attempts from the controller. Throughout this timeframe, recorded radar data showed the airplane at an altitude of 6,500 ft msl. The airplane impacted mountainous terrain at an elevation of 6,500 ft msl, about 400 ft below the peak. The wreckage was fragmented and mostly consumed by fire. Examination revealed no anomalies with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the pilot had some sort of terrain awareness warning available; however, it was undetermined what type of system it was. While the pilot reported that he received a “low altitude alert” from an unknown source about 22 seconds before the last radar target, it’s likely that the pilot did not have sufficient time to maneuver to avoid terrain.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn November 26, 2019, about 1730 Pacific standard time, a Cirrus SR-22 airplane, N7GA, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near North Las Vegas, Nevada. The pilot and 2 passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot filed and activated a visual flight rules flight plan from his departure airport of Lake Havasu City Airport (HII), Lake Havasu, Arizona, to his intended destination of North Las Vegas Airport (VGT), North Las Vegas, Nevada. Review of recorded communication and transcripts revealed that, at 1720:23, the pilot contacted Nellis Air Traffic Control Facility and reported an altitude of 6,500 ft and that he had “information papa.” The controller advised the pilot that the transmission was “broken” and confirmed that the pilot had information papa. The pilot responded that he had information papa for North Las Vegas and requested a practice instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 12 left. The controller acknowledged and informed the pilot to expect the ILS approach. At 1723:48, the controller instructed the pilot to turn left heading 270° due to a departure of a flight of four F-35s, which were climbing through 2,200 ft, which the pilot acknowledged. At 1724:40, the controller instructed the pilot to turn left heading 240°, which the pilot read back; he also stated that he had [in sight] the last F-35 off the departure end. At 1725:30, the controller instructed the pilot to fly heading 280°, which the pilot acknowledged. The controller then advised the pilot that a flight of four F-22s would be departing runway 21 and climbing to the north. The pilot responded that he was searching. At 1726:03, the pilot asked the controller to verify that the F-22s were departing runway 21. The controller responded affirmative and subsequently instructed the pilot to fly a heading of 310° and advised the pilot that the F-22s were departing. The pilot read back his instruction. At 1726:54, the controller instructed the pilot to turn right heading 360°, which the pilot acknowledged. At 1727:58, the controller instructed the pilot to turn left heading 270°, which the pilot acknowledged. Five seconds later, the controller instructed the pilot, “N7GA, altitude your discretion,” which the pilot responded with his call sign. At 1729:52, the pilot stated, “we’re getting a low altitude alert for N7GA, we gotta turn left.” Shortly after, the controller instructed the pilot to “turn left heading 250°,” which the pilot acknowledged. No further communications from the pilot were received despite multiple attempts from the controller. Recorded radar data showed a flight track consistent with communication between the pilot and the controller. From 1727:28 to 1730:14, the radar data showed the airplane on a west-northwesterly heading at an altitude of about 6,500 ft msl, with a groundspeed varying between 161 knots and 171 knots until radar contact was lost in the area of Gass Peak. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot’s personal logbook was not located. However, a digital logbook was obtained from ForeFlight, which contained logbook entries between April 20, 1986, through November 12, 2019, for a total of 246.5 hours of flight experience. The pilot reported on his most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical application, dated February 22, 2019, he had accumulated 446.7 hours of flight experience, of which 2.4 hours were in the previous 6 months. Additionally, the pilot and airplane were based at VGT. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane was equipped with an Aspen PDF1000 Pro display, which was not equipped with terrain avoidance alerts. Additionally, the airplane was equipped with a Avidyne FlightMax EX5000C multi-function color display. It was not determined if the EX5000C was configured with an optional terrain awareness warning system. The pilot had a ForeFlight Pro Plus subscription for their electronic flight book application. Per representatives from ForeFlight, based upon his subscription, the pilot would have had access to the Hazard Advisor feature of the application, however, it would have required an Apple iPad to either have a cellular option or external GPS for location reference. The pilot also had access to the Synthetic Vision feature of the application, which would have required the use a compatible altitude and heading reference system (AHRS) device. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONOfficial sunset occurred at 1627 with end of civil twilight at 1655. The moon was in a new moon phase. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe airplane was equipped with an Aspen PDF1000 Pro display, which was not equipped with terrain avoidance alerts. Additionally, the airplane was equipped with a Avidyne FlightMax EX5000C multi-function color display. It was not determined if the EX5000C was configured with an optional terrain awareness warning system. The pilot had a ForeFlight Pro Plus subscription for their electronic flight book application. Per representatives from ForeFlight, based upon his subscription, the pilot would have had access to the Hazard Advisor feature of the application, however, it would have required an Apple iPad to either have a cellular option or external GPS for location reference. The pilot also had access to the Synthetic Vision feature of the application, which would have required the use a compatible altitude and heading reference system (AHRS) device. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONExamination of the accident site by representatives of the FAA revealed that the airplane impacted terrain about 400 ft below the summit of Gass Peak in the vicinity of the last recorded radar target at an elevation of about 6,500 ft mean sea level. The wreckage was fragmented and mostly consumed by a postimpact fire. Examination of the recovered airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONFederal Aviation Administration (FAA) order JO 7110.65Y, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 7-6-1. “Application” described basic radar services that controllers provided to a VFR aircraft. The paragraph stated in part: a. Basic radar services for VFR aircraft must include: Safety alerts. Traffic advisories. Limited radar vectoring when requested by the pilot. Sequencing at locations where procedures have been established for this purpose and/or when covered by a LOA [Letter of Agreement]. FAA order JO 7110.65Y, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 2-1-6, “Safety Alert,” described procedures and circumstances when controllers would provide a safety alert to a pilot. The paragraph stated in part: Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is in a position/altitude that, in your judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. Once the pilot informs you action is being taken to resolve the situation, you may discontinue the issuance of further alerts. Do not assume that because someone else has responsibility for the aircraft that the unsafe situation has been observed and the safety alert issued; inform the appropriate controller. NOTE-1. The issuance of a safety alert is a first priority…once the controller observes and recognizes a situation of unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain, obstacles, or other aircraft. Conditions, such as workload, traffic volume, the quality/limitations of the radar system, and the available lead time to react are factors in determining whether it is reasonable for the controller to observe and recognize such situations. While a controller cannot see immediately the development of every situation where a safety alert must be issued, the controller must remain vigilant for such situations and issue a safety alert when the situation is recognized. Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), paragraph 4-1-18, “Terminal Radar Services for VFR Aircraft,” described the pilot’s responsibilities when operating VFR and receiving radar services. The paragraph stated in part: e. PILOT RESPONSIBILITY. These services are not to be interpreted as relieving pilots of their responsibilities to see and avoid other traffic operating in basic VFR weather conditions, to adjust their operations and flight path as necessary to preclude serious wake encounters, to maintain appropriate terrain and obstruction clearance, or to remain in weather conditions equal to or better than the minimums required by 14 CFR section 91.155. Whenever compliance with an assigned route, heading and/or altitude is likely to compromise pilot responsibility respecting terrain and obstruction clearance, vortex exposure, and weather minimums, approach control should be so advised, and a revised clearance or instruction obtained.
The pilot’s failure to maintain clearance from terrain during cruise flight in dark night conditions.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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