Springfield, TN, USA
N615MW
ROTORSPORT UK LTD MTOsport 2017
The pilot conducted an intersection takeoff with the gyroplane loaded near its maximum gross weight. The pilot stated he lifted off at 45 knots and accelerated "in ground effect" in an attempt to reach his planned climb speed of 55 knots, but the gyroplane would not accelerate past 48 knots. Data from an onboard GPS navigation device revealed that, in calm winds, the gyroplane reached a maximum groundspeed of 40 knots. Although the gyrocopter was only about 10 ft above the ground (agl) where, based on the pilot’s performance planning, it should have been 50 ft agl, and sufficient runway and turf overrun were available to abort the takeoff, the pilot chose to continue the takeoff. As the gyroplane approached the airport boundary, it was neither climbing nor accelerating. Due to obstacles beyond the airport’s boundary, the pilot performed a forced landing between the airport boundary fence and the road. The gyroplane landed hard and sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. Despite the pilot having completed detailed weight and balance and performance-planning calculations, the pilot continued the takeoff when the gyroplane failed to achieve its predicted performance by large margins. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical deficiencies with the gyroplane that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the wreckage and a postaccident engine run revealed no anomalies with the gyrocopter. The reason the gyrocopter did not perform as expected could not be determined based on available evidence.
On August 11, 2020, about 0815 central daylight time, a Rotorsport UK LTD MTOsport 2017 gyroplane, N615MW, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Springfield, Tennessee. The pilot and his passenger were not injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to the pilot, the gyroplane was loaded 8 lbs below its maximum allowable gross weight when he taxied it for an intersection takeoff from runway 4 at Springfield-Robertson County Airport (M91), Springfield, Tennessee. From that takeoff point, about 2,300 ft of the 5,505-ft-long runway remained available for the takeoff. At 45 knots, the pilot lifted the nose, and the gyroplane lifted off from the runway. The pilot accelerated "in ground effect" in an attempt to attain his planned climb speed of 55 knots, but the gyroplane would not accelerate past 48 knots. According to the pilot, the throttle was fully advanced, and there was no indication of any engine malfunction. As the gyrocopter had attained an airspeed in the range of the published best-angle-of-climb speeds (45 to 50 knots), the pilot chose to continue the takeoff. As the gyrocopter approached the airport boundary, it had "only climbed to probably 50 [ft]" and was not accelerating. The pilot chose to perform a forced landing between the airport boundary fence and a road to avoid powerlines off the departure end of the runway. According to the pilot, the gyroplane “bounced hard and rolled left” during the landing, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot provided performance planning information based on the gyroplane's weight and the atmospheric conditions at the time of takeoff. The information indicated the takeoff roll would be about 400 ft and the distance to clear a 50 ft obstacle would be about 1,813 ft. A review of surveillance video and data from an onboard GPS navigation device that captured the accident flight revealed that the gyroplane accelerated to a maximum of 40 knots ground speed and was about 10 ft above the runway surface at the point where it should have been in a steady-state climb and clearing a 50-ft obstacle. From that point, about 400 ft of runway and 1,200 ft of turf runway overrun remained. The gyroplane was examined by Federal Aviation Administration aviation safety inspectors at the scene, and flight control continuity was confirmed. An engine run was conducted on the airframe using the gyroplane's own battery and fuel system. The engine started immediately, accelerated smoothly, and ran continuously without interruption. In the NTSB Form 6120.1 Pilot/Operator Accident Report Form, the pilot reported that there were no mechanical deficiencies with the gyroplane. The pilot provided charts and statements which detailed his predicted performance, and his actual performance, then theorized that perhaps the published performance-planning data for the gyroplane were somehow inaccurate. The pilot stated: I had mentioned that I had over 2000 take offs and landings in the last 6 months in our 2 AutoGyro gyroplanes. The VAST majority of those were solo and at 100 to 230 lbs below max gross weight. I am concerned that this experience may have masked a deficiency in the performance of the MTOS-2017 equipped with the Rotax 912ULS 100hp engine and HTC prop, a deficiency compared to the published performance data, which I failed to detect until analyzing this accident in detail. Given that I climbed out at Best Angle of Climb speed and never reached an appropriate altitude, I do have a concern that the published AutoGyro performance numbers might require a correction… According to Rotosport’s Chief Compliance Officer, he was the factory test pilot who performed the flight tests on the MTOsport 2017 model gyroplane equipped with the Rotax 912ULS engine and HTC propeller. The evaluations were “recorded via a datalogger and are very accurate.” According to the proprietary flight test report addendum published following these flights: The MTOsport 2017 flight testing with the 914UL engine was summarised under RSUK0384, which was a comprehensive flight test report demonstrating compliance to BCAR Section T, CRI E-01 and the German BUT. The purpose of this document is to summarise the comparative flight tests undertaken to prove compliance for the aircraft fitted with a 912ULS engine. In a telephone interview, the pilot said, “I regret the intersection takeoff. I would never do that in an airplane. I became complacent because I was used to a 400-ft ground run.” Later in the interview, the pilot said he regretted the use of the word “complacent.” He said that most of his flights in the gyroplane were solo and that perhaps his confidence in the performance capabilities of the gyroplane with only himself onboard adversely affected his expectation of performance with a passenger onboard and the gyroplane’s weight at or near its maximum allowable. In the Operator/Owner Safety Recommendation section of the NTSB Form 6120.1, the pilot wrote, “…we wouldn’t be talking had I chosen the full runway length of 5500 [ft] instead of the just over 2200 [ft] of runway remaining due to the intersection takeoff…” According to the FAA Rotorcraft Flying Handbook, “planning a course of action for an abort decision at various stages of the takeoff is the best way to ensure the gyroplane can be brought safely to a stop should the need arise.” According to the FAA Airplane Flying Handbook, “prior to takeoff, the pilot should identify a point along the runway at which the airplane should be airborne. If that point is reached and the airplane is not airborne, immediate action should be taken to discontinue the takeoff.”
The pilot’s decision to continue the takeoff when the gyroplane’s actual performance failed to match that predicted in his performance planning. Contributing to the accident was the gyrocopter’s insufficient performance for reasons that could not be determined.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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