Fernandina Beach, FL, USA
N456FL
RAYTHEON 400A
The air taxi flight departed in visual meteorological conditions. Upon arrival in the area of the destination airport, the flight crew of the business jet encountered instrument meteorological conditions and precipitation as a trough passed through the area. During the downwind leg of the instrument approach to runway 13, the copilot checked the automated surface-reported wind, which was from 110° at 4 knots gusting to 18 knots. Audio from the airplane’s cockpit voice recorder showed that, as the crew continued the approach, the copilot twice commented to the pilot that the actual wind for the approach was a tailwind (which he likely observed on the airplane’s primary/multi-function displays), at one point noting that the tailwind was more than 20 knots. The flight crew nonetheless continued the instrument approach, and after visually identifying the runway at a height of about 300 feet above the ground, landed the airplane. Data downloaded from the airplane’s flight data recorder showed that the airplane touched down at a groundspeed exceeding 120 knots, about 10 knots faster than the airplane’s reference approach airspeed (Vref). After the airplane touched down, the pilot believed that there was a problem with the airplane’s brakes, as he received “zero feedback” despite his attempts to slow down. During the landing the copilot deployed the airplane’s speed brakes for about 6 seconds before retracting them, about the time he commented to the pilot that they should abort the landing. The pilot declined to abort and directed the copilot to deactivate the airplane’s anti-skid system with about 1/3 of the available runway remaining. With no observed change in the airplane’s braking, the pilot attempted to slow the airplane by steering it from side to side on the runway, but it ultimately the airplane departed the end of the runway. The airplane came to rest in the soft soil and grass about 150 feet beyond the runway end, substantially damaging the wings and fuselage during the excursion. After the accident, the pilot observed that the runway was wet, but that there was no standing water. Postaccident examination and testing of the airplane’s braking system revealed no evidence of any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures. Review of recorded weather information, and a witness who landed shortly after the accident flight, confirmed that after the flight crew reported obtaining the wind from the automated weather reporting system at the airport and during their final approach to the runway, the wind had shifted from a slight headwind out of the southeast to a substantial tailwind out of the northwest. Based on the comments made by the copilot during the approach, the flight crew was aware of this tailwind condition, but did not discontinue their approach in favor of landing in the opposite direction, where a headwind would have prevailed. Landing overruns typically involve multiple cumulative factors, and may include a wet runway, landing with a tailwind, and the improper use of deceleration devices. During the accident sequence, the copilot mentioned twice the presence of a tailwind, and flight data recorder information indicated that the airplane’s groundspeed was higher than normal at touchdown. Thus, the pilots failed to recognize and take action in response to performance cues that indicated that the airplane would be landing with a significant tailwind. While the flight crew had accounted for the wet runway in their preflight performance calculations, the premature stowing of the speed brakes after touchdown prevented lift from being further decreased, which would have increased the weight on the airplane’s main wheels, thereby increasing braking effectiveness. In addition, turning off the anti-skid system precluded protection from skids and likely resulted in a longer landing roll along the wet runway. In summary, the flight crew should not have attempted the landing given the prevailing wind, and their actions further exacerbated the situation when they retracted the speed brakes early and turned off the anti-skid system. This resulted in the pilots’ inability to stop the airplane on the available runway surface and the subsequent runway overrun.
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn November 1, 2020, about 1400 eastern standard time, a Raytheon 400A airplane, N456FL, operated by Georgia Jet Incorporated, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Fernandina Beach Municipal Airport (FHB), Fernandina Beach, Florida. One passenger sustained minor injuries, and the pilot, copilot, and three passengers were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air taxi flight. The flight departed from Naples Municipal Airport (APF), Naples, Florida, about 1304 in visual meteorological conditions. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), at 1337:22, while the airplane was en route to its destination, air traffic control informed the flight crewmembers that they would be entering an area of moderate-to-heavy precipitation in the next 1.5 miles and that an area of heavy-to-moderate precipitation was directly over FHB. The pilots then discussed the weather that was over the airport and the runway to use. The pilots stated that the airplane had plenty of fuel for holding if the weather over the airport did not improve before their arrival in the FHB area. At 1349:46, the flight crew requested a descent to 2,500 ft, which was approved by the controller. Upon reaching 2,500 ft, the flight crew discussed that the airplane was still in instrument meteorological conditions. The flight crew then asked the approach controller for vectors for the area navigation (RNAV) approach for runway 13. The copilot stated that, if needed, the airplane could hold at a waypoint before attempting the approach. At 1352:22, the copilot told the pilot that they should attempt the approach. The pilot agreed and noted that the reported weather was “just a little rain shower” and that he did not expect any concerns with windshear. At 1355:25, the controller cleared the airplane for the RNAV approach to runway 13. In a postaccident statement, the copilot described that he checked the automated weather observing system on the downwind leg of the approach. The wind was from about 110° at 4 knots gusting to 18 knots. Rain showers had passed over the airport before the airplane’s arrival in the FHB area. He also described that the landing data calculations were within limits for a 5,152-ft-long wet runway (based on the wind reported by the automated weather observation). At 1357:39, the flight crew performed the before landing checklist and stated that the landing gear was down and that the flaps were at 30°. At 1358:04 the copilot stated, “I got you at ref (Vref) plus 20” (the airplane’s calculated Vref speed was 110 knots). At 1358:30, the pilot stated, “we’ll probably just go hold for 15 minutes and try it again.” The copilot replied, “yeah you got a 22-knot tailwind.” The flight crew continued the approach. At 1359:05, the copilot reported 300 ft until minimums and stated that he had the runway in sight. The pilot stated he had the runway in sight and that the approach would continue. At 1359:52, the copilot stated, “speeds good. Hold whatcha got and put [the airplane] on down. Still got a tailwind.” In their post accident statements, the pilot and copilot described the subsequent landing. The copilot stated that the engine was at idle power when the airplane was 50 ft above ground level. The airplane touched down on speed, on centerline, and on aim point. The copilot deployed the speed brakes when the airplane’s speed was about 97 knots. The pilot applied the brakes, but the airplane was not decelerating normally. The pilot further described that he knew immediately that there was a problem with the brakes because he received “zero feedback.” The pilot then instructed the copilot to deactivate the anti-skid system during the final third of the runway, but the braking action did not improve. The pilot was able to reduce the airplane’s groundspeed with side-to-side steering, and then he straightened out the airplane as it departed the end of the runway. According to data retrieved from the airplane’s flight data recorder, after touchdown, ground speed was initially in excess of 120 knots. The weight on wheels switch did activate indicating that the airplane had transitioned from air to ground mode, and the speed brakes were deployed after touchdown. However, about 6-seconds after being deployed (at a ground speed of more than 100 knots), the speed brakes were retracted (at 1400:18). At 1400:11, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airplane touching down on the runway. Afterward, the pilot stated, “it won’t stop.” The copilot reported the speed as 105 knots. The pilot repeated, “it won’t stop” and “hang on.” Four alert tones, similar to the landing gear warning tone, were then recorded. The pilot stated, “anti-skid off,” and the copilot replied that the antiskid was off. The copilot stated, “go around,” and the pilot replied, “I can’t go around,” to which the copilot stated, “okay.” At 1400:35, a sound similar to the airplane departing the paved surface was recorded. After the airplane came to rest, the CVR recorded the pilot stating, “man those brakes did not work at all,” and the copilot replying, “nope.” Neither pilot reported any anomalies with the antiskid system, and no “ANTISKID FAIL” annunciation occurred during the accident flight. In his postaccident statement, the copilot described that the airplane stopped about 150 ft beyond the runway in soft soil and grass. According to the pilot, when he observed the runway after the accident it appeared wet and opaque with no standing water. The pilot also stated that there were no skid marks on the runway except in the area of the side-to-side skidding. According to a witness, who was flying his airplane about the time of the accident and landed at the airport shortly afterward, he could see some weather coming through the airport area. Air traffic control had vectored him to the west; while he was outbound on the vector, the visibility decreased to about 1/2 mile, the wind direction shifted to 340°, and the wind gusts increased to 20 to 30 knots, and heavy rain began. After landing, the witness noticed that the runway was extremely wet. According to a passenger aboard the accident airplane, during the landing, they “hit the ground” and it felt “like a push, like they were going up again.” The airplane started to slide and then went off the runway into dirt. The passenger heard the pilot say that he had no brakes. She could see the left wing dig into the dirt and thought that the airplane was going to flip over. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONWheel Brake System The main landing gear wheels were equipped with full-powered brakes operated by pressing on the rudder pedals. The brake system can work with or without the anti-skid system. Emergency braking could be accomplished through a nitrogen brake system using the emergency brake control lever, which was installed on the upper right side of the cockpit pedestal. Antiskid System The antiskid system was electrically controlled. The system detected the start of a skid condition at the wheels and automatically released the brake pressure for both wheels based on the severity of the skid. The system was activated by placing the “ANTI SKID” switch, which was located on the center pedestal, in the “ON” position. A stationary wheel speed transducer, mounted inside each main gear axle, would electrically sense any change in wheel rotation speed. As a skid was detected, an electrical signal was supplied to the system, which would then release hydraulic pressure from the brakes. With brake pressure released, the wheel speed would then increase, and hydraulic pressure would be restored to the brakes. The antiskid system would continue this cycle if the braking pressure was causing the skidding condition. The “OFF” position on the “ANTI SKID” switch would restore the system to the power brake mode after a 2- to 3-second delay. Avionics System The airplane had a Collins Pro Line 21 integrated avionics system. The system had four adaptive flight displays that showed attitude, heading, altitude, airspeed, navigation, flight control functions, and engine and systems indications. The primary flight display and multifunction display had overlays that showed weather hazards. Groundspeed was displayed in knots along the bottom of the multifunction display. Wind speed and direction were displayed on the primary flight display and the multifunction display. An arrow showed the wind direction relative to the airplane’s position. Weight and Balance Information Review of the passenger load and fuel load found that the airplane was within weight and balance limitations at the time of the accident. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONWeather at Time of Accident A trough was moving through the area near the accident site at the time of the accident. The trough helped to initiate a line of rain showers that moved eastward across the area during the period surrounding the accident. The 1355 meteorological aerodrome report for FHB indicated a southeast wind gusting to 18 knots, heavy rain, and temporary instrument meteorological conditions. The wind quickly shifted to the northwest by 1400 with gusts to 23 knots. The wind remained from the northwest through 1410. Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler indicated moderate-to-heavy precipitation over the airport before the accident, and the 1400 high-resolution rapid refresh sounding indicated downdraft or gusting surface wind up to 37 knots. Accident Weather Forecast A center weather advisory issued at 1254, which was valid through 1500, warned that areas of scattered rain showers and isolated thunderstorm could occur near the accident site. The Jacksonville International Airport (JAX), Jacksonville, Florida, terminal aerodrome forecast warned of gusting wind conditions during the time surrounding the accident. (JAX was the closest airport to the accident site with a terminal aerodrome forecast.) Pilot Weather Information The pilot stated that, before departure, he briefed the copilot of likely low-level rain showers during the arrival at FHB. While en route, the pilots discussed other potential landing options if needed because of rain shower activity. The pilot stated that he and the copilot checked the wind observations from FHB on the downwind leg only, at which time the wind was favorable for a landing from the northwest. AIRPORT INFORMATIONWheel Brake System The main landing gear wheels were equipped with full-powered brakes operated by pressing on the rudder pedals. The brake system can work with or without the anti-skid system. Emergency braking could be accomplished through a nitrogen brake system using the emergency brake control lever, which was installed on the upper right side of the cockpit pedestal. Antiskid System The antiskid system was electrically controlled. The system detected the start of a skid condition at the wheels and automatically released the brake pressure for both wheels based on the severity of the skid. The system was activated by placing the “ANTI SKID” switch, which was located on the center pedestal, in the “ON” position. A stationary wheel speed transducer, mounted inside each main gear axle, would electrically sense any change in wheel rotation speed. As a skid was detected, an electrical signal was supplied to the system, which would then release hydraulic pressure from the brakes. With brake pressure released, the wheel speed would then increase, and hydraulic pressure would be restored to the brakes. The antiskid system would continue this cycle if the braking pressure was causing the skidding condition. The “OFF” position on the “ANTI SKID” switch would restore the system to the power brake mode after a 2- to 3-second delay. Avionics System The airplane had a Collins Pro Line 21 integrated avionics system. The system had four adaptive flight displays that showed attitude, heading, altitude, airspeed, navigation, flight control functions, and engine and systems indications. The primary flight display and multifunction display had overlays that showed weather hazards. Groundspeed was displayed in knots along the bottom of the multifunction display. Wind speed and direction were displayed on the primary flight display and the multifunction display. An arrow showed the wind direction relative to the airplane’s position. Weight and Balance Information Review of the passenger load and fuel load found that the airplane was within weight and balance limitations at the time of the accident. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe nose landing gear had completely collapsed and separated from its mounting location. The nose section of the airplane was severely damaged, and the forward pressure bulkhead sustained substantial damage to the lower half of the bulkhead and deformation throughout the bulkhead. Some exterior skins were damaged, and frame damage was observed on the lower sections of several frames. Both engines had ingested mud, and foreign object damage was observed. The left-wing trailing edge was damaged from contact with the ground, and the trailing-edge skin was damaged at the center wing flap track location. The left wing flap had been pushed up into the wing, and the upper surface of the wing skin was damaged by contact with the left wing flap when it entered the wing structure. Examination of the wing alignment revealed that the alignment between the wings had shifted, which resulted in the left and right wings being asymmetric. The antiskid switch was found in the OFF position, and the emergency brake control lever was found in the OFF position with its safety wire intact. No anomalies with the brake or antiskid systems were found, and during a postaccident test they operated normally according to functional testing guidance. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONFederal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 91-79A, Mitigating the Risks of a Runway Overrun Upon Landing, indicated (in-part) that the following hazards increase the risk of a runway overrun: o delayed use of deceleration devices; o landing with a tailwind; and o a wet or contaminated runway. The AC stated the following about the effect of a tailwind on the landing distance: The effect of a tailwind on landing distance is significant and is a factor in determining the landing distance required. Given the airplane will land at a particular airspeed, independent of the wind, the principal effect of a tailwind on operational landing distance is the change in the ground speed at which the airplane touches down. The AC also stated that the effect of a tailwind would increase the landing distance by 21% for the first 10 knots of a tailwind and that tailwind landings affect all types of airplanes. Regarding wet or contaminated runways, the AC stated the following: Landing distances in manufacturers-supplied airplane flight manuals (AFM) provide performance in a flight test environment that is not necessarily representative of normal flight operations. For those operators conducting operations in accordance with specific FAA performance regulations, the operating regulations require the AFM landing distances to be factored to ensure compliance with the pre-departure landing distance regulations. These factors should account for pilot technique, wind and runway conditions, and other items stated above. Pilots and operators should also account for runway conditions at the time of arrival (TOA) to ensure the safety of the landing…. A safety margin of 15 percent should be added, and the resulting distance should be within the runway length available. The FAA considers a 15 percent margin to be the minimum acceptable safety margin…. Know you can stop within the landing distance available. The cumulative effect of the conditions that extend the airplane’s landing distance, plus the 15 percent safety margin, can be a substantial increase to the AFM/POH data, unless the pilot is aware of the items presented, and possesses the knowledge and flying discipline to mitigate the risk of a runway overrun. In addition, the AC stated the following: When the runway is wet or slippery, reverse thrust (if the airplane is equ
The flight crew's improper decision to land with a tailwind on a wet runway, which resulted in a runway overrun. Contributing to the accident was the copilot’s early retraction of the speed brakes and the pilot’s decision to turn off the anti-skid system.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
Aviation Accidents App
In-Depth Access to Aviation Accident Reports
