Honolulu, HI, USA
N810TA
BOEING 737-275C
Transair flight 810, a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 cargo flight, experienced a partial loss of power involving the right engine shortly after takeoff and a water ditching in the Pacific Ocean about 11.5 minutes later. This analysis summarizes the accident and evaluates (1) the right engine partial loss of power, (2) the captain's communications with air traffic control (ATC) and the first officer's left and right engine thrust reductions, (3) the first officer's misidentification of the affected engine and the captain's failure to verify the information, (4) checklist performance, and (5) survival factors. Maintenance was not a factor in this accident. The flight data recorder (FDR) showed that, when the initial thrust was set for takeoff, the engine pressure ratios (EPR) for the left and right engines were 2.00 and 1.97, respectively. Shortly after rotation, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded a “thud” and the sound of a low frequency vibration. The captain (the pilot monitoring at the time) and the first officer (the pilot flying) reported that they heard a “whoosh” and a “pop,” respectively, at that time. As the airplane climbed through an altitude of about 390 ft while at an airspeed of 155 knots, the right EPR decreased to 1.43 during a 2 second period. The airplane then yawed to the right; the first officer countered the yaw with appropriate left rudder pedal inputs. The CVR showed that the captain and the first officer correctly determined that the No. 2 (right) engine had lost thrust within 5 seconds of hearing the thud sound. After moving the flaps to the UP position, the captain reduced thrust to maximum continuous thrust, causing the left EPR to decrease from 1.96 to 1.91 while the airplane was in a climb. (The right EPR remained at 1.43). The captain reported that he did not move the thrust levers again until after he became the pilot flying. The first officer stated that, after the airplane leveled off at an altitude of about 2,000 ft, he reduced thrust on both engines. FDR data showed that thrust was incrementally reduced to near flight idle (1.05 EPR on the left engine and then 1.09 EPR on the right engine) and that airspeed decreased from about 250 to 210 knots. (A decrease in airspeed to 210 knots was consistent with the operator’s simulator guide procedures for a single engine failure after the takeoff decision speed [V1]. The simulator guide, which supplemented information in the company’s flight crew training manual, contained the most recent operator guidance for single-engine failure training at the time of the accident.) The captain was unaware of the first officer’s thrust changes because he was busy contacting the controller about the emergency. The captain told the controller, “we’ve lost an engine,” but he had declared the emergency to the controller twice before this point, as discussed later in this analysis. The captain instructed the first officer to maintain a target speed of 220 knots (which the captain thought would be “easy on the running engine”), a target altitude of 2,000 ft, and a target heading of 240°. (About 52 seconds earlier, the controller had issued the 240° heading instruction to another airplane on the same radio frequency.) About 3 minutes 14 seconds after the right engine loss of thrust occurred, the captain assumed control of the airplane; at that time, the airplane’s airspeed was 224 knots and heading was 242°, but the airplane’s altitude had decreased from about 2,100 ft (the maximum altitude that the airplane reached during the flight) to 1,690 ft. The captain increased the airplane’s pitch to 9°; the airplane’s altitude then increased to 1,878 ft, but the airspeed decreased to 196 knots. The captain subsequently stated, “let’s see what is the problem...which one...what's going on with the gauges,” and “who has the E-G-T [exhaust gas temperature]?” The first officer stated that the left engine was “gone” and “so we have number two” (the right engine), thus misidentifying the affected engine. The captain accepted the first officer’s assessment and did not take action to verify the information. Afterward, the EPR level on the right engine began to increase in response to the captain advancing the right thrust lever so that the airplane could maintain airspeed and altitude. Right EPR increased and decreased several times during the rest of the flight (coinciding with crew comments regarding the EGT on the right engine and low airspeed) while the left EPR remained near flight idle. The first officer asked the captain if they “should head back toward the airport” before the airplane traveled “too far away,” and the captain responded that the airplane would stay within 15 miles of the airport. During a postaccident interview, the captain stated that, because there was no fire and an engine “was running,” he intended to have the airplane climb to 2,000 ft and stay within 15 miles of the airport to avoid traffic and have time to address the engine issue. The captain also stated that he had been criticized by the company chief pilot for returning to the airport without completing the required abnormal checklist for a previous in-flight emergency. Although the captain’s decision resulted in the accident airplane flying farther away from the airport and farther over the ocean at night, the captain’s decision was reasonable for a single-engine failure event. The captain directed the first officer to begin the Engine Failure or Shutdown checklist and stated that he would continue handling the radios. The first officer began to read aloud the conditions for executing the Engine Failure or Shutdown checklist but then stopped to tell the captain that the right EGT was at the “red line” and that thrust should be reduced on the right engine. The captain then decided that the airplane should return to the airport and contacted the controller to request vectors. The flight crew continued to express concern about the right engine. The first officer stated, “just have to watch this though…the number two.” The captain asked the first officer to check the EGT for the right engine, and the first officer responded that it was “beyond max.” Afterward, the captain told the first officer to continue with the Engine Failure or Shutdown checklist and finish as much as possible. The first officer resumed reading aloud the conditions for performing the checklist but then stopped to state, “we have to fly the airplane though,” because the airplane was continuing to lose altitude and airspeed. The captain replied “okay.” As a result, the flight crew did not perform key steps of the checklist, including identifying, confirming, and shutting down the affected (right) engine. The first officer told the captain that the airplane was losing altitude; at that time, the airplane’s altitude was 592 ft, and its airspeed was 160 knots. The captain agreed to select flaps 1 (which the first officer had previously suggested likely because the airplane was slowing). The CVR then recorded the first enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) annunciation (500 ft above ground level); various EGPWS callouts and alerts continued to be annunciated through the remainder of the flight. The captain then told the controller that “we’ve lost number one [left] engine…there’s a chance we’re gonna lose the other engine too it’s running very hot….we’re pretty low on the speed it doesn't look good out here.” Also, the captain mentioned that the controller should notify the US Coast Guard (USCG) because he was anticipating a water ditching in the Pacific Ocean. Because of the high temperature readings on the right engine, the flight crew thought, at this point in the flight, that a dual-engine failure was imminent. During a postaccident interview, the captain stated that his priority at that time was figuring out how the airplane could stay in the air and return safely to the airport. The captain also stated that he attempted to resolve the airplane’s deteriorating energy state by advancing the right engine thrust lever. However, with the left engine remaining near flight idle, the right engine was not producing sufficient thrust to enable the airplane to maintain altitude or climb. The captain’s communication with the controller continued, and the first officer stated, “fly the airplane please.” The controller asked if the airport was in sight, and the captain then asked the first officer whether he could see the airport. The first officer responded “pull up we’re low” to the captain and “negative” to the controller; the captain was likely unable to respond to the controller because he was trying to control the airplane. The captain asked the first officer about the EGT for the right engine; the first officer replied “hot…way over.” The captain then asked about, and the controller responded by providing, the location of the closest airport. Afterward, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the stick shaker, which continued intermittently through the rest of the flight. The CVR then recorded sounds consistent with water impact. The aircraft performance study for this accident found that the airplane had adequate total engine thrust available to climb, accelerate, and maintain altitude both before and after the rapid decrease in right EPR to 1.43. However, as the left EPR decreased and remained below a level of 1.2 (which occurred about 35 seconds after the airplane leveled off at 2,000 ft and while the EPR on the right engine was about 1.4), total engine thrust decreased to the point that the airplane transitioned to and remained at a low energy state (that is, low total engine thrust, low airspeed, and low altitude). The flight crew relied exclusively on thrust from the damaged right engine as thrust on the left engine remained near flight idle. With this engine power configuration, the flight crew could not arrest the airplane’s descent, and the airplane was unable to maintain altitude, accelerate, or climb because the flight crew did not take the corrective action of adding left engine thrust, which was available. Right Engine Loss of Thrust and Left Engine Pressure Ratio Decrease The rotational signatures observed during postaccident examination of both engines indicated that the right engine was rotating at a much faster speed at impact than the left engine. The indications showing low rotation of the left engine core at impact were consistent with the engine operating near flight idle at that time. Postaccident examination of the left engine found no anomalies that would have caused the reduced thrust on that engine. The teardown of the right engine showed that two high-pressure turbine stage 1 blades were missing their outer spans and that both had failed from a stress rupture fracture due to oxidation and corrosion of the internal blade lightening (weight-reduction) holes, which resulted in a loss of load bearing cross section. The blade failures caused downstream (secondary) damage to the low pressure turbine, resulting in a loss of thrust, which would have been presented to the flight crew as a decrease in EPR on the right engine (along with the thud sound recorded on the CVR and the yaw to the right). Postaccident examination of the high-pressure turbine stage 1 right engine blades also revealed that they had been exposed to temperatures beyond the blades’ normal operating range, resulting in microstructure changes to the blade material. According to flight crew postaccident interviews as well as CVR evidence, the right EGT was at the top of the gauge (at or above the red line). Also, the operator’s Boeing 737 Aircraft Operations Manual stated that the maximum continuous EGT for the airplane’s engines was 540°C, but the EGT gauge was found in the wreckage indicating 700°C. Thus, the overtemperature damage on the right engine blades likely occurred during the accident flight when the engine was operated at elevated temperatures. Notification to Controller About Emergency and Engine Thrust Reductions The captain first declared an emergency to the controller about 36 seconds after the CVR recorded the thud sound; he also advised the controller to stand by. The controller responded with a routine departure clearance; thus, the controller likely did not hear or understand the captain’s transmission. About 7 seconds later, the captain again declared an emergency and advised the controller to stand by. During the 30 seconds that followed, the captain reminded the first officer to fly the airplane on a heading of 220° and level off at 2,000 ft. The controller again provided routine instructions to the flight crew about 33 seconds after the captain’s second transmission about the emergency. The captain then declared an emergency (for the third time) and stated that the airplane lost an engine and was on a 220° heading. The controller responded, “say again heading two four zero.” Immediately after issuing this instruction, the controller informed the captain that the heading was intended for another airplane. The captain did not hear, understand, or remember this transmission because he later instructed the first officer to fly the airplane on a 240° heading. The controller then cleared the accident airplane for a visual approach to the airport, and the captain informed the controller that he and the first officer had to perform a checklist and would let her know when they were ready to return to the airport. The controller then asked the captain to keep her advised. The process of declaring the emergency to ATC took 1 minute 53 seconds. During a postaccident interview, the captain stated that his communications with the controller “became a project” and that “it took a while for ATC to know what was going on” regarding the emergency. The captain added that those communications “took too much of [his] time away from the cockpit.” Although frequency congestion impeded the captain’s efforts to declare an emergency to ATC, the captain could have entered squawk code 7700 (indicating an emergency situation) into the transponder and deferred further radio communications until after the first officer stabilized the airplane in level flight. In addition, about 25 seconds after the previous exchange between the controller and captain ended, the controller asked for more information about the emergency, including which engine was affected. The operator’s simulator guide stated that, after declaring an emergency involving a single-engine failure after V1, the captain could provide additional information to ATC when time permitted. Because further communication with ATC was not a priority at that time, the captain responded appropriately to the controller by stating that he would provide the information later. The simulator guide also stated that, after declaring an emergency to ATC, selecting flaps to the UP position, reducing thrust, and establishing the airplane’s climb at 210 knots, the pilot flying was to fly, navigate, and communicate, and the pilot monitoring was to “reconfirm” the failure. However, much of the captain’s time by this point in the flight was spent listening and responding to ATC transmissions. Thus, communications between the captain and controller after the onset of the emergency caused interruptions that delayed the flight crew’s efforts to address the emergency situation. While the captain was communicating with the controller, the first officer, as the pilot flying, incrementally reduced left and then right engine thrust to near flight idle so that the airplane could slow down after leveling off. The first officer stated that he had been trained in the simulator to move the thrust levers together until the crew was ready to confirm the affected engine. Thus, the first officer’s decision to independently move the left and then the right thrust lever was inappropriate. When the captain turned his attention back to the airplane after communicating with the controller, both engines were near flight idle (the EPR was 1.05 and 1.12 for the left
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn July 2, 2021, about 0145 Hawaii-Aleutian standard time, Rhoades Aviation flight 810, dba Transair flight 810, a Boeing 737-200, N810TA, experienced an engine anomaly shortly after takeoff from Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL), Honolulu, Hawaii, and was subsequently ditched into Mamala Bay (in the Pacific Ocean), about 5.5 miles southwest of HNL. The captain sustained serious injuries, the first officer sustained minor injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. The flight was operating under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a cargo flight from HNL to Kahului International Airport (OGG), Kahului, Hawaii. The flight crew arrived at Rhoades Aviation’s flight-following office at HNL by 0015 for the flight to OGG, which was scheduled to depart at 0100. The flight was the first of the day’s six planned flight legs for the captain and first officer. According to postaccident interviews, the flight crew discussed the weather for the flight and other related information. The captain then determined the performance limitations of the airplane and provided that information to the flight follower, who in turn provided the information to the cargo load manager. The flight crewmembers monitored cargo loading activities, and the cargo load supervisor gave the crewmembers the weight and balance paperwork. The first officer conducted a preflight external inspection of the airplane. He found dried fluid that appeared to have leaked onto the right main landing gear. The first officer reported his findings to the captain, who examined the area with a mechanic. They determined that no active leak was occurring, the landing gear hydraulic reservoir had an appropriate amount of fluid, and the dried fluid was not a concern. According to the CVR, the flight crew completed the Before Engine Start checklist at 0119:33 and the Engine Start checklist at 0120:01. During a postaccident interview, the captain stated that both engines started normally. At 0123:08, the tower controller cleared the airplane to taxi to runway 8R; the flight crew reported that the airplane left the gate behind schedule because of delays with cargo loading. The flight crew began the Taxi checklist at 0124:45, and the captain recalled that the engine indications looked normal at that time. After taxiing the airplane onto the runway, the first officer recalled that he brought up the power to an EPR level of 1.4 and then asked the captain to set the thrust. The captain adjusted the thrust until the EPR indications were at the carats (an EPR level of 2.01). At 0132:20, the controller cleared the airplane for takeoff, and the first officer, who was the pilot flying, acknowledged the clearance. (The captain was the pilot monitoring.) At 0132:44, the flight crew completed the Before Takeoff checklist. The captain recalled that, during the takeoff roll, the EGT indications for both engines were at the line between the green (normal) and the yellow (caution) ranges on the displays. (The yellow range on the EGT display indicates temperatures between 520°C and 590°C; according to the Boeing 737 Aircraft Operations Manual, the maximum continuous EGT was 540°C.) During a postaccident interview, the captain stated that he had seen that EGT position during previous takeoffs and thus considered it to be normal. According to the FDR, the engines were advanced to takeoff power starting at 0133:08, and both engines stabilized at an EPR consistent with takeoff; specifically, the No. 1 (left) engine was at 2.00 EPR, and the No. 2 (right) engine was at 1.97 EPR. According to the CVR, at 0133:13, the captain stated, “engines stable.” Between 0133:35 and 0133:46, the captain made the standard takeoff callouts, including “V1,” “rotate,” “V2” (takeoff safety speed), and “positive rate,” and the first officer made the callout “gear up.” The airplane flew a heading of 080°. At 0133:52, the CVR recorded the sound of a “thud.” Starting about 2.5 seconds later, the CVR recorded the sound of a low-frequency vibration, the first officer stating an expletive, the captain stating “lost (an) engine,” and both pilots noting that the right engine had lost power. FDR data showed that, as the airplane climbed through an altitude of about 390 ft mean sea level (all altitudes in this report are mean sea level unless stated otherwise) while the airplane was at an airspeed of 155 knots, the EPR for the right engine dropped suddenly to 1.43; the EPR for the left engine remained at a level of about 2.00. (The only engine parameter that the accident FDR recorded was EPR.) The left rudder pedal then moved to a position consistent with the application of about 5.5° of left rudder. During postaccident interviews, the crewmembers recalled that the airplane yawed to the right and that the first officer corrected the yaw with the left rudder pedal. In addition, when the loss of thrust on the right engine occurred, the airplane banked 2° to the left; immediately afterward, the airplane banked 3° to the right. About 0134:22, the captain stated, “I’ll give you flaps up,” and the first officer acknowledged this statement. During a postaccident interview, the captain stated that, after setting the flaps, he reduced thrust to maximum continuous thrust. FDR data showed that, during a 2.6-second period ending about 0134:28, the EPR for the left engine decreased from 1.96 to 1.91. The captain’s initial notification to the controller about the emergency occurred at 0134:29; at the end of that transmission, the captain stated, “stand by.” The controller responded with a routine departure instruction, after which the captain again declared an emergency and repeated “stand by.” The captain then told the first officer that the airplane should climb to and level off at 2,000 ft (the airplane was at an altitude of 1,200 ft at that time) and fly a 220° heading. At 0135:16, the controller again provided the flight crew with routine instructions. One second later, the airplane reached its maximum altitude of 2,107 ft. Also at that time, the EPR on the left engine began incrementally decreasing from 1.91 to 1.83, 1.53, and 1.23 during the next 1 minute 17 seconds. At 0135:35, the captain told the controller about the emergency for the third time, stating, “we’ve lost an engine…we are on a two twenty heading…maintaining two thousand [ft]…declaring emergency.” About that time, the airplane’s airspeed reached a maximum of about 252 knots. After this transmission, the CVR recorded the controller stating, “say again heading two four zero.” Immediately after issuing this instruction, the controller informed the captain that the heading was intended for another airplane on the same radio frequency. At 0135:55, the controller cleared the airplane for a visual approach to runway 4R at HNL and stated that the airplane could turn toward the airport. The captain responded, “we’re gonna have to run a checklist” and “we’ll let you know when we’re ready to come into the airport.” At 0136:08, the controller asked the flight crew to keep her advised, and the captain acknowledged the transmission. The exchange between the captain and the controller ended at 0136:22. While that exchange was occurring, the EPR for the left engine decreased to 1.05 (at 0135:56), which was consistent with a power level near flight idle. The EPR for the left engine remained at this level for the remainder of the flight; 8 seconds later, the EPR for the right engine began to decrease below a level of about 1.4. At 0136:20, the airplane began to descend from 2,000 ft, reaching an altitude of 1,659 ft before beginning to climb again. At 0136:34, the captain stated, “two forty heading.” About 13 seconds later, the controller requested more information about the flight, including which engine was affected, and the captain responded, “we'll give you all that in a little bit.” At 0137:06, the captain stated that the airplane should maintain an airspeed of 220 knots. During a postaccident interview, the captain stated that the 220-knot airspeed would be “easy on the running engine.” FDR data showed that, at 0137:09, the EPR for the right engine reached 1.09, which was also consistent with a power level near flight idle. At 0137:13, the captain announced his intention to take control of the airplane, which the first officer acknowledged. FDR data showed that the airplane’s altitude at the time was 1,690 ft and that its airspeed was 224 knots. At 0137:36, the captain stated, “let's trim this up at two thousand [ft]”; at that time, the airplane’s altitude was 1,878 ft and airspeed was 196 knots. Four seconds later, the captain stated, “let’s see what is the problem…which one…what’s going on with the gauges,” and “who has the E-G-T?” The first officer stated, “it looks like the number one [engine].”About that time, the EPR on the left and right engines was 1.05 and 1.12, respectively. At 0137:54, the captain asked, “number one is gone?” The first officer replied that the left engine was “gone” and that “we have number two”; at 0137:58, the captain repeated “we have number two” and stated “okay.” Between 0137:59 and 0138:10, the right EPR level (which had been slowly increasing after reaching a level of 1.09) increased quickly from 1.12 to 1.18. At 0138:16, the first officer asked, “should we head back toward the airport…before we get too far away?” The captain responded that the airplane would stay within 15 miles of the airport. During a postaccident interview, the captain recalled that he intended to climb the airplane to 2,000 ft and stay 15 miles from HNL to avoid traffic and have time to address the engine issue. He also recalled that there was no need to rush because there was no fire and an engine “was running.” The captain called for the “engine failure shutdown checklist” and then stated, “I have the radios.” At 0138:43, the captain notified the controller that the airplane could turn to the right toward the airport but that he was not yet ready to land, and the controller provided instructions for the airplane to fly a 250° heading, which the captain acknowledged. At 0138:56, the right EPR reached 1.22. Two seconds later, the first officer stated, “engine failure engine flameout or another checklist directs an engine failure.” This information was consistent with the conditions for executing the Engine Failure or Shutdown checklist (see the Organizational and Management Information section of this report.) The first officer then stated, “we’re red line here” and “we should pull the right [thrust lever] back a little bit.” At 0139:10, the captain stated that the airplane should head toward HNL, and the first officer agreed. The captain then instructed the first officer to set up the airplane for the instrument landing system approach to runway 4R. At 0139:18 and 0139:24, the captain informed the controller that the airplane was ready to proceed toward the airport and that he did not have the airport in sight, respectively. At 0139:46, the captain requested vectors straight to the airport and informed the controller that “we might lose the other engine too.” At 0139:56, the EPR on the right engine began to decrease from 1.22. At 0140:05, the first officer stated, “just have to watch this…the number two [engine].” At 0140:10, the right EPR reached 1.18. One second later, the airplane’s altitude and airspeed were 1,050 ft and 157 knots, respectively, and the CVR recorded sounds lasting 1.8 seconds that might have been associated with the stick shaker. The captain stated something similar to “what’s this” and then “we can’t keep going down,” and the first officer noted that the airplane was descending. Between 0140:12 and 0140:27, the right EPR increased from 1.18 to 1.37, the airplane’s airspeed increased to 172 knots and altitude decreased to 680 ft, and the first officer stated, “we’re descending” and “we have to climb.” At 0140:30, the captain asked the first officer to check that the airplane was “cleaned up”; at that time, the airplane began to slowly climb from 632 ft. The first officer stated that the flaps were up, and he started to report the status of the speedbrakes when the captain stated, “how is the EGT?” The first officer replied, “it’s beyond max.” The airplane’s airspeed began to drop below 170 knots, and the right EPR decreased from 1.37 to 1.33 during a 2-second period. At 0140:41, the captain stated, “we’re barely holding altitude…see what you can do in the checklist finish as much as possible.” By 0140:48, the airplane’s airspeed had decreased to 165 knots, and its altitude began to descend from 682 ft. Five seconds later, the first officer resumed the checklist by stating, “airframe vibrations abnormal engines exist.” Step 1 of the Engine Failure or Shutdown checklist prompted flight crews to determine whether they should continue with this checklist or instead use the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation checklist. The first officer continued, “it says do the engine shutdown only when flight conditions” but interrupted this thought to state, “we have to fly the airplane though.” At that time, the airplane’s airspeed was 159 knots and altitude was 614 ft. The captain replied, “okay.” At 0141:10, the first officer stated, “we’re losing altitude”; at that time, the airplane was at an altitude of 592 ft and an airspeed of 160 knots. Between 0141:14 and 0141:17, the right EPR increased from 1.33 to 1.36. About 3 seconds later, the controller instructed the crew to fly a heading of 050°; the first officer acknowledged this instruction at 0141:22. Starting at 0141:46, the first officer asked the captain whether the flaps 1 setting should be used, and the captain responded “not yet.” The first officer then stated that the airplane was “very slow,” to which the captain responded, “shoot…okay flaps one.” At 0141:58 and 0142:00, the CVR recorded the EGPWS annunciations “five hundred [feet above ground level]” and “too low gear,” respectively. At 0142:05, the captain told the controller, “we’ve lost [the] number one engine…we’re coming straight to the airport…we’re gonna need the fire department there’s a chance we’re gonna lose the other engine too it’s running very hot.” The captain further stated, “we’re pretty low on the speed it doesn’t look good out here…you might want to let the Coast Guard know as well.” Afterward, the captain informed the controller that the airplane had no hazardous material and about 2 hours of fuel and that he and the first officer were the only occupants aboard. In between those transmissions, the first officer stated, “fly the airplane please,” which was followed by the EGPWS annunciations “too low terrain,” “too low gear,” and “terrain terrain.” At 0142:45, the captain asked the first officer if he had the airport in sight, which was followed by the EGPWS annunciation “pull up” and the first officer’s statement, “pull up we’re low.” The EGPWS annunciations continued throughout the rest of the flight. At 0142:50, the controller asked whether the crew had the airport in sight, and the first officer stated “negative.” The controller informed the flight crew about a low-altitude alert for the airplane and asked whether the airplane was able to climb. The first officer again stated “negative.” Between 0142:58 and 0143:02, the right EPR increased from 1.33 to 1.45 and remained between 1.45 and 1.47 for the rest of the flight. Between 0143:00 and 0143:06, the controller stated that the airplane should proceed directly to the airport on a heading of 060° and cleared the airplane to land on any airport runway. At 0143:24, the captain told the controller that the airplane “cannot maintain altitude.” Between 0143:35 and 0143:41, the first officer stated, “pull back we've got a climb” and “pull back to the stick shaker,” and the captain stated, “shoot three hundred feet.” At
The flight crewmembers’ misidentification of the damaged engine (after leveling off the airplane and reducing thrust) and their use of only the damaged engine for thrust during the remainder of the flight, resulting in an unintentional descent and forced ditching in the Pacific Ocean. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s ineffective crew resource management, high workload, and stress.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
Aviation Accidents App
In-Depth Access to Aviation Accident Reports
