Malbis, AL, USA
N3156W
Beech F33
The pilot departed on a visual flight rules cross-country flight in daylight marginal visual flight rules conditions. Flight track and weather radar data indicated that, about 15 minutes after departure, the airplane made a 360° decreasing radius left turn after encountering increasing rain showers and possible cloud layers. After the turn, the ground track became erratic as the airplane descended and its groundspeed varied between 150 and 34 knots, before it struck trees and impacted a field. All major components of the airplane were located in the vicinity of the main wreckage. Examination of the wreckage revealed no major malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation prior to the accident. The pilot requested a preflight weather briefing along the intended route of flight for both the afternoon of the accident and the following day from flight service. The briefer stated that the forecast conditions for the following day included thunderstorms, rain showers, low ceilings, and reduced visibility; and that forecast conditions for the accident day included a convective SIGMET warning of instrument metrological conditions, heavy precipitation, and severe turbulence. The briefer advised that although reported observations indicated visual flight rules conditions at the surface, thunderstorms and rain showers were already present in the area, and visual flight rules flight was not recommended. The pilot stated that he would probably depart that afternoon because weather would be worse the following day and shared that his own review of weather showed “everything is VFR as we speak.” The briefer confirmed no instrument conditions at the surface existed but cautioned that cloud layers were “getting pretty close” and areas along the route may drop to instrument conditions due to precipitation. The pilot said he could avoid the precipitation unless he encountered a solid line of thunderstorms. He added, “If I’m going VFR I’m going this afternoon, unless I got clouds that are getting low enough that I can’t fly… and I haven’t heard anything to tell me that.” In response the briefer offered a recent weather observation from Mobile Alabama (about 25 miles west of the intended route of flight) showing visibility of 1.5 miles in heavy rain and mist, and advised the pilot that areas along the route of flight experiencing rain showers or thunderstorms may have visibility or ceilings reduced to instrument meteorological conditions, as it did in Mobile. The pilot and briefer then discussed where the precipitation was occurring, and the location covered by the convective SIGMETs before concluding the call. In the pilot’s conversation with the briefer, he expressed a sense of urgency to depart for the flight to a destination 267 nm away under less-than-optimal conditions because conditions were forecast to be worse the next day; and evidence indicates that the pilot had a meeting near the destination the day after the accident. As a noninstrument-rated pilot, his decision to conduct a flight into deteriorating weather conditions that included heavy rain showers and likely cloud layers, would have made him vulnerable to the development of spatial disorientation as he encountered areas of restricted visibility. Flight track data in the final moments show altitude and airspeed variations, an erratic flightpath, and a decreasing radius 360° turn, which are characteristic of the known effects of spatial disorientation.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn July 28, 2020, about 1901 central daylight time, a Beech F33A, N3156W, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident in Malbis, Alabama. The private pilot and the passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Family members reported that the pilot’s original plan was to return home to the Northwest Alabama Regional Airport (MSL), Muscle Shoals, Alabama, on either July 29 or July 30, depending on the weather. The pilot had a business meeting scheduled for July 29. At 1615, the pilot called flight service for a weather briefing. A review of that recorded briefing revealed that the pilot inquired about the weather for his route of flight from Jack Edwards National Airport (JKA), Gulf Shores, Alabama, to MSL, for both that afternoon and the following day. The briefer responded “it doesn’t look good” for the following day, with thunderstorms, rain showers, low ceilings and reduced visibility expected, and that visual flight rules (VFR) flight was not recommended. The pilot then inquired about the weather for a flight that afternoon around 1800. The briefer responded, “That’s not looking so good right now” and advised that there were thunderstorms and rain showers over the area, and a convective SIGMET for the southern portion of his route, which noted an area of thunderstorms moving eastward. For the northern portion of the route, a center weather advisory was in effect for developing thunderstorms, and “weather” was currently building along and on both sides of the route and around the destination. The briefer advised that VFR flight was not recommended. The pilot responded “It looks like my best shot is, I’m gonna probably go this afternoon because its going to be worse tomorrow…what I’m seeing… reported… online anyway is that everything is VFR as we speak … are you seeing anything… between here and Muscle Shoals that’s not VFR?” The briefer responded “I have some clouds that are between 1,200 and 2,000 feet and…then some higher clouds…multiple layers of clouds, I don’t see anybody that’s reporting [instrument meteorological conditions] either visibility or ceilings but there are clouds that are you know getting down pretty close to it even though they’re scattered. You get into the areas where the precipitation is, and it could be IFR.” The pilot responded “Well, I feel confident that if I go during the daylight that I can, unless I got a solid line of thunderstorms, that I can go around a lot of precipitation.” The pilot added “If I’m going VFR I’m going this afternoon, unless I got clouds that are getting low enough that I can’t fly… and I haven’t heard anything to tell me that.” The briefer then offered a recent weather observation from Mobile, Alabama (about 25 miles west of the intended route of flight) which indicated a visibility of 1.5 miles in heavy rain and mist. The briefer advised that areas along the route of flight that may be experiencing rain showers or thunderstorms may have the visibility or ceilings reduced to instrument meteorological conditions, as it did in Mobile. The pilot and briefer then discussed where the precipitation was occurring, and the location covered by the convective SIGMETs in the area before concluding the call. According to a customer service representative at a fixed based operator (FBO) at JKA, the pilot and his wife arrived at the FBO about 1630 or 1700. They stayed there for about an hour and the pilot kept checking the weather in the flight planning room, and on a monitor in the lobby which displayed weather radar from Flight Aware. The pilot called a family member about 1800 and said that he was unsure if he would be able to depart that evening and discussed returning to the house for dinner. About 15-20 minutes later, the pilot telephoned again, and said “they had a window and were leaving after all.” According to air traffic control (ATC) radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the airplane departed JKA about 1845, and flew toward the north. The pilot contacted Pensacola approach control, requested VFR flight following, and advised that his intended altitude was 3,000 ft. At 1854, the airplane turned left about 90° (heading west) and descended from 3,200 ft to 2,500 ft. A witness located in her back yard about 1/2 mile from the turn reported hearing a small airplane nearby and described the engine sound as the “same sound as when crop dusters dive.” She tried to look for the airplane; however, the “cloud cover was just too thick” and the “vertical visibility was very low.” The airplane then sounded as though it recovered and flew away. At 1854:17, the air traffic controller asked the pilot, “Do you need any help on that that cell off to your north there? Looks like you took uh pretty harsh westbound turn.” The pilot did not reply. About 30 seconds later, the controller contacted the pilot, and advised him that if he continued westbound for about 10 miles, he would be “clear of all that weather” north of the airplane’s position. The pilot did not respond. The controller then handed off the flight to another controller, and the airplane began a turn to the north. When the new controller asked the pilot what his intentions were, he replied “right now I’m trying to get through [unintelligible] clouds here.” The controller then asked the pilot if he intended to continue to the northwest and advised that a west heading for about 5 or 6 miles would “get you in to less precip[itation].” The pilot acknowledged. At 1856:25, the controller advised that there was an area that was 10 miles in diameter of “heavy to extreme precipitation” located about 5 miles north of his current position. The pilot did not respond. The airplane’s track continued in a north-northeasterly direction, and climbed to an altitude of about 5,200 ft. After having traveled about 5 miles on the northerly heading, the airplane began a decreasing radius 360° turn to the left, during which the altitude increased from 5,000 ft to 5,800 ft and then decreased back to 5,000 ft. Over the next two minutes, the track became erratic as the altitude decreased from 5,000 ft to 1,275 ft and the groundspeed varied between 150 and 34 knots. At 1900:23, the pilot transmitted a partial callsign and there were no further communications from the pilot. The airplane’s last position was recorded at 19:00:47, located about 0.1 nautical mile northeast of the accident site. Figure 1 - Left 360 Degree Turn Figure 2 - Last 30 Seconds of Track Data AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA airworthiness records, the airplane was equipped with electronic primary and multifunction displays. The primary flight display included a synthetic vision function. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe 1855, weather conditions reported at HL Sonny Callahan Airport (CQF), Fairhope, Alabama, located about 18 nautical miles southwest of the accident site, included overcast skies at 1,200 ft, visibility ½ (statute) mile, heavy rain, temperature 23° C, dewpoint 22°C, wind calm. Figure 3 depicts a weather radar scan at 1857, as the airplane’s track entered increasing levels of reflectivity. Figure 3 – The airplane’s radar-derived flight track (magenta) overlaid on top of the Mobile, Alabama WSR-88D weather radar scan for 1857. The white circle shows the approximate location of the airplane at that time. Further review of weather radar scans and satellite data revealed that the airplane’s flight track remained in areas of lower reflectivity from about 1846 through 1853. Examination of upper air sounding data for the accident location and time, revealed the possibility of clouds from 1,500 through 14,000 ft msl, and the possibility of low-level windshear between the surface and 1,500 ft msl. Infrared satellite data indicated cloud tops near 41,000 ft msl. The radar scan at 1903:52 (about 3 minutes after the accident) indicated moderate to very heavy rain in the area of the accident site. Weather forecast data available prior to the flight and valid at 1900 included a convective SIGMET for the route of flight, which warned of instrument metrological conditions, heavy precipitation, and severe turbulence that were likely when encountering the precipitation. Additionally, Graphical Forecasts for Aviation (GFA) indicated visual flight rules surface visibilities expected along the route of flight (which was consistent with the current observations at the time the pilot received his weather briefing). The GFA also included a forecast of 30-60 % chance of rain showers, and a 30-50 % chance of thunderstorm activity along a majority of the intended route of flight. The weather conditions reported at JKA near the time of departure included visibility 5 miles in rain (or light rain) overcast clouds at 8,500 ft, scattered to broken clouds at 7,500 ft, and scattered clouds at 2,200 ft. Visibility of 3 to 5 miles (and/or ceilings from 1,000 to 3,000 ft) is considered as marginal visual flight rules conditions by the National Weather Service. AIRPORT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA airworthiness records, the airplane was equipped with electronic primary and multifunction displays. The primary flight display included a synthetic vision function. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONExamination of the accident site by an FAA inspector revealed that the airplane struck trees, impacted a field, and came to rest upright at the end of a 215 ft long debris path. All major components of the airplane were located in the vicinity of the main wreckage. Most of the fuselage above and forward of the wings was consumed by a post-impact fire. Both wings exhibited leading edge crush damage. The wing center section, areas near both wing roots and the right-wing leading edge sustained significant fire damage. The empennage was largely intact. The engine was completely separated from the fuselage and was found 40 ft to the southwest of the main wreckage. The engine sustained impact damage but was largely intact and did not sustain any fire damage. The engine case appeared intact with no holes or breeches. A follow-up examination of the airplane confirmed flight control continuity from each flight control surface to recovery cuts in the cables, located near the wing center section. All three propeller blades exhibited leading edge damage and twisting near their tips. Examination of the engine revealed no anomalies with the exception of the left magneto, which would not produce spark on any lead when tested. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONThe FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute's publication, "Introduction to Aviation Physiology," defines spatial disorientation as a “loss of proper bearings; state of mental confusion as to position, location, or movement relative to the position of the earth.” Factors contributing to spatial disorientation include changes in acceleration, flight in IFR conditions, frequent transfer between visual flight rules and IFR conditions, and unperceived changes in aircraft attitude. The FAA’s Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3B) describes some hazards associated with flying when the ground or horizon are obscured. The handbook states, in part, the following: The vestibular sense (motion sensing by the inner ear) in particular can and will confuse the pilot. Because of inertia, the sensory areas of the inner ear cannot detect slight changes in airplane attitude, nor can they accurately sense attitude changes that occur at a uniform rate over a period of time. On the other hand, false sensations are often generated, leading the pilot to believe the attitude of the airplane has changed when, in fact, it has not. These false sensations result in the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation.
The noninstrument-rated pilot’s decision to depart in deteriorating weather conditions, which led to restricted visibility and the pilot’s loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation. Contributing to the pilot’s poor decision-making was self-induced pressure.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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