Wheeling, IL, USA
N1128M
LEARJET 60
The flight crew of the nonscheduled air taxi airplane inadvertently landed on runway 30 instead of runway 34 at Chicago Executive Airport, Wheeling, Illinois. Before departure, the captain conducted a time-of-arrival landing distance assessment and calculated a factored landing distance of 4,790 ft. The landing distance available on runway 34 was 5,001 ft. During the visual approach to the airport, the flight crew misidentified runway 30 as runway 34; visually aligned with runway 30, which had an available landing distance of 3,983 ft; and used the runway 30 PAPI lights to provide vertical guidance to the runway. Sufficient landing distance was not available on runway 30, and the captain steered the airplane to the left after realizing that it would not be able to stop before the end of the runway surface. The airplane subsequently overran the runway and came to rest by the airport perimeter fence, causing substantial damage to the right wing. The flight crew did not recognize its runway alignment error until after landing.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn October 21, 2020, about 2255 central daylight time, a Learjet 60 airplane, N1128M, landed on runway 30 instead of runway 34 at Chicago Executive Airport (PWK), Wheeling, Illinois, and overran the end of the runway. The two pilots and six passengers were not injured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 nonscheduled air taxi flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The accident flight departed Cuyahoga County Airport, Cleveland, Ohio about 2158 (2258 eastern daylight time). For the first portion of the flight, the first officer was the pilot flying (PF), and captain was the pilot monitoring. At 2237:28, the captain called for the approach checklist and briefed the approach to PWK. The crew planned for a visual approach to runway 34; as a backup, the captain set up the instrument landing system approach frequency for runway 16 into the navigation system for a possible circle to land on runway 34. During a postaccident interview, the captain stated that, about this point in the flight, he and the first officer discussed the pre-departure landing distance assessment that used wet runway assumptions for a landing on runway 34. The assessment showed that a factored landing distance of 4,790 ft was required. At 2241:09, the flight crew exchanged flight controls, and the captain became the pilot flying as the airplane descended through 8,000 feet mean sea level when it was about 50 miles from PWK. The flight crew navigated around minor rain showers and was cleared direct to PWK at 2249:26. The crewmembers reported, during postaccident interviews, that they had trouble turning on the pilot-controlled runway lighting at PWK; two attempts to turn on the runway lights were recorded on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) at 2250:53 and 2252:19. Between those times, at 2251:01, the first officer stated that he thought that he saw the field. and the first officer confirmed he had runway 24 in sight at 2252:39. The first officer then told the Chicago approach controller that the field was in sight, and the controller cleared the airplane for the visual approach to runway 34. About 2253:00, the airplane began to turn left toward the runway, and the first officer reported, on the common traffic advisory frequency for PWK, that the airplane was on a right base for runway 34 (as recorded by the CVR at 2253:16). The captain asked the first officer to input the Northbrook VOR frequency into the navigation system. The captain stated that he saw the runway and a set of precision approach path indicator lights on the right side of the runway and followed that guidance to the runway. The airplane touched down at 2255:20, and the captain stated that the ground spoilers extended normally, the thrust reversers were deployed “carefully” because of a crosswind, and brakes were applied immediately. At 2255:24, the first officer called 100 knots and 1,000 feet of runway remaining. The captain recognized that the airplane would not stop by the end of the runway surface and steered the airplane left to avoid a road. At 2255:45, the CVR recorded sounds indicating the airplane had left the runway surface. The airplane came to rest at the airport perimeter fence a few seconds later. The crewmembers commenced an evacuation of the airplane and was told by ground personnel afterward that they landed the airplane on runway 30 instead of runway 34. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 2252, the PWK automated surface observing system reported the wind from 080° at 7 knots, a visibility of 10 statute miles or greater, ceiling overcast at 4,500 ft above ground level, a temperature of 11°C and a dew point temperature of 8°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.19 inches of mercury. The remarks section indicated that, 0.01 inch of liquid equivalent precipitation had fallen since 2152. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing. The upper wing skin was deformed in the downward direction aft of an area of leading-edge damage, and the lower wing skin was deformed and gouged. A right wing spar was also damaged. The damage to the spar and wing skins required major repairs.
The flight crew's misidentification of the landing runway, which resulted in a runway overrun and the airplane’s impact with the airport perimeter fence.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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